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ABSTRACT 
 
CULTIVATING EMPIRE: INDIANS, QUAKERS, AND THE NEGOTIATION OF 
AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, 1754-1846 
 
Lori J. Daggar 
 
Daniel K. Richter 
 
 
 
This dissertation examines the ways in which indigenous peoples and 
missionaries, specifically Quakers (Society of Friends), contributed to the development of 
the American empire in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The U.S. civilization 
plan, in which Friends were central participants, offered agricultural education to 
American Indian men and, for women, instruction in the “domestic arts” as part of a 
broader mission complex. Far from being simply a means to “assimilate the Indians,” the 
mission complex was central to U.S. imperial and economic development, and its 
methods, endurance, and character grew out of a particular historical moment and as the 
result of a negotiation of Indians’ and Euroamericans’ goals and motivations. In order to 
investigate that negotiation, “Cultivating Empire” follows the evolution of diplomacy and 
agricultural mission work in the Ohio Country as a case study, and it draws upon 
individuals’ journals, family papers, account books and receipts, as well as missionary 
correspondences, meeting minutes from the Society of Friends, and various papers of 
federal, state, and territorial governments. Reading Euroamerican-produced sources 
against the grain in conjunction with sources such as Hendrick Aupaumut’s (Mohican) 
invaluable journals, moreover, offers means to bring indigenous politics to bear on this 
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history, and it offers a top-down and bottom-up glimpse of the making of American 
empire. Such work reveals that the Society of Friends and its members, and their 
cooperation with the U.S. federal government, in many ways established the paradigm for 
the United States’ model of “philanthropic” empire beginning in the late eighteenth 
century. It also demonstrates that the society’s work was foundational for the 
development of the federal government’s relationship with non-governmental 
organizations and imperial policies abroad. Quaker diplomacy and agricultural missions 
also, however, offered Native peoples a powerful discourse and innovative means to 
continue to negotiate for power into the twenty-first century. U.S. state officials, Quaker 
missionaries, Euroamerican immigrants, and indigenous peoples together, then, produced 
the paradigms of U.S. empire in North America and the world in ways that had lasting 
consequences. 
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Introduction!
 
In 1831, a young French aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville, traversed the Atlantic 
to visit the United States. He traveled widely, taking in all that he could, and in 1835, he 
published the first volume of a revealing portrait of the republic in its adolescence. In his 
famous Democracy in America, Tocqueville devoted hundreds of pages to descriptions of 
American political structures, economics, and reform efforts, as well as to the plights of 
African Americans and American Indians. With regards to the latter, the Frenchman 
explained that “[t]he Spaniards, despite acts of unparalleled monstrousness that left them 
indelibly covered with shame, were unable to exterminate the Indian race or even prevent 
the Indians from sharing their rights. The Americans of the United States achieved both 
results with marvelous ease, quietly, legally, philanthropically, without bloodshed, 
without violating a single one of the great principles of morality in the eyes of the world. 
To destroy human beings with greater respect for the laws of humanity would be 
impossible.”1 
Tocqueville’s assessment of U.S. Indian affairs implicitly acknowledged a 
fundamental truth: Americans, like imperial Spaniards, exacted violence over North 
American indigenous peoples. According to the Frenchman, however, Americans did so 
“philanthropically.” Beginning in the late eighteenth century, Americans set out to 
“civilize,” through agricultural education, American Indians who, due to their supposed 
“savage” and “barbaric” state, “misused” North America’s bountiful lands. Tocqueville 
insisted that the civilizing process made way for the rapid proliferation of American 
                                                
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated by Arthur Goldhammer (New York: 
Penguin Putnam, Inc., 2004), 391. 
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democracy, and that it was a humane alternative to the depravity that characterized 
Spanish imperial policies. For him, the United States’ method for dealing with its “Indian 
problem,” though harsh, nonetheless offered a means to avoid the “indelible shame” 
attributed to the Spaniards’ brutality.  
Many Americans, particularly missionaries, did not consider efforts to “civilize” 
Native peoples to be quite so vicious. They instead viewed such policies to be the most 
enlightened way to tackle a problem of immense proportions. Peaceful diplomacy and 
then axes, ploughs, and fences, they argued, were the best defenses against indigenous 
peoples’ “extinction.” U.S. officials and settlers too gave voice to these ideas, though 
they added their own motivations and reasoning to their arguments. Civilizing policies 
could save an entire race, but they could also facilitate nation-building and territorial 
acquisition, as well as create new consumers and debtors. Though Americans’ goals and 
motivations differed, most saw philanthropy—if not philanthropic violence—as central to 
their national project. Ultimately, however, as Tocqueville’s statement suggests, acts and 
rhetoric of philanthropy offered means by which to obscure the cultural, economic, and 
political carnage of American settler colonialism and imperialism, and they were 
fundamental to the making and endurance of American empire. 
 
* * * 
“Cultivating Empire” seeks to understand the roots, contingencies, and 
consequences of U.S. empire-building in North America. Before the United States 
became a global imperial power, it was a continental empire. Americans used Native 
lands to develop their own economy, exported social and cultural ideals, and framed their 
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political ascendency in North America in dialogue with Indians’ political and economic 
dependence and decline—decline that was often fictional. And they did so with 
missionary assistance and in ways that obscured the mechanisms and processes of their 
imperialism. Agricultural mission work, part of the federal government’s civilization 
plan, was one such mechanism. Ideas of “savagery” and Native peoples’ supposed misuse 
of abundant lands—as well as Americans’ land hunger—prompted George Washington’s 
Secretary of War Henry Knox to conceive of a plan to civilize the Indians in 1789. His 
plan, and the federal government’s eventual partnership with missionary societies, 
became the cornerstone of U.S. Indian policies in the nineteenth and into the twentieth 
century. The plan’s longevity was not, however, preordained. The primary goal of the 
plan was to educate American Indians in the ways of agriculture for males and “domestic 
arts” such as spinning and weaving for females in order to make way for American 
territorial acquisition. The plan’s methods, endurance, and character, however, grew out 
of a particular historical moment and as a result of a negotiation of goals and motivations.  
Despite the civilization plan’s goal to assimilate Native peoples and thus eradicate 
their culture, indigenous peoples of North America did not succumb to the fates assigned 
them by Tocqueville and Euroamericans more generally; they did not fall to extinction, 
and they did not disappear. Rather, they influenced the character of U.S. Indian policies 
and of American imperialism. Indeed, the emergence of the civilization plan itself was, in 
part, due to Native peoples’ persistence. After years of violence during both the periods 
of European and American colonization, the struggling American republic, equipped with 
a still-small state apparatus, needed an Indian policy that cut the financial and human 
costs of war. Knox developed his understanding of Indian affairs in the context of 
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conflict, and he, like others, understood the practicalities involved in attempting to 
colonize a vast array of still-powerful peoples. Endemic violence in the eighteenth 
century and armies of united Indians in the 1790s thwarted American dreams of 
conquering North America quickly and efficiently. Those Native peoples who avoided 
war—but nonetheless maintained their own politics and ways of living—offered the 
United States equal amounts of frustration. Knox thus conceived of his plan to civilize 
Native peoples in 1789 in the midst of Native-produced obstruction. Recognition of that 
fact forces us to consider the limits of U.S. state power and the ways in which that power 
grew together with the breadth of indigenous authority in eastern North America during 
the era of the early republic.  
Agricultural education was, on paper, at the heart of the civilization plan, with 
other goals including the spread of Christianity and, sometimes, literacy. Central to the 
plan were missionaries—members of the Moravian church, Presbyterians, Methodists, 
and, most often in the early years of the nineteenth century, Quakers. Indeed, thanks to 
their own expertise and interest in Indian affairs, Knox found an able partner in the 
Society of Friends (Quakers), and Friends’ relationship with the federal government 
proved long-lasting. The clerks of Friends’ Indian concerns committees were the War 
Department’s frequent correspondents beginning in the late eighteenth century, and 
Friends offered diplomatic support and performed the work of establishing and 
maintaining agricultural missions in both New York State among the Haudenosaunee 
peoples and in the Ohio Country, among the Shawnees, Miamis, Delawares, Wyandots, 
and their neighbors. Friends divided their labors into two distinct jurisdictions: 
Philadelphia Friends missionized in Haudenosaunee Country, while Baltimore Friends 
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worked among the various Ohio Indians. The Society of Friends’ political structure 
facilitated its partnership with the U.S. War Department, and it likewise lent organization 
to the society’s philanthropic efforts in Indian Country. The society was organized in a 
series of hierarchical “meetings,” with yearly meetings serving as the umbrella 
organization for smaller, more local monthly meetings. The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting 
corresponded with the Baltimore Yearly Meeting regularly after the latter’s establishment 
in 1795, and both corresponded with the London Yearly Meeting on the topic of 
civilizing Native peoples.  
The Society of Friends and its members, and their cooperation with the U.S. 
Federal government, in many ways established the paradigm for the United States’ model 
of “philanthropic” “destruction” beginning in the late eighteenth century. Friends 
performed diplomatic work alongside U.S. officials, and they received public lands and 
funds for their missions. Friends corresponded with federal and state officials, shared 
information about local Indian politics, and offered their labor in mission spaces. In 
return, they received financial support as well as explicit endorsements, often from the 
secretary of war or the president, that facilitated both traveling to mission sites and 
striking partnerships with regional Indian agents. After years of working with Friends, the 
U.S. government institutionalized its partnership with missionary societies in 1819 with 
the passage of the Civilization Act, which guaranteed $10,000 annually for missionary 
endeavors in Indian Country. Another prominent missionary society, the American Board 
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), established in 1810, followed the 
Quaker model of agricultural education, and they continued, like the Friends, to work at 
home and abroad into the twentieth century.  
 
 
6 
Analyzing the formation of the partnership between the U.S. government and the 
Society of Friends is foundational for understanding the United States’ humanitarian 
work in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Framing the partnership in this way 
encourages scholars to abandon the tendency to treat Friends’ mission efforts in 
isolation.2 Indeed, the case of the Society of Friends offers a means to explore the early 
foundations of federal relationships with what would later be termed non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), as well as the roles of NGOs in imperial development. While the 
term may appear, at first blush, an anachronism, members of the Society of Friends were 
non-government individuals who were, nonetheless, quasi-state actors, and they 
performed work similar to that of later and present-day NGOs—many of which, like the 
Friends, received government funds. The Society of Friends brought to its agricultural 
mission work ideas regarding civility, religion, race, gender, class, and education. Friends 
also, however, compromised their own religious tenets—namely, distancing oneself from 
the affairs of worldly governments—to take advantage of the benefits that federal support 
offered—money, intelligence, and personnel support. The personnel, financial, and 
political ties that grew between Friends and the U.S. government in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century established a paradigm for Indian policies, and they proved 
                                                
2 The movement toward cultural and social histories in the 1970s and 1980s enabled historians to 
view missions—correctly—as sites of cultural negotiation. That rich scholarship offers a jumping 
off point for a renewed look at Friends—and missionaries more broadly—and Native Americans’ 
connections with broader political and economic developments. For studies of Friends’ missions, 
see Jill Kinney, "'Letters, Pen, and Tilling the Field': Quaker Schools Among the Seneca Indians 
on the Allegany River, 1798-1852" (Ph.D. diss., University of Rochester, 2009); Diane 
Rothenberg, "Friends Like These: An Ethnohistorical Analysis of the Interaction Between 
Allegany Senecas and Quakers, 1798-1823" (Ph.D. diss., City College of New York, 1976). 
Matthew Dennis’s Seneca Possessed begins the work of connecting Quaker missions to broader 
political phenomena. Matthew Dennis, Seneca Possessed: Indians, Witchcraft, and Power in the 
Early American Republic (Philadelphia, 2010). 
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crucial both to the political and economic growth of the American imperial state and to 
the cultivation of a U.S. reputation of moral authority.3  
That reputation was often grounded in ideas of humanitarianism, mercy, and 
charity, and, as work by Ian Tyrrell demonstrates, it remained a central concern of the 
United States in the world into the twentieth century and, indeed, to present day.4 Moral 
authority was a means by which to claim political authority on the international stage, 
and that linkage between morality and political power reached back, as Tocqueville 
makes clear, to the days when the “Black Legend” soured the Spanish Empire’s 
reputation. Nonetheless, the emergence of Friends’ partnership with the federal 
government reveals that a seemingly simple question remains: why did the particular way 
in which Americans endeavored to spread “civilization”—agricultural education carried 
out by a combination of missionary, Native, and U.S. state agents—gain such purchase in 
the United States in the first place?  
As the following pages make clear, notions of “civilizing” Native peoples were 
grounded in differing opinions and motivations, practicalities, and contingencies, and the 
                                                
3 Friends’ work in Indian Country differed little from other ventures, described as NGO efforts, in 
other locales. In a 2002 study funded by the United States Agency for International Development, 
Bureau for Africa, for example, the authors write that “[t]he involvement of NGOs in education 
can be traced from the end of the 19th Century when missionaries introduced formal education in 
the country. The main aim of schooling was to spread Christianity but apart form [sic] teaching 
the bible the schools which were opened also offered lessons such as reading, writing, counting, 
carpentry, brick laying and needlecraft.” The authors note that government funding for such 
efforts grew as the twentieth century progressed. See Esme Chipo Kadzamira and Demis Kunje, 
“The Changing Roles of Non-Governmental Organisations in Education in Malawi,” (Zomba, 
Malawi: Centre for Educational Research and Training, University of Malawi, 2002), IV-V. Julie 
Hearn offers a starting point for understanding twentieth and twenty-first-century missionary 
organizations as “invisible” NGOs. See Julie Hearn, “The ‘Invisible’ NGO: US Evangelical 
Missions in Kenya,” Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol. 32, Fasc. 1 Christian and Islamic Non-
Governmental Organizations in Contemporary Africa (Feb., 2002), 32-60. 
4 Ian Tyrrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America’s Moral Empire (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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actual policies of civilization, Indian affairs, and empire-building more generally were 
marked by negotiation. Scholars Francis Paul Prucha, Bernard Sheehan, and Reginald 
Horsman point to ideas of Christian humanitarianism and race as the primary factors in 
determining U.S. Indian policies, but such interpretations omit other defining 
developments that marked the early republican period.5 Both ideas of Christian 
humanitarianism and race played key roles in creating Indian policies, but both were also 
tools employed by the U.S. state and its citizens to meet a certain end, namely, to build a 
powerful empire that stretched to—and beyond—the Pacific. Some Americans firmly 
believed that civilization and even Indian removal were humanitarian policies, others 
cared less about ideas of humanity and more about the growth of U.S. power in North 
America and the world. All, however, grappled with ideas regarding moral authority—
indeed, even the self-interested employed a discourse of humanity—and all were 
complicit in processes of settler colonialism and empire-building. The question of how 
such a discourse developed to become a viable defense of some of the harshest of U.S. 
Indian policies—including removal—is an important one.  
So too are questions regarding the consequences of that discourse’s development. 
At the heart of the civilization plan was Americans’ need to build their republic, both 
politically and economically. Indeed, U.S. Indian policies were inseparable from larger 
efforts of state-building, and they were, as a result, influenced by those efforts. Costly 
                                                
5 Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American 
Indians, 2 vols. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1984); Reginald Horsman, Race and 
Manifest Destiny: Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1981); Bernard W. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and 
the American Indian (Chapel Hill, NC: Published for the Institute of Early American History and 
Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia by The University of North Carolina Press, 1973). 
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war with Britain in the American Revolution combined with the struggle to build a 
system of taxation that most Americans could accept. Episodes such as Shays’s Rebellion 
made clear that the taxation issue was not an easy one to reconcile for many Americans, 
and subsequently economic issues were on the forefront of citizens’ minds. 
Unsurprisingly, Indian policies such as the civilization plan and removal were bound up 
in the context of state formation and economic development. 
Indeed, one of the central claims of “Cultivating Empire” is that agricultural 
mission work ultimately contributed to the development of the U.S. market economy and 
the entrenchment of ideas that both accompanied and facilitated the growth of market 
capitalism. Missionaries’ labors were part of a mission complex, a web of networks that 
linked urban manufacturers and their wares—the axes, hoes, and ploughs required for 
farming—with Indian consumers, interior lands, and growing markets. Missions required 
goods that, in turn, bolstered American manufacturing and consumerism, often at the 
expense of Native peoples’ once more global economic ties with a variety of polities. 
Ideas of poverty, morality, and charity, meanwhile, also played a large role in defining 
Indian policies, and they were bolstered by the complex’s development. As historian 
Michael Katz argues, the connection between virtue and success accompanied the 
“transition to capitalism” in the early republic.6 Drawing connections between these 
ideas, cultivated, in part, in the republic’s urban spaces enables us to link Indian policies 
and Native peoples’ histories more fully with the social, economic, and political history 
of the early republic.  
                                                
6 Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 14. 
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Early Americans themselves understood the situations of Native Americans, 
African Americans, and laboring peoples as connected and in dialogue with one another. 
Missionaries compared the civilization plan as akin to the colonization plan that 
endeavored to send free African Americans to Liberia, while Baltimore Friends perceived 
Ohio Indians, and explicitly wrote about them, in ways that drew upon their experiences 
living among the enslaved and wage laborers of the city. Agricultural mission work 
among Native peoples, then, was bound up in the ideas and developments of the republic 
at large. 
Approaching the problem of the development of U.S. Indian policy in such a 
wide-reaching way enables us to wed the histories of U.S.-Indian relations with the 
broader narratives of early American history. Too often, analyses of U.S. Indian policy—
and, indeed, Native Americans’ histories in general—remain divorced from the larger 
story. But framing Indian policy against the backdrop of state formation and market 
development offers a means by which we can better understand the contingencies of 
policy development as well as the way in which Native peoples, their politics, and U.S. 
Indian affairs influenced the development of early American economics, politics, and 
social hierarchies, analysis that is rarely undertaken by scholars of the early republic.7 
                                                
7 Indeed, though scholars increasingly understand slavery as fundamental to the development of 
the early American economy, most histories neglect the ways in which peoples and policies in 
Indian Country affected the development of the U.S. market economy in the early republic. For 
classic understandings of economic development, see Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: 
Jacksonian America, 1815-1848 (Oxford, 1991); Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: 
The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (Oxford, 2009); James A. Henretta, The Origins of 
American Capitalism, Collected Essays (Boston, 1991); Christopher Clark, The Roots of Rural 
Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860 (Ithaca, 1992). For recent work on slavery and 
capitalism, see Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton 
Kingdom (Cambridge, 2013); Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the 
Making of American Capitalism (New York, 2014); Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global 
 
 
11 
Market development, in many ways, gave Indian policies their character, as did the goals 
and motivations of Native peoples, missionaries, settlers, and U.S. officials. But efforts in 
Indian Country also profoundly influenced the development of the United States. 
Missionaries’ agricultural work, diplomacy, and influence offered a blueprint for the 
development of U.S. foreign relations in places like Hawaii, Alaska, and Liberia.8 The 
emphasis on agricultural production and the consumption of American manufactures in 
Indian Country, meanwhile, expanded the U.S. market economy and further encouraged 
the intertwined development of both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of the 
American economy—an intertwining that men like Tench Coxe and Thomas Jefferson 
debated in the years of the early republic.9 Such economic growth contributed to the 
growth of the federal state and the American empire. 
                                                
History (New York: Knopf, 2014). For calls to include Native peoples in broader economic 
histories, see Stephen Aron, "The Significance of the Frontier in the Transition to Capitalism," in 
Christopher Clark, ed., "The Transition to Capitalism in America: A Panel Discussion," The 
History Teacher, Vol. 27, No. 3 (May, 1994), 263-288; Alexandra Harmon, Colleen O'Neill, and 
Paul C. Rosier, "Interwoven Economic Histories: American Indians in a Capitalist America," The 
Journal of American History, (December 2011), 698-722. 
8 Ideas of agricultural education and civilization were centerpieces of missions abroad in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well. Like Friends, missionaries abroad also brought to their 
work their own ideas regarding the role of governments. Merze Tate notes antagonisms between 
missionaries and government officials and that members of the Sandwich Island Missions (the 
ABCFM in Hawaii) exercised a good deal of influence over policy in Hawaii. They 
communicated with government officials regarding officers and officials and policies in Hawaii, 
and acted as a kind of “watchdog” group in the islands. Merze Tate, “U.S. Diplomacy: Influence 
of Sandwich Island Missionaries and the ABCFM,” Oregon Historical Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 1 
(Mar., 1967), 53-74; Nicholas E. Flanders, "Missionaries and Professional Infidels: Religion and 
Government in Western Alaska," Arctic Anthropology, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1991), 44-62; Emily 
Conroy-Krutz, Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic 
(The United States in the World) (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2015). 
9 Coxe was an ardent supporter of an economy that married manufacturing and farming interests. 
Jefferson, on the other hand, envisioned a thoroughly agrarian republic. [Coxe, Tench], 
Observations on the Agriculture, Manufactures and Commerce of the United States (New York, 
Childs & Swaine, 1789); Jacob E. Cooke, "Tench Coxe, Alexander Hamilton, and the 
Encouragement of American Manufactures," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 
32, no. 3 (July 1975), 369-392; Jacob E. Cooke, Tench Coxe and the Early Republic (Chapel Hill, 
University of North Carolina Press, 1978). Jefferson offered his clearest articulation of his 
 
 
12 
Understanding Friends’ partnership with the federal government as fundamental 
to the growth of American empire also adds to a growing historiographical corrective. Ian 
Tyrrell’s work, like many works by scholars of empire and American foreign relations, 
suggests that the United States built its moral empire at the end of the nineteenth century. 
A burgeoning literature, including works on North American settler colonialism, 
demonstrates, however, that such a timeline obscures the United States’ imperial 
beginnings.10 Bethel Saler’s study on settler colonialism in Wisconsin Territory, for 
example, suggests that families, missionaries, and even ground-level U.S. officials were 
complicit in the haphazard development of the republic’s territories.11 By examining the 
important role of the state in such processes, “Cultivating Empire” ultimately suggests 
instead that it was often on the edges of empire where the federal state strove to exercise 
the most power. Thus not only does Friends’ relationship with the federal government 
reveal that Americans’ territorial and “moral empire” emerged in the late eighteenth 
century, but it also demonstrates that the federal state employed various agents—both 
state and non-state—in an effort to carry out its policies. This endeavor had mixed 
results, thanks to actors’ own motivations and goals,  but nonetheless, Quakers’ 
                                                
agrarian idealism in Notes on a State of Virginia. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on a State of 
Virginia in Merrill D. Peterson, ed., Thomas Jefferson: Writings: Autobiography/Notes on the 
State of Virginia/Public and Private Papers/Addresses/Letters (Library of America) (New York: 
Penguin Putnam, Inc., 1984), 123-325. See also Peter S. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language 
of American Nationhood (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2000). 
10 Recent works seek to remedy this oversight. See Emily Conroy-Krutz, Christian Imperialism; 
Eliga H. Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a 
New World Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Walter Johnson, River of 
Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2013); Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 
1673-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
11 Bethel Saler, The Settlers’ Empire: Colonialism and State Formation in America’s Old 
Northwest (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). 
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partnership with the U.S. government offers a compelling means to analyze how and why 
missionaries and cultural imperialism more broadly became vital components of the 
American empire, and it forces us to understand Americans’ empire as one built upon 
foundations of both settler colonialism and federal state power and initiative.12 Indeed, 
the American empire that occupies a central place in these pages was not an all-powerful 
behemoth but rather one built upon reciprocal relations of power.13 It was also one built 
upon popular narrative fictions of humanitarianism and indigenous “dependence.”14 This 
perspective on power and discourse facilitates a simultaneously “top-down” and “bottom-
up” exploration of the ways in which U.S. officials, missionaries, Euroamerican settlers, 
and Native Americans each played a role in the making of American empire. 
 
                                                
12 Indeed, Patrick Wolfe contends that missions were among the “positive outcomes of the logic 
of elimination” in that they endeavored to create “a new colonial society on the expropriated land 
base.” See Patrick Wolfe, “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” Journal of 
Genocide Research, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December, 2006), 387-409, quotation 388. For recent work on 
settler colonialism see Saler, The Settlers’ Empire; Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction 
and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-1836 (Harvard Historical Studies) 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
13 Much of my understanding of empire is based upon a number of scholars’ works. See, for 
example, Amy Kaplan, The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture (Cambridge, 2002); 
Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power (Berkeley, 2002); Ann Laura Stoler, 
ed., Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History (Durham, 2006); 
Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867 
(Chicago, 2002). 
“Cultivating Empire” also draws upon Michel Foucault’s theories of power and supposes 
that ideas and social assumptions facilitate the emergence of social, economic, and political 
hierarchies. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-
1977, Colin Gordon, ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); Michel Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Alan Sheridan, ed., 2nd edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1995, 
1977). 
14 Theorist Lorenzo Veracini notes the importance of narratives in settler colonial societies. Key 
among those narratives is a disavowal of violence. In the United States, Americans obscured the 
violence of their project with ideas of humanitarianism. Veracini also points to Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America as being a settler colonial text. See Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: 
A Theoretical Overview (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 76-86, 95-104. 
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* * * 
Bernard Sheehan wrote in 1973 that “[b]ooks about Indian-white relations are 
usually confined to the description of the white man’s policy and Indian’s reaction.”15 
And, indeed, beginning in the 1970s, historian Francis Paul Prucha penned an extensive 
corpus of literature devoted to the development of Indian policies in the United States, 
and his work stood then, as it does now, as the quintessential interpretation of U.S.-Indian 
policy relations. His studies emphasized Americans’ paternalism and Christian 
humanitarianism, and volumes such as The Great Father offer much in the way of 
detailed accounts of various policies’ strengths and weaknesses.16 Largely absent from 
Prucha’s analyses were Native peoples’ own politics. Much, however, has changed in the 
literatures of American Indian history and of early America since Prucha completed his 
volumes. While notions of paternalism, emphasized by Prucha, are important for 
understanding some early Americans’ motivations, they are insufficient for understanding 
Indian policy’s connection with the larger history of the early United States, and a simple 
acceptance of those ideas obscures both their creation and the many inherent 
contradictions that accompanied Americans’ discourse of humanitarianism. While Prucha 
                                                
15 Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, IX. 
16 Most of Prucha’s work focused on Euroamericans and Indian policies. Though his volumes 
neglect indigenous perspectives, goals, and motivations, they nonetheless offer a foundational 
understanding of U.S. Indian policy. For a sampling of his works, see Prucha, The Great Father; 
Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers and the Indian, 
1865-1900 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976); Francis Paul Prucha, American 
Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1994); Francis Paul Prucha, The Indians in American Society: From the Revolutionary War 
to the Present (Quantum Books) (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985) 
Other scholars have offered much-needed updated takes on Indian policy, but still they 
adopt top-down perspectives. See, for example, Stephen J. Rockwell, Indian Affairs and the 
Administrative State in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); 
William H. Bergmann, The American National State and the Early West (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
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focused his interpretations on Americans’ ideas of humanitarianism in an effort to 
approach the past on its own terms, in doing so, he overlooked some of the more 
insidious consequences and designs at work, namely state formation, market expansion, 
and imperial rivalries. Analyzing the rhetoric of paternalism “on its own terms” serves to 
mask important underlying agendas, and it encourages scholars to render U.S.-Indian 
relations a somewhat separate, unique thread of American history.  
With the “New Indian History” that grew during the 1980s, scholars such as Ned 
Blackhawk, Brian DeLay, James Merrell, and Daniel K. Richter reveal in clear terms, 
however, that Native peoples’ histories are fundamental to any history of early North 
America.17 What is more, scholars such as Stephen Warren and Joshua Piker have offered 
histories of individual indigenous peoples and towns that have not only forced scholars to 
rethink the geopolitics of North America but have encouraged many to find ways to tell 
stories on both the macro- and micro- levels.18 These works should encourage historians 
                                                
17 As a result, a number of excellent works, ranging from the Great Basin and Southwest to the 
North American southeast, have asserted that Native histories are essential for understanding the 
broader geopolitics of North America. See, for example, Ned Blackhawk, Violence Over the 
Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2006); Brian DeLay, The War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the 
U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); James H. Merrell, The Indians’ 
New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact Through the Era of Removal 
(Chapel Hill, NC: Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, VA by The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1989); Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: 
A Native History of Early America (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 
2001); Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes 
Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). In the Ohio Valley, Robert 
Michael Morrissey’s work grapples with empire-building in a way that combines both a top-down 
and bottom-up approach. See Robert Michael Morrissey, Empire by Collaboration: Indians, 
Colonists, and Governments in Colonial Illinois Country (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2015). 
18 Stephen Warren, The Shawnees and Their Neighbors, 1795-1870 (Urbana and Chicago, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 2009); Joshua Piker, Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in Colonial 
America (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2004); 
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to approach policy history in a similar manner, to combine the “top-down” approach 
adopted by Prucha with the “bottom-up” approaches showcased in works by Piker and 
others. The resulting approach, a simultaneously “top-down” and “bottom-up” history, 
guides what follows, and rather than offer a wholesale rejection of Prucha, it combines 
his analysis with the lessons gleaned from the New Indian History. It aims to interrogate 
the ways in which Native peoples’ politics also affected U.S. policy, market and imperial 
development, and it contributes to our understanding of the history of Native peoples’ 
“survivance” in North America.19 
Indeed, a set of interrelated queries drive this history. How was the American 
empire made? How did Native Americans’ various motivations influence its growth? 
Why did U.S. Indian policies take on the forms they did? How did Americans—and, 
indeed, Tocqueville and many of the world’s citizens—come to understand the 
“civilization plan” as “humane”? And finally, and perhaps most importantly, given the 
devastating removal of thousands of American Indians from eastern North America, why 
do such questions and histories matter? The answers are not, of course, simple. 
Nonetheless, an exploration of the emergence of the U.S. civilization plan and its 
endurance, offers a means by which to investigate these questions. 
The Ohio Country, in particular—and thus Ohio Indians and Baltimore Friends’ 
work among them—offers a compelling case study. Though scholars define the 
geographic bounds of the region differently, “Cultivating Empire” focuses on the lands 
                                                
19 Gerald Vizenor understands “survivance” as an “active sense of presence,” and his 
work aims to dispel the notion that Native peoples merely survived or reacted to 
Euroamerican colonialism. See Gerald Vizenor, Manifest Manners: Narratives on 
Postindian Survivance (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), vii. 
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and peoples that make up present-day Ohio and Indiana. Baltimore Friends established 
their agricultural missions within the bounds of these modern-day states, at Wapakoneta 
and Captain Lewis Town (Lewistown) in Ohio and at Dennis’s Station (near present-day 
Huntington) in Indiana. It was in the Ohio Country that the federal government 
established its blueprint for colonization with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. That 
document established the procedure for U.S. territorial acquisition and for the translation 
of “territories” into “states” and “settlers” into citizens who possessed the equal rights of 
their counterparts in other states. The region allows us to see how American imperialism 
facilitated the economic rise of one of the early United States’ most rapidly developing 
regions.  
What becomes quickly apparent in an examination of civilizing efforts in the Ohio 
Country, however, is that any history of mission work in this relatively small region 
requires an examination of more far-flung locales. Colonial Pennsylvania, early republic 
Baltimore, and even western New York, Detroit, Missouri, and the Mexican Republic 
factor into the story of American empire in the Ohio Country. Indeed, traveling Quakers, 
U.S. officials, settlers, and Indians created linkages between discrete locales, and they 
force scholars to understand regional histories in a wider context. Moreover, recent 
scholarship pays excellent attention to the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes, but too often 
those treatments are confined to the continent, overlooking broader context and 
connections and encouraging a division between Atlantic and continental histories. This 
is particularly true, with important exceptions, for the historiography of Ohio and Indiana 
during the era of the early republic. Part of the aim of “Cultivating Empire” is to 
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encourage further connections between continental and Atlantic historiographical 
paradigms.20  
“Cultivating Empire,” then, frames Friends’ agricultural mission work in the 
contested Ohio Country as a case study, and it demonstrates that missions and 
"civilizing” policies were not simply tools for “assimilating the Indians," but rather were 
hinges for economic and political development. It shows that the United States’ civilizing 
efforts offered Native peoples a discourse and means to negotiate for power even as those 
same efforts bolstered Americans’ claims to moral authority on the international stage. 
The first chapter sketches the eighteenth-century history of Quaker-Native relations. Its 
central focus rests on Friends' and Delaware Indians' diplomatic partnership during the 
years of the Seven Years War (1754-1763)—a war fought in large part over Ohio 
Country lands—and the ways in which this partnership proved formative for U.S.-Indian 
relations. It reveals that though Friends were once deemed "meddling nuisances" by the 
colonial Pennsylvania government, they ultimately became invaluable partners of the 
U.S. government after the American Revolution. 
                                                
20 Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-
1774 (Lincoln, NE and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1992); John P. Bowes, Exiles and 
Pioneers: Eastern Indians in the Trans-Mississippi West (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007); Stephen Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from 
Daniel Boone to Henry Clay (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); 
Hinderaker, Elusive Empires; Saler, The Settlers’ Empire. Andrew R. L. Cayton, Frontier Indiana 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996); Andrew R. L. Cayton and 
Stuart D. Hobbs, eds., The Center of a Great Empire: The Ohio Country in the Early American 
Republic (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005). For efforts to link regional histories with 
broader perspectives, see Andrew R. L. Cayton and Peter S. Onuf, The Midwest and the Nation: 
Rethinking the History of an American Region (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1990). 
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Chapter two continues to examine how missionaries' and Native Americans' 
diplomatic efforts laid the foundation for U.S. imperial politics and policies. Here, in an 
examination of 1790s diplomacy, I draw upon the scholarship of U.S. foreign relations to 
argue that Native nations conducted themselves as—and were in reality—sovereign 
nations with their own diplomatic and political ambitions during the earliest years of the 
republic. Indians' politics forced U.S. state officials to bring missionary men to the 
dinners, official treaties, and pipe-smoking affairs that characterized the spaces within 
which the United States conducted some of its earliest diplomacy with foreign nations in 
North America. As a result of Native political authority and the international politics of 
intercultural diplomacy, then, missionaries labored as extensions and representatives of 
the U.S. government in Indian Country. 
I connect Baltimore Friends' educational reform work among the free and 
enslaved laboring poor in Baltimore with their agricultural instruction among Ohio 
Indians in chapter three. Such analysis reveals that Friends' visions of and efforts in the 
"west" were informed by their experiences in the east. It argues that Quakers took 
advantage of the young republic's small state apparatus to garner official support for their 
work among Native peoples, but that emerging U.S. social ideals nonetheless shaped 
Friends' efforts in both Baltimore and Indian Country. This chapter also reveals the ways 
in which Quakers offered the Ohio Country's Indian nations direct intellectual links to the 
emerging discourses of race and class of the early American republic. Rather than offer 
"civilization" according to Euroamerican standards, then, these missionary linkages 
served to educate Native communities in the ways of American imperialism such that 
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Native peoples continued to take advantage of Euroamerican politics and policies into the 
nineteenth century. 
Chapter four tells the story of how the "mission complex" expanded the influence 
and power of the United States in the Ohio Country and beyond. The mission complex 
linked missionaries, humanitarians, manufacturers, federal employees, and indigenous 
peoples through networks of markets and capital: the material goods used in the 
agricultural missions offered a means both to stimulate business for eastern (and 
developing western) manufacturers and develop a new consumer base in the Ohio 
Country. Attention to the functioning of this system, based upon hierarchical relations of 
power, reveals how the early U.S. Empire thrived off of economic growth. It also 
demonstrates that imperial state policy, as well as a myriad of Native and non-Native 
actors, facilitated the development and expansion of capitalist markets and forms of labor 
in the early republic, and that such developments linked Native peoples ever closer to the 
U.S. market economy through the War of 1812 and beyond. 
The fifth chapter demonstrates that Native peoples in the Ohio Country 
manipulated Americans' own economic and social ideals for their own purposes in efforts 
to assert the authority of their nations beyond the War of 1812. They drew upon the 
paradigm of missionaries' labor and contracted Euroamerican wage laborers to perform 
the same physical work formerly undertaken by missionary men on their lands by the 
1820s and 1830s. They blended many of their own economic ideals with the 
understandings of both poverty and "poor Indians" brought to them through missionary 
rhetoric, and they used their increasingly uncertain political and economic status to make 
claims upon the U.S. state for material aid. By doing so, however, they aided in the 
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development of the U.S. economy and its social relations in Indian Country, the United 
States, and beyond, and they contributed to the growth of the early American state. 
The final chapter, "'Of Mercy and of sound policy too': Indian Removal and the 
Cultivation of American Empire" contends that, as a result of Indians’ persistence, ideas 
of poverty, dependence, civilization, and humanitarianism intertwined to facilitate the 
ongoing development of a discourse of exclusion that increasingly characterized 
American imperialism during the nineteenth century. These exclusionary politics 
combined, however, with U.S. government officials' desire to present the United States as 
a humanitarian state on the world stage, and some U.S. officials and their missionary 
partners wove ideas of poverty, the "deserving poor," and mercy into their statements 
regarding Indian removal. With Great Britain's abolition of slavery and the United States' 
ongoing dependence upon slave labor, Indian affairs, and missionaries' connection with 
policies, thus became a means by which some cast the United States as a benevolent 
power. Race, then, was not always the central factor in shaping Euroamerican-indigenous 
relations; rather, ideas of race, class, and nation together created a discourse of inclusion 
and exclusion that, in turn, shaped the politics of Indian removal, benevolence, reform 
and empire in the early republic and on the world stage. 
 
* * * 
In 1817, Superintendent of Indian Trade Thomas L. McKenney, a Quaker, 
prophesied that the indigenous peoples of North American would, “at no very distant 
day,” “constitute a portion of ‘our great American family of freemen’” thanks to the 
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ongoing efforts of missionaries.21 His sentiments are reminiscent of episodes labeled by 
literary scholar David Kazanjian as being part of the United States’ “colonizing trick.”22 
By relegating American Indians to a future citizenship premised on their eventual 
civilization, Americans cultivated a homogenous and inherently equal citizenry by 
masking the inequalities that accompanied their developing political economy. Through 
policies of “philanthropic” violence—civilizing efforts as well as schemes such as 
African colonization and Indian removal—Americans worked to realize—and display for 
others—the nation’s adherence to its founding tenets of freedom and equality. By 
pointing to their missionary partners and framing their efforts as philanthropic, however, 
Americans obscured their empire-building efforts. Missionaries’ agricultural mission 
work in Indian Country masked the process of transforming Indians lands into a 
marketable commodity, and it concealed the fact that agricultural education implicitly 
relegated Native peoples to the lowest ranks of the republic’s developing social 
hierarchy. Missionaries’ partnership with the federal government likewise facilitated the 
erosion of Americans’ recognition of Native peoples’ sovereign authority by providing 
“evidence” of Natives’ “dependence” on American aid, and it attempted to mask the 
violence of removal by offering a means to frame it in humanitarian terms.  
By continuing to assert political, economic, and cultural autonomy, however, 
Native peoples exposed the contradictions inherent to Americans’ project and forced the 
United States to adapt its policies to Indians’ persistence. Miamis, Shawnees, and their 
neighbors in the Ohio Country ultimately seized the benefits of civilizing schemes—
                                                
21 Thomas L. McKenney to Samuel Worcester, October 30, 1817, Newberry Library, Chicago, Il.  
22 David Kazanjian, The Colonizing Trick: National Culture and Imperial Citizenship in Early 
America (Minneapolis, MN and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). 
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missionary labor, infrastructure, and a political discourse that enabled them to make 
claims upon the U.S. state—and ensured that U.S. policies would continue to be 
negotiated throughout the nineteenth and into the twenty-first century. Missionaries’ 
work, and Indian policies more broadly, offered Americans a means to cultivate new 
lands, as well as a nation and an empire, but North American indigenous peoples 
ultimately played an immense role in developing that empire’s character by forcing 
Americans to adapt their policies and ideas to Native peoples’ own politics of 
endurance.23 
  
                                                
23 A note on the text: abbreviations, including those that are superscript, the long s, and other 
eighteenth and nineteenth century notations included in primary source materials cited in the 
main body of the text have been corrected to modern usage and, in the case of abbreviations, fully 
written out. 
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Chapter 1 
"The Most Extraordinary Procedure": Friends and Delawares in Penn's Woods 
 
 
 
 In 1757, Pennsylvania's governor William Denny confronted Philadelphia's 
Quakers. The Earl of Halifax, Denny wrote, offered "very strong Expressions of 
Dissatisfaction" regarding "a Treaty held with the Indians at Philadelphia by the People 
called Quakers, which his Lordship was pleas’d to think the most extraordinary 
procedure he had ever seen in Persons who are on the same footing only with all others of 
the King’s private Subjects, to presume to treat with Foreign Princes."24 Such frustrations 
were understandable. It was the height of the Seven Years War in Pennsylvania, and 
members of the Quakers' Friendly Association for the Preservation of Peace with the 
Indians by Pacific Measures had, one-year earlier, forced the issue of the controversial 
1737 Walking Purchase to the forefront of official conversation at the Treaty of Easton. 
Discussion of the suspect land deal was a political nuisance that Denny had hoped to 
avoid. After a series of private meetings with the Friends at Easton, however, the 
Delaware leader Teedyuscung approached the governor and his secretary to officially 
request that “Friends might have liberty to examine into their complaints” regarding the 
late purchase.25 Denny ultimately conceded and, in doing so, strengthened Friends' 
relations with Native peoples and, in turn, their ability to influence Indian affairs in 
eastern North America. 
                                                
24 William Denny to Mr Israel Pemberton and the other Gentlemen, July 11, 1757, Parrish Family 
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
  25 Ibid., 39. 
 
 
25 
 When the Earl of Halifax framed Friends' treaty work as "the most extraordinary 
procedure" adopted by "the King's private Subjects," he condemned private citizens' 
participation in official diplomatic affairs. Friends, however, paid no heed. They 
participated in the 1758 Treaty of Easton, they continued to offer gifts at meetings, 
councils, and treaties with the region's Indian peoples (gifts that the colony's officials 
gladly accepted), and they maintained their connections with leaders like Teedyuscung.  
Friends' efforts during the Seven Years War, though they stirred controversy during the 
1750s and 1760s, also contributed to a narrative of Quaker-Indian friendship that was 
foundational for their ongoing diplomatic and reform work among the continent's Native 
peoples throughout the subsequent centuries. That narrative proved central to the 
cultivation of Friends' partnership with the United States War Department in North 
America. 
 The Friendly Association's efforts in Pennsylvania built upon the revered history 
of William Penn's first meeting with Native peoples in 1682. They were also the 
consequence, however, of Friends' and Delawares' political agendas. During the 1750s, 
Pennsylvania Quakers faced political competition in the colonial assembly as well as 
internal strife within the Society of Friends. At the same time, Delawares confronted the 
consequences of migrations and land competition. They witnessed European peoples 
invade their home of Lenapehoking, and they watched as some of their countrymen left 
their lands for new homes in the Ohio Country. Friends and Delawares, then, each 
confronted political crises. Those Delawares still in "Penn's Woods" saw peace with 
Pennsylvania as crucial to their futures on their lands, and Friends hoped to scavenge for 
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as much political capital as possible while also upholding their faith's commitment to 
peace.  
 Though some scholars interpret the eighteenth century as a period when the 
Society of Friends turned inward, individual Quakers' work in Indian affairs suggests that 
some Friends found ways to resist that turn.26 That Israel Pemberton, Anthony Benezet, 
and others willingly pursued a political connection with Pennsylvania and the Indians by 
forming the Friendly Association, suggests that various Friends envisioned different 
futures for their society and for themselves. Already during the 1750s, some Friends saw 
that philanthropic benevolence offered a means to engage with the world, to cultivate a 
positive image of their society, and to garner political capital within their community. 
Friends' relationship with the Delawares during the years of the Seven Years War—as 
well as their continued philanthropy after that conflict—reveals, then, that the Quakers 
were a varied lot, and that they held myriad political opinions and motivations. Those 
opinions and motivations, however, also proved to be pivotal for Friends' ability to gain a 
political foothold during and after the American Revolution and throughout the following 
centuries. 
 
* * * 
 When the Delaware Teedyuscung sought alliance with Quaker Israel Pemberton 
and other members of the Friendly Association in 1756, he did so in large part because 
his people shared a history of friendship with Philadelphia's Quakers—a friendship 
                                                
26 Jack D. Marietta, The Reformation of American Quakerism, 1748-1783 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984).  
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rooted in both action and memory. Friends and Delawares laid the groundwork for their 
enduring friendship in the late seventeenth century when William Penn, newly arrived in 
North America, met with leaders of the Delaware Nation beneath an elm tree on the 
banks of the Delaware River. Or, rather, they laid the groundwork by remembering (and 
romanticizing) that fabled gathering later.27 Indeed, during the height of war, the Friendly 
Association's clerk recorded a meeting between the Friends and various Native leaders 
wherein William Penn, then dead, figured prominently. The men gathered reportedly 
enjoyed a meal and discussed their conjoined pasts. They together spoke of the “happy 
state of the first settlers” of Pennsylvania and bemoaned “the unhappy Rupture” which 
had, of late, disrupted their lives and threatened Euroamericans and Native peoples' 
already tenuous coexistence.28 They lamented that some Delawares and their allies, 
mostly hailing from lands in the western Ohio County, attacked Pennsylvania 
settlements, and they likewise lamented that Euroamerican settlers and governments 
slighted the region's Native peoples during several land negotiations. The men gathered at 
the table, however, determined to restore peace. As they continued to speak of William 
Penn’s first treaty of peace with the Indians, Conrad Weiser, provincial interpreter, 
reportedly noticed a calm overtake the agitated Native discussants. Weiser informed the 
men that he had not “heard [the Indians] express themselves with so much openness” and 
urged the Quakers there assembled to call “together as many of our ancient Men of the 
                                                
27 The meeting was immortalized in Benjamin West's 1771-72 Penn's Treaty with the Indians, 
and Friends and Delawares referenced the meeting throughout their exchanges during the Seven 
Years War and on into the nineteenth century. 
28 Minute book of the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians 
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Survivors of the first settlers as we could collect and to give the Indians another 
Meeting.”29 Penn and other first generation Pennsylvanians would play a pivotal role, 
along with the "ancient Men" of the Delawares, in restoring peace to “Penn’s Woods.” 
 Those "ancient Men" who crossed the Atlantic in the late seventeenth century 
were among the earliest of the Quakers. The Society of Friends organized in the midst of 
England's violent mid-seventeenth-century turmoil. Many Friends identified with 
Parliamentarians during the English Civil War as a result of both their aversion to the 
Anglican Church and their place among the ranks of England's middling and non-elite 
populations.30 By the time of the Restoration of Charles II to the throne in 1660, however, 
many officials and English Protestants considered the Friends with contempt. Quakers 
failed to recognize social distinctions and, more broadly, England's socio-economic 
hierarchy, they believed in the spiritual equality of the sexes and a de-emphasis of the 
Bible, and they opposed oath-taking and military service and action. Such beliefs meant 
that the Friends were, increasingly, aberrations in English society. Though the Society of 
Friends eventually became a quietist, inward-looking faith, during the mid-seventeenth 
century Quakers openly protested the war, the Anglican Church, and England's prevailing 
social order. Many English subjects consequently deemed them radical. 
 Under Charles II, Friends encountered particularly vehement opposition. The 
Quaker Act passed Parliament in 1662 and required all English subjects to swear an oath 
of loyalty to the king—an act that violated Quaker doctrine. The Conventicle Act of 
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1664, meanwhile, forbade meetings for unauthorized worship—anything that was not 
Anglican worship—if there were more than five persons present. These harsh realities 
offered Friends' ample reason to journey across the Atlantic, though, even in North 
America, Friends encountered others' scorn. The Puritans, in particular, discriminated 
against the Quakers in Massachusetts. Perhaps most infamously, Puritan colonists hanged 
Puritan-turned-Quaker Mary Dyer in 1660 after she repeatedly refused to leave the 
colony. Quakers' belief in social and gender equality directly contradicted the firm 
hierarchy of the Puritan's city upon a hill.31 Quaker William Penn's 1681 acquisition of 
land, then, offered many Friends a means to live unmolested in North America. 
 Quakers' peace testimony, conceived of by George Fox during the years of 
English civil war, required peaceful relations with the continent's indigenous peoples. 
Even at Pennsylvania's founding, then, the Quakers' political motivations—the peaceful 
acquisition of land for their own colony—required the recognition of Indians' rights to 
their lands. As a result, William Penn, unlike many of his fellow English proprietors, 
initiated a policy of paying the region's Native peoples for their lands. It was in this 
context that William Penn famously treated with Delawares beneath a tree on the banks 
of the Delaware River.32 
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 While Friends' pacifism and Penn's desire for land required that they establish 
close working relations with the Delawares, the Quakers' faith and recognition of others' 
spiritual potential pushed them to respect Native peoples as well as recognize the many 
shared cultural similarities with their Delaware neighbors. Indeed, both George Fox, the 
founder of Quakerism, and William Penn penned positive accounts of their time among 
the Delawares, and their writings figured prominently in the development of Friends' 
attitudes regarding Native peoples in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Fox noted 
in his journal, for example, that the Indians "received mee very loveingly," and he 
emphasized their willingness to embrace his religious teachings.33 Penn likewise 
explained that "[i]f an European comes to see them, or calls for Lodging at their House or 
Wigwam they have him the best place and first cut. If they come to visit us, they salute us 
with an Itah which is as much as to say, Good be to you."34 Both Fox and Penn penned 
such accounts consciously, but their willingness to frame Delawares as polite people who 
possessed the equivalent of their own greeting, "good be to you," reflects the influence of 
their belief in the Inner Light and their recognition of their shared qualities. Indeed, the 
Inward Light, an internal spiritual presence that rendered everyone—without exception—
capable of receiving God's grace, encouraged Friends like Fox and Penn to view Native 
peoples in their own image. Fox noted in his journal, for example, that he was asked, 
upon a visit to an Indian village, to prove that Indians possessed the spirit of Christ. In 
order to make his case, he simply asked one individual whether he knew when he 
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committed wrong. When the man replied in the affirmative, Fox used the response as 
evidence of the Inward Light.35  
 Fox's beliefs and observations influenced eighteenth-century Friends. Anthony 
Benezet quoted Jonathan Carter in his Some Observations on the Situation, Disposition, 
and Character of the Indian Natives of this Continent, in order to make the point that 
Indians were "not without some sense of Religion, such as proves that they worship the 
great Creator."36 Friends did, of course, note differences, but compared to many of their 
other English religious counterparts, they were particularly receptive to Native peoples' 
cultures and mannerisms. The wide availability of Fox and Penn's writings likewise 
encouraged eighteenth-century Quakers to contemplate and adopt their forbears' views. 
Those views rendered Friends willing to embrace Native peoples’ potential for reform—a 
trait that would prove foundational for their later reform work. 
 Quakerism itself encouraged individuals like Penn, Fox, and Benezet to consider 
working with and among Delawares, but Friends and Delawares also shared a number of 
practices that rendered each intelligible to the other. Like Friends, Delaware women were 
central participants in the rituals of their people. Early twentieth-century anthropologist 
M.R. Harrington noted that not only were girls "taught the manifold duties and arts of the 
household, how to tan hides, and to plant and cultivate the garden," but they also 
"received instruction in the tradition and rituals of religion."37 On the twelfth night of the 
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Gamwing, an annual celebration that took place just after harvest, one early twentieth-
century Delaware informed another observer that that night "is the time that our women 
and any other person who feels competent among our young people take part and help. If 
his mind is made up, anyone truly is permitted to 'Sing-the-Fires-out.'"38 Delaware 
women, moreover—like many Algonquian women—enjoyed political power. Not only 
could they speak during the Gamwing, but Delawares traced their lineages through the 
maternal line, and they afforded women prominent roles in matters of peacemaking.39 
Although Delaware women enjoyed, arguably, greater political power and mobility, the 
Society of Friends too considered women to be the spiritual equals of men, and they 
permitted them to share their thoughts in meeting when moved to do so. 
 Similarly, George Fox, believing that God moved individuals to speak, embraced 
one Delaware man's contention that he received a vision from the Great Spirit. The 
Delaware in question reportedly explained that if his people "did hurt or wrong the white 
people, they would be destroyed. And this hath been seen and fulfilled, that when they 
did wrong the English they never prospered and have been destroyed."40 After listening 
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to the man, Fox came to the conclusion that "that Indian was a prophet and prophesized 
truly."41 William Penn likewise offered appreciation for Delawares' religion when he 
explained that they believe "in God and Immortality without the help of Metaphysics."42 
All of this suggests that Friends viewed Delaware spirituality in the context of their own. 
Not only did this provide Fox and Penn with the satisfaction of knowing that their 
religious tenets were grounded in "truth"—if evidence demonstrated that Native peoples 
possessed the capacity for religion, then surely the Inner Light was, in fact, real—but it 
also suggests that Friends and Delawares recognized their similarities and that this 
recognition, in turn, facilitated their partnership during the eighteenth century. 
 
* * * 
 The Seven Years War in North America put Friends and Delawares' relationship 
to the test. The British and French empires long antagonized one another, and by mid-
century, the fertile Ohio Country lands were particularly divisive in North America. Both 
France and Britain claimed the lands as theirs, and neither power paused to consider 
Native peoples' own claims, save for when such claims bolstered their own. The valley 
was valuable. The Ohio River flowed out of western Pennsylvania and offered a pathway 
to the heart of the continent and the Mississippi River, though Euroamericans found parts 
of the river to be initially impassable. To hold claim to the region was to gain a foothold 
to the rich continental interior and to the thriving port of New Orleans. By mid-century, 
British officials contested French efforts to build new forts in the region, and Native 
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peoples grew increasingly frustrated. Lieutenant Colonel George Washington attempted 
to push the French out of the region, but he failed. As episodes such as the 1754 Battle of 
Jumonville Glen and the well-known history of Washington’s Fort Necessity suggests, 
Ohio River politics stood at the center of the conflict between French and British at mid-
century.43  
 The string of early eighteenth-century wars for empire in North America 
presented Pennsylvania's Quaker leadership with the problems inherent in being pacifist 
leaders in an empire at war. The Friends avoided crippling political controversy by 
appropriating funds rather than men in arms, though as historian Hermann Wellenreuther 
makes clear, Friends’ peace testimony in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did 
not necessarily preclude them from ensuring against any dangers to government. 
Nonetheless, Governor Benjamin Fletcher of New York, who took charge of 
Pennsylvania after the Crown suspected William Penn of treason in 1692, informed the 
Quaker-dominated Pennsylvania colonial assembly that their funds would “not be dipt in 
blood.” Friends agreed to the proposition and allocated funds that were, according to 
Fletcher, used for budget items such as salaries. Though Wellenreuther interprets 
Fletcher’s statement as a political one meant to assuage the fears of Friends, the episode 
offers a glimpse of the ways in which the Society of Friends avoided destructive political 
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conflict. By working to ensure that their own Indian affairs remained peaceful, moreover, 
Pennsylvania’s Quakers worked to keep wars distant.44 
 This changed when the governor of Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, declared war on 
the Delawares in 1756. Many of the colony's inhabitants cheered the declaration: they 
blamed the Delawares for recent attacks on their lands and families. Indeed, the Seven 
Years War in North America pitted French against English, but Native peoples were 
largely responsible for its start. Delawares fought alongside French and British but they 
also did so as individual groups, each with its own political agenda. The "French and 
Indian War" was, more accurately, a contest for power among many polities. Even more 
confusing for colonial Pennsylvanians were political and geographic divisions among 
Delawares. “Eastern” Delawares still lived in Pennsylvania and remained neutral or sued 
for peace. "Western" Delawares—those who migrated to the Ohio Country to escape 
European colonization and find peace—fought to protect their adopted lands against the 
incursions of Anglo-American families that pushed toward and beyond the Appalachian 
Mountains. In many Pennsylvania colonists’ minds, however, Delawares were 
Delawares, Indians were Indians, and all of them were violent.45 
 The escalation of violence in western colonial Pennsylvania exacerbated the 
problem of Friends' pacifism. Members of the Proprietary party pressured their Quaker 
colleagues in the colonial assembly to vote for defense of the colony. Proprietary party 
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members saw the violence as a political opportunity to discredit and disempower their 
Quaker party rivals—many of whom, but not all, were members of the Society of 
Friends. William Smith, a Proprietary party member and vocal supporter of the current 
colonial proprietor Thomas Penn, circulated pamphlets questioning Quakers' ability to 
lead in a time of war, and he urged that a loyalty oath be required of all assemblymen.46 
As a result of party antagonisms and the threat of losing political power, Friends in the 
assembly split into two factions. Defense Quakers remained in the assembly and voted to 
allocate funds for the defense of the colony, while stricter pacifist Friends abdicated their 
seats.  
 The peace testimony conflict was not new but amplified. William Penn himself 
had had to find ways to balance his pacifist principles with his duties as the governor of 
Pennsylvania to protect the king's subjects.47 After the turmoil of the mid-to-late 
seventeenth century in England, many of the Friends advocated for removal from the 
world, and they adopted a more quietist modus operandi. To hold political power in 
colonial Pennsylvania as a Quaker, then, was already to engage with the world; to agree 
to support war, as the Defense Quakers did, was to threaten the very meaning of what it 
meant to be a member of the Society of Friends by the mid-eighteenth century. 
Unsurprisingly, the public division between Friends in the assembly coincided with the 
Philadelphia Monthly Meeting's call for simplicity and avoidance of "pernicious Books 
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and the Corrupt Conversation of the World."48 Pennsylvania's crisis was also a crisis 
within the Philadelphia Meeting. 
 It was in this context that Israel Pemberton, Jr., a Quaker merchant and 
councilman who abdicated his seat in the assembly, and several others called on 
Governor Morris "to reconsider the proposed declaration of war, and to institute a rigid 
inquiry, as to 'whether some apprehensions these Indians have conceived, of a deviation 
from the integrity of conduct towards them, so conspicuous in the first establishment,' 
may not have assisted, to alienate their affections."49 Pemberton, Anthony Benezet, and 
interpreter Conrad Weiser then met with Delaware leaders and urged them "to lay down 
the hatchet."50 The Friends demonstrated "willingness to meet them, at some place 
mutually agreed upon, in friendly conference."51 They believed that "some further 
attempts may be made by pacific Measures to reduce them to a Sense of their Duty, and 
that a farther opportunity may be offered to such as may be willing to separate from those 
who have been the wicked Instruments of perverting them."52 As Friends' language 
suggests, they, in essence, waged war against Pennsylvania's violent measures; they 
pitted peace against war in a battle to determine which would guarantee political stability. 
 The Friends' language also reveals both their political motivations and their 
internalization of earlier Friends' accounts of the region's Indians. On the one hand, they 
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endeavored "to reduce [the Indians] to a Sense of their Duty"—rhetoric that appealed to 
their former colonial constituents, and on the other, they blamed Delawares' violence on 
"those who have been the wicked Instruments of perverting them"—language that 
recalled both Fox and Penn's claims that Native peoples were once polite and religious. 
The careful balance of language suggests that Friends hoped their political exile from the 
assembly was temporary. Peace, they hoped, would not only afford the colony security, 
but its triumph would restore the Quakers' political mandate. That Friends' words were 
recorded in the minutes of the Provincial Council is further suggestive of their hope to 
win back the hearts and minds of their fellow colonists.  
 It was at this same meeting that Conrad Weiser, the colony's interpreter, 
suggested that Pennsylvania round up its "ancient Men" and "give the Indians another 
Meeting." Weiser, the proprietors' employee, likely envisioned such a meeting to take 
place between the colonial government and the Delawares. He likely knew that Friends 
would be present, but also probably hoped that they would accept their place as subjects 
of the government. For Friends, however, the prospect of another meeting was far more 
meaningful. Theorist Yael Zerubavel argues that groups perform "memory rituals" in 
order to revive, reaffirm, and modify collective memories in an effort to reemphasize the 
"master narrative" of their identity.53 While Friends acted for political, self-interested 
purposes, the prospect of reviving their own political power—and that of the Quakers 
writ large—likely made the re-performance of the earlier, romanticized meeting between 
Penn and the Indians attractive. By remembering and recreating a past in which they 
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possessed ample political power, they hoped to remind others' of their history of 
leadership. 
 The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting dampened the effect, however, by declaring 
"any interference with 'public affairs' to be beyond its jurisdiction."54 Instead of 
abandoning the peace effort, however, Pemberton and his companions established the 
Friendly Association. It was the first of Friends' voluntary associations, and it offered a 
means to engage with the political world in a way that complemented the Society of 
Friends' commitment to peace. It also, however, offered Friends a means to pursue their 
own agendas as individuals separate from the larger body of the yearly meeting. It meant 
that Friends could engage with political life, accumulate "moral capital," and, in turn, 
maintain their position of leadership within their community.55 For men like Israel 
Pemberton, a prosperous merchant from a prominent Quaker family, it was ideal. The 
Friendly Association wove together ideals of benevolence, pacifism, and political action 
in a way that spoke to mid-eighteenth-century Friends' political needs and aspirations. 
The association's example proved enduring. 
 The Friendly Association boasted a large membership drawn from the most-
respected (and prosperous) families of Philadelphia Friends.56 The association declared 
that it was "determined to improve every future opportunity of manifesting some Regard" 
with the Indians after "seriously considering the fatal Consequences of losing that Interest 
and Friendship our Predecessors had obtain'd by their upright dealing and Hospitable 
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Treatment of the Indians in the first Settlement."57 The mission statement was thus 
twofold: the association endeavored to exact peace in the colony, but it also sought to 
revert back to what was, to the Friends’ minds, a glorious past. The intervening decades 
between Penn and the Seven Years War saw a slow decline in both Quakers' proportional 
population in the colony and their political power. Those changes, they implicitly argued, 
produced the "fatal Consequences" of war.  
 The association raised funds for the purchase of presents distributed during 
conferences with Native leaders and their peoples. Members also attended numerous 
councils and treaties in 1756 with the most significant being the Treaty of Easton. Friends 
attended the meeting in an unofficial capacity that frustrated the colonial government's 
efforts to unilaterally deal with the Delawares. Given that many of the Friendly 
Association's members included those who abdicated their legislative seats, their 
presence was controversial. They endeavored to steer politics by circumventing the 
colony's official political process. Some Delawares, undoubtedly aware of the Quaker-
proprietary political divide (indeed, they were using it to their advantage), were left 
"inquisitive about the Governor's coming" to Easton at all.58 According to one Quaker 
chronicler, however, Delawares were "told he was on the road and would be here soon." 
Still doubtful, the Delawares ultimately concluded that if "Israel Pemberton said so, they 
would believe it."59  
 Delawares' uncertainty and alliance with the Friendly Association was chronicled 
later by Samuel Parrish, a descendent of the prosperous Parrish family—a family whose 
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own John Parrish played a pivotal role, as will be seen in chapter two, in Indian affairs 
during the 1790s. Parrish's account is, of course, biased. Writing in 1877, however, 
Parrish's narrative describes the pivotal role played by the Friendly Association in 
crafting Friends' internal narrative of their own work in Indian affairs. That narrative both 
endured and transformed as it was passed down through subsequent generations of 
Friends, and it was foundational to their involvement in Indian affairs throughout the 
subsequent centuries.60 Despite the bias of time and association, Samuel Parrish's account 
of Friends' efforts at the Treaty of Easton is supported by contemporary documentation, 
though much of that documentation varies.61 What is certain, however, is that Friends 
played a pivotal role both at the treaty and behind the scenes.  
 The Delaware Teedyuscung, in particular, embraced the Friends' willingness to 
pursue peace. He professed that he was glad that they were "willing to renew the old, 
good understanding, and that you call to mind the first treaties of friendship made by 
Onas, our great friend....We take hold of these treaties with both our hands, and desire 
you will do the same, that a true friendship may be re-established."62 Like Friends, the 
Delaware leader employed the past for political purposes. He reminded Pennsylvanians 
that their forbears declared friendship—not merely through words but through treaty. 
Instead of invoking the power of wampum or oral agreement, as would have been custom 
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among his people, Teedyuscung consciously appealed to the Europeans' strategy of using 
paper when crafting peace and alliances, and he likely did so in order to place his 
argument for peace in their own political context. He established Pennsylvanians as the 
hypocritical violators of their own political tools. The Delaware concluded his speech by 
informing Friends that "what you said to us we took to heart, and we speak to you from 
our heart, and we will deal honestly with you in every respect."63  
 Teedyuscung was simultaneously perfect and horribly suited for the role of 
negotiator. Born around 1700 in Delaware lands near present-day Trenton, New Jersey, 
he was accustomed to dealing with Euroamericans. He wore European-style clothing, and 
his people were well-acquainted with European trade goods and modes of conduct. He 
was a "go-between"—a man who was at the same time in both and neither the worlds of 
the Delawares and the Europeans. His ability to render himself intelligible to both 
Delawares and Euroamericans in Pennsylvania proved valuable, and he proved a pivotal 
ally of the Philadelphia Friends' Indian affairs work.64 
 Teedysucung met with the Friendly Association during a series of private 
meetings at Easton, and he asked the Friends to "examine into [Delawares'] complaints" 
regarding the controversial 1737 Walking Purchase.65 The purchase concerned a large 
tract of land north of Philadelphia near the Forks of the Delaware in the Lehigh River 
Valley, and it ultimately became emblematic of colonials' desire for cheap land. 
Pennsylvania officials claimed that William Penn purchased lands that were bounded by 
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the distance of a day and a half walk. Penn’s sons, Thomas and John then produced a 
deed in order to claim that Pennsylvania had already paid for the lands but that the walk 
was never performed.66 Some Delaware leaders reluctantly allowed Pennsylvania to 
measure the lands in 1737. John and Thomas Penn and land speculator James Logan, 
however, hired a team of skilled runners to complete the "walk" on a prepared trail. By 
doing so, the colonial government measured out a tract much larger than Delawares had 
originally intended to sell—roughly 1,200 square miles. The purchase remained a foul 
memory for Delawares during the Seven Years War, and Teedyuscung endeavored to 
bring it up during the treaty in order to gain political leverage. After the conclusion of the 
1756 treaty, Pemberton followed through on Teedyuscung's request. He formally asked 
proprietary secretary Richard Peters for permission to examine the Minutes of the 
Governor and Council in order to evaluate the Delawares' claim of fraud. Peters denied 
his request.67 
 Proprietary government officials considered the Friendly Association's work 
during the 1756 treaty to be a nuisance, but the aftermath of the Walking Purchase 
incident reveals that their annoyance became open disdain. Indeed, in 1757, Pennsylvania 
Governor William Denny informed the Earl of Halifax of Friends' interventions. 
According to Denny, the Earl considered the Friends' actions to be "the most 
extraordinary procedure he had ever seen," but Friends were undeterred. Indeed, Israel 
Pemberton informed Mennonites just one year later that "[t]he Encouragement we daily 
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receive...is alone worth all our Labour & Expense, but we likewise have the Satisfaction 
of finding our Proceedings are well approv'd of by the King & Great Men in 
England...which will not be agreeable to those who have oppos'd us."68 In this letter, 
Pemberton crafted a narrative that both ignored official disdain for their work and framed 
their efforts as politically viable. His invocation of the "King & Great Men in England" 
suggests that he hoped to frame the Friends' work as beneficial to the colony and empire. 
Such a narrative either would prove useful to build coalitions if the Friends regained 
political power after the war, or it would facilitate the maintenance of their unofficial 
diplomatic work. Either way, it was a narrative with political purpose. 
 Members of the Friendly Association also captured their political message in coin. 
In 1757, they distributed the first peace medal coined in the British colonies. It was a 
tradition that the United States, most famously President Thomas Jefferson, continued 
throughout the nineteenth century. The Friendly Association's medal depicted a Quaker 
seated across from an Indian, likely Delaware, male (see figure 1.1 below). A council fire 
burned between the two, and the Quaker held out a peace pipe—both symbols of peaceful 
negotiation. While the medal was not meant to depict William Penn's first treaty with the 
Delawares literally, certain elements were borrowed from the tale of the "first 
establishment." The elm beneath which Penn reportedly treated with the Indians in 1682 
was diplomatic sacred space, and the men on the coin invoked that romantic past. The 
tree was symbolic, but the placement of the Quaker beneath its branches was also 
significant. The Quaker ventured into the woods to treat with the Indian; he was a guest 
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on Native ground. When William Penn arrived on the shores of the Delaware, the 
members of the Friendly Association recalled that he too was a guest: "when [the 
Indians'] Numbers were great and their strength vastly superior, they received our 
Ancestors with gladness, relieved their wants with open Hears, granted them peaceable 
possession of the Land, and for along Course of Time, gave constant and frequent Proofs 
of a cordial Friendship."69 The peace medal thus harkened back to a rosier past, but it also 
suggested a way forward. It asserted that alliance between Euroamericans and Native 
peoples was crucial, and the placement of the Indian in the sun and the Quaker in the 
woods, suggested that Native peoples could prove to be an aid to European success on the 
continent. This was, then, but one vision of North America's political future. 
 
 The peace medal was also indicative of the Friendly Association's support for 
Teedyuscung. In 1757, Teedyuscung continued to craft his political power, even as the 
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Figure 1.1 
 
This medal depicts a Quaker 
holding a peace pipe at a council 
fire. These medals were 
distributed to Native peoples by 
members of the Friendly 
Association as a token of their 
goodwill, as a reminder of the 
peaceful past, and as a statement 
of their political agenda. 
Peace Medal (from the Friendly 
Association for Regaining and 
Preserving Peace with the 
Indians), 1757. Silver. Library 
Company of Philadelphia. 
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proprietary government endeavored to take advantage of his political weaknesses. When 
the Earl of Halifax, through Governor Denny's pen, argued that the Friends endeavored to 
treat with "Foreign Princes," he conceptualized—for primarily political reasons—Native 
polities as sovereign political entities whose leaders were similar to those in Europe. The 
earl’s assertion that Native leaders were “foreign princes” was likely not a widely-held 
viewpoint in Britain, but it reveals both that notions of Native sovereignty had political 
currency in the British Empire and that Friends’ aid was so unwanted that the earl was 
willing to present Native peoples as sovereign polities in order to discourage Quakers’ 
efforts. Teedyuscung's authority in Pennsylvania was also derived, in part, from colonial 
government officials' desire to seek out individual Native "chiefs"—whether truly leaders 
or not—as partners during treaty negotiations. In doing so, they sought to undermine 
localized tribal authority. Treating with a leader representing a hierarchical indigenous 
polity was far simpler than negotiating with what were, in actuality, many clan and 
village leaders.  
 As a consequence of partnership with Friends and the colony's attempt to simplify 
negotiations with the Delawares, Teedyuscung spoke on behalf of eastern and western 
Delawares at a council held in 1757 between members of the Pennsylvania government 
and leaders of the western Indian nations (including western Delawares). Positioning 
himself as leader of a coalition of all gathered nations, Teedyuscung implored the 
gathered Indians, "I take you, my Grand Children, by the Hand; I take your young Men 
by the Hand; I take the Hatchet out of all your Hands, and lay it upon the Ground, and 
observe you to do so."70 Teedyuscung invoked the authority of the Delaware Nation by 
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referring to those gathered as his "Grand Children" in the tradition of fictive kinship. He 
used his peoples' authority as "grandfathers" to seek the respect of those gathered, but he 
also sought power among the English. In a monologue addressed to the gathered Ohio 
leaders and councilmen, Teedyuscung explained, "[y]ou see here this Belt; It tells you 
that Peace is concluded. With one hand I take hold of the governor; the Five Nations take 
hold of the Governor likewise. With my other hand, I will take hold of you, and bring you 
together."71 Teedyuscung, then, was the link between Pennsylvania and the Six Nations 
(Haudenosaunee) on the one hand, and the Ohio Indians on the other. Not only did he 
seek to bolster his power by fashioning himself as a grand mediator, he also sought to 
dramatically alter North America's political landscape. He sought to bring the old 
"Covenant Chain" to the Ohio Country. It was an idea that would bolster his own power, 
and give the British an advantage over their French foes. 
 Teedyuscung's proposal was grounded in fantasy. Few, particularly those among 
the Ohio Indians, recognized the Delaware as a viable leader with the authority to create 
and lead a coalition of "ten nations." Just as importantly, the idea was rejected by the 
leaders of the Six Nations who were also present in 1757. The Haudenosaunee had long 
claimed superior status among the Crown's Indian allies. During the Seven Years War, 
Sir William Johnson, a man closely connected with Six Nations' leadership, tried 
desperately to convince them to join the British in the fight against the French. The 
British promised to recognize the Six Nations’ fictional authority over southern and 
western lands and peoples so long as they then turned over those lands to the British as 
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part of their alliance.72 From the Six Nations' perspective, it was a means to ensure that 
Iroquoia remained protected against British encroachments; from the Crown's 
perspective, the agreement granted them political authority over lands and peoples that it 
had never conquered. The Six Nations had already declared Delawares to be "women" 
and subordinated them to the council at Onondaga, and so, in 1757, Pennsylvania 
supported its Haudenosaunee allies and dismissed Teedyuscung's proposal.73 
 The Six Nations, however, went further. They referred to them as “nephews” 
rather than “grandfathers” and reduced the Delawares under Teedyuscung's leadership to 
the status of tributary nation, while also allowing them to occupy lands in the Wyoming 
Valley. What was more, they co-opted Teedyuscung's role as mediator. They informed all 
gathered,  
that we have not only brought about this Union with our Nephews on the 
Waters of the River Susquehannah, but also have sent Messages to our 
Nephews, the Delawares and Minisinks, and to those likewise of our own 
Nations, who are on the Ohio under the influence of the French; We have 
told all these that they must lay down the French Hatchet, and be 
reconciled to their Brethren, the English, and never more employ it against 
them, and we hope they will take our advice; We, the Mohocks, Senecas 
and Onondagas, deliver this String of Wampum to remove the Hatchet out 
of your Heads that has been struck into them by the Ohio Indians, in order 
to lay a Foundation for Peace.74 
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 If the Friendly Association's goal was peace alone, then the council and the 
subsequent 1758 Treaty of Easton was immensely satisfying. If, as was more likely, they 
hoped to secure some semblance of political authority in the colony and heal divisions 
within their society, then the aftermath of the council was disastrous. Teedyuscung, the 
association's principal ally, was politically impotent. What was more, Friends received no 
credit for the peace despite their earlier attempts to convince others of their political 
support in London. Indeed, several months after the 1758 treaty, Philadelphia Quakers 
"received undoubted Intelligence from our Friends in London" that a circulating report 
"designed to lay on us the whole Blame of the late Indian Ravages."75 London Friends 
were in turn "desirous of receiving from the Governor and Council the whole of these 
Charges in such manner that we may acquit ourselves" and protest their "Interest and 
reputation as a Religious Society."76 Not only had Philadelphia Friends failed to secure 
political capital, but they had also failed to heal the growing internal tensions within the 
Society of Friends. Indeed, they had made matters worse. The London Yearly Meeting 
redoubled its efforts to encourage its members to minimize their involvement in 
governmental affairs.77  
 Despite cautions from the London and Philadelphia meetings, in 1759 Pemberton 
opened a store near Fort Pitt in order to provide wares to nearby Indians at a reasonable 
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price.78 His efforts were, in many ways, a continuation of his earlier work among the 
Indians during the war. They stemmed from a perceived sense of benevolence, but, unlike 
the earlier peace efforts, they also incorporated his economic ambitions. Members of the 
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting chastised Pemberton in an effort to enforce recent calls to 
embrace simplicity and minimal engagement with the world. They explained that "we did 
desire thee not to prossecute thy Intentions of Fixing a Licenc'd Trade with the Indians in 
the manner thou propos'd."79 Instead of embracing his fellow Quakers' perspectives, 
however, Pemberton continued to frame his work as misunderstood benevolence. Indeed, 
in a letter to the Moravian missionary Christian Frederick Post, Pemberton reflected that 
"[p]arts of the Service which fall to our Lotts may subject us to divers Difficulties & 
Inconveniences some of the greatest is that of being often blamed & censured by those 
we love & Esteem, yet if he who knows the Secrets of all Hearts approves of our 
Intentions, he can & will in due time manifest our Integrity & reward us openly."80  
 While Pemberton struggled to square his own efforts with the demands of his 
yearly meeting, Teedyuscung succumbed to bribery and alcohol. In an effort to bury the 
Walking Purchase issue for good, Pennsylvania's Provincial Council offered 
Teedyuscung £400 in 1762 to claim that "[h]e himself knew nothing of the Proprietors 
cheating them, and was sorry it had reached their Hearts."81 The council then "asked 
                                                
78 The most complete compilation of Pemberton's life before, during, and after the Seven Years 
War is Thayer's biography of the man. Theodore Thayer, Israel Pemberton: King of the Quakers 
(Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1943). 
79 William Calendar, Jos. Morris, John Reynell, Jacob Lewis, Owen Jones, Rich Wistar, Jacob 
Shoemaker, Jr., Thomas Say to Israel Pemberton, 1st Month, 26, 1759, Pemberton Family Papers, 
Haverford College Special Collections, Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania. 
80 Israel Pemberton to Christian Frederick Post, 6.5 Month, 1760, “Pemberton Family Papers, 
1741-1789,” Haverford College Special Collections, Haverford College, Haverford, PA. 
81 Colonial Records, VIII, 708. 
 
 
51 
whether the Indians had ever conferr'd together about the Lands they said were never sold 
by them to the Proprietors, He answered that they had, & that they would be contented 
with £400."82 Teedyuscung was murdered by arsonists—likely representatives of the 
Susquehanna Company of Connecticut—the following year during an attack on the 
Delawares' settlement in the Wyoming Valley.83  
 
* * * 
 The attack on the Delawares' settlement was part of renewed violence in 
Pennsylvania. Once again, Pennsylvanians pushed onto Indian lands to the fury of 
western Indians. A group of Euroamerican men expressed their frustrations with the 
government's ineptitude, dubbed themselves the Paxton Boys, and determined to take 
measures into their own hands. Indeed, they argued that the "Quakers may talk what they 
will of the Happiness & Justice of their Administration, but...their want of the Principles 
of Justice & the common Feelings of human Nature for the distressed" meant "that we 
cannot but blame them as the Cause of many of our Sufferings."84 When the Philadelphia 
Yearly Meeting chastised Pemberton for opening a store, then, it did it because it knew 
that prevailing political attitudes did not look upon it favorably, and it wished to remain, 
at least for a time, distant from Indian affairs. For a religious group whose own historical 
beginnings were clouded in violence and ostracization, others' scorn was a potent 
concern.  
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 The Paxton Boys called into question Quakers' past political leadership by 
pushing the Society of Friends’ pacifism to the forefront of discourse once more. Rather 
than lament Quakers’ inability to raise funds or pursue war, however, the men questioned 
Friends' very humanity by questioning their ability to care about "the distressed." For 
Friends in the colony and in London, the problem was serious. One Friend informed 
another that the Paxton men "were still roving about in companys, and that in all their 
Revels, they Breath vengeance against Is Pemberton...as well as against many others."85 
After the Paxton Boys' brutal murder of Conestoga Indians near and at Lancaster, they set 
their sights on killing both Moravian Indians in Philadelphia and Israel Pemberton. More 
generally, a flurry of pamphlets almost universally blamed the Quakers for the recent 
violence.86 Friends' political past and the Friendly Association's efforts combined to 
render the Quakers widely hated among their fellow Pennsylvania colonists.  
 Friends' troubles did not cease once peace returned to Pennsylvania in the mid-
1760s. Instead, the American Revolution exacerbated Friends' political woes. News of 
rebellion gripped Philadelphia in 1774, and it forced both the Philadelphia Yearly 
Meeting and individual Friends to confront the practicalities, once again, of wartime 
politics. The yearly meeting condemned opposition to Great Britain, and admonished its 
members against participating in protests. The stance proved problematic for both those 
Quakers who harbored sympathies for colonial independence as well as for those who 
advocated pacifist neutrality. As a result, "Free Quakers" organized in Philadelphia and 
moved to contribute money to the cause and take up arms. Those who chose the 
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increasingly strict policies of the meeting endeavored to remain above the fray. As 
scholars such as Sydney James suggest, however, many non-Quaker Pennsylvanians 
often confused these latter Friends' neutrality with loyalism.87 Officials jailed numerous 
of Philadelphia's Friends for suspected loyalties to the British, and they exiled others. 
They sent Israel Pemberton, for example, to western Virginia for failing to take a loyalty 
oath—an oath that violated his religious principles.88  
 Over time, however, the yearly meeting softened its anti-Revolution position, and 
increasing concern over the slave trade pushed some Friends to take on variations of the 
philanthropic work that Israel Pemberton continued after the Seven Years War. Sydney 
James points out that Friends in Philadelphia—as well as in other meetings in eastern 
North America—offered relief for the victims of war in 1775, including those Friends 
who lived in rebellious and besieged Boston as well as their Quaker and non-Quaker 
neighbors in Philadelphia in 1776.89 The war years—and the accompanying internal 
squabbling—pushed Friends to repair their reputation as a society among their peers. 
Crucially, Friends' wartime philanthropy gained sanction from the yearly meetings in 
Philadelphia and London, and it meant that the meetings officially recognized such 
efforts as a means to heal internal divisions and garner political capital.  
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Native peoples' politics proved to be just as complicated during the Revolution as 
they had been during the Seven Years War, and, like the Quakers, many communities 
faced internal divisions. Some were pro-American, some favored the British, and others 
desired neutrality.90 Colin Calloway demonstrates that, for Shawnees in particular, the 
American Revolution offered an opportunity to form an alliance with the British and 
recommence their quest to secure the lower Ohio Valley lands against Euroamerican 
encroachments. For many Shawnees and Six Nations peoples alike, the political 
ramifications of the war centered on the destruction of their lands, communities, and 
crops.91 The Revolution, then, brought about devastating economic and political 
consequences, but it also offered an opportunity to protect, maintain, or reaffirm the 
boundaries of Indians' lands. It was, in many ways, part of the ongoing battle for the Ohio 
Country—waged since Delawares fought to keep westward roaming Pennsylvanians off 
of their lands during the 1750s and 1760s—and it offered the hope that Native peoples 
could serve their own political agendas during a contest between their two Euroamerican 
neighbors.  
Despite the complicated geopolitics of war and alliance, the 1783 Treaty of Paris 
declared that, as British allies, Native peoples lost the war. If the treaty signers did not 
lump a particular Indian nation along with the losing British allies, they ignored their 
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presence on the map of North America altogether. Indeed, the British abandoned their 
Indian allies during peace negotiations. Consequently, more of the Delawares chose to 
migrate westward and, in doing so, they endeavored to keep much of their culture and 
political organization intact. Others, however, remained and continued the fight—
whether through violence or simple occupation—for their lands.92 
Indeed, while the American victors claimed authority over Ohio Valley lands 
once claimed by the British, Delawares, Shawnees, and other Ohio Country Indians did 
not recognize those rights to their lands. Disputes over the controversial Kentucky region, 
proved especially difficult to resolve. Ohio Indians raided settlers through the 1780s and 
early 1790s, and they put financial, political, and military strain on the young U.S. state at 
a time when its inhabitants were testing its authority in episodes such as Shays's 
Rebellion.93 The region's Indians also partnered with the British, still lingering in Ohio 
Country forts after the Revolution, in efforts to thwart U.S. expansion.  One official noted 
in 1784 that “the British keep within those garrisons, several Americans who were taken 
prisoners by the Indians under their direction” and that Congress should “take such 
measures as becomes the honor of the United States so flagrantly wounded by the 
Officers of the King of Great Britain.”94 Indians' alliances thus ensured that the United 
States' dreams of unfettered expansion remained elusive.  
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The U.S. state, meanwhile, attempted to wed dream with reality with a series of 
ordinances in the 1780s. The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, in particular, proved crucial to 
both the processes of empire building and state building during the nineteenth century. At 
its most basic level, the 1787 ordinance provided a procedure for territories' incorporation 
into the U.S. as states, and it sketched a plan for their government. The United States 
Congress appointed territorial governors and secretaries, and territorial officials were to 
"adopt and publish in the district such laws of the original States, criminal and civil, as 
may be necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the district, and report them to 
Congress from time to time."95 It was a practical system, and it was also a clear assertion 
of federal power over states and territories that enabled the republic to avoid formerly 
articulating its status as an imperial power. Congressional power over the territories 
meant that subsequent states and territories must adopt laws, procedures, and rights of 
"the original States" that were "not repugnant to the principles and articles" of the 
Ordinance created by the federal government.96 It was, in essence, a plan for self-
replication across the continent. What was more, the legislation required "an oath or 
affirmation of fidelity and of office; the governor before the president of congress, and all 
other officers before the Governor."97 The territories thus had their own governments, 
laws, courts, even a representative in Congress, but all were subject to congressional 
approval or to the approval of a congressional appointee. Lastly, the Ordinance explicitly 
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banned slavery in the Northwest territories, revealing that the federal government claimed 
the power to limit the extension of slavery and to define the property rights of individuals 
living beyond the bounds of the original state. Power flowed from the center outward and 
the Northwest Ordinance should be interpreted as a watershed moment in defining the 
federal state's powers.98  
The Northwest Ordinance codified the United States' imperial ambitions, but the 
mechanics of empire nonetheless remained uncertain and obscured—many Americans 
did not wish to consider themselves constituents of a new empire. The U.S. federal state 
was small, and its Articles of Confederation did it no favors. The loose confederation of 
states meant that the federal government lacked the resources to colonize a continent and 
its peoples by force. Such a political organization was, in some ways, the result of 
Americans' victory in a revolutionary contest that concerned, largely, competing visions 
of empire. With victory, Americans' initial vision for empire prevailed. The functioning 
of the British Empire in eastern North America had been predicated on the mutual 
consent of its constituent parts. A delicate and contested balance of power existed 
between the center and the periphery with the colonies subordinate to metropolitan 
authority and colonial inhabitants vested with the rights of Englishmen and substantial 
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power over the conduct of local affairs.99 Britain's North American colonists had found 
this arrangement increasingly frustrating. When the Crown attempted to pay its war debts 
with new taxes after the Seven Years War, for example, the colonists affirmed their 
perceived right to be governed by consent and insisted, by the 1770s, that "taxation 
without representation" was unjust. Many colonists wished to govern their own internal 
affairs, and, through protest, they articulated their own imperial vision in which multiple 
centers were connected by mutual affinity. 
That arrangement, however, proved practically problematic for a migratory 
population, and the Northwest Ordinance thus not only bolstered federal power and 
vested it with the ability to expand its territorial reach, but it also suggested a new mode 
of empire. Jack Greene argues that revolutionary Americans separated from Britain in 
part because they envisioned the relationship between "peripheries and center" to be one 
of mutually constitutive parts, but the Ordinance legislation suggests that, at least for 
1787 policy-makers, this was no longer the case.100 Episodes such as Shays's Rebellion 
seemed to suggest for some policy-makers that limited, decentralized power was 
inadequate. The problem posed by the continent's Indian peoples did so likewise. 
The Northwest Ordinance declared that "[t]he utmost good faith shall always be 
observed towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them 
without their consent; and, in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be 
invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress."101 The 
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document thus presumed Euroamerican immigration to the region, and it also implicitly 
presumed future land sales. It presumed, in other words, settler colonialism. This posed a 
conundrum, however, with regard to U.S. Indian relations. If Native peoples' property 
could "never be taken from them without their consent," then the United States needed to 
translate and transform Native peoples' ideas regarding land into ones of private property, 
so that they would be intelligible to Euroamerican land buyers. Such a transformation 
would promise peaceful dealings with the Indians, and it would facilitate the new U.S. 
policy of buying Indian lands through formal treaties. In the meantime, however, the 
United States government erased Indians' alternative conceptions of the land, and instead, 
as the ordinance's text reveals, assumed that ideas of property were already mutually 
intelligible. 
 With the pressures of U.S. immigration to the region, however, tensions continued 
to mount. Skirmishes abounded in the Ohio Country during the 1780s. Just two years 
after the ordinance's presumptions regarding private property, the U.S. federal 
government endeavored to begin the hard work of altering Native peoples' conceptions of 
their lands. To do so, Secretary of War Henry Knox devised a plan to transform the 
continent's Native peoples into yeoman farmers. He enlisted the aid of missionaries, and 
his plan is the product of a small, indebted state bent on territorial acquisition premised 
on the ideas of commoditized private property and recognition of indigenous peoples’ 
persistence. It articulated Americans’ desires for the “west,” but also offered an implicit 
acknowledgment that the state required assistance. Indeed, Knox declared in 1789, 
"[m]issionaries of excellent moral character should be appointed to reside in their nation, 
who should be well supplied with all the implements of husbandry and the necessary 
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stock for a farm. These men should be made the instruments to work on the indians."102 
In the Ohio Country, however, Knox’s plan remained an idea into the 1790s. Ohio 
Indians’ politics intervened, prevented that idea from being translated into action, and 
prompted Friends to continue their diplomatic work, this time alongside U.S. officials. 
 
* * * 
 Given their history, Philadelphia's Quakers were accustomed to cultivating 
political partnerships that proved mutually beneficial. Like their relationship with the 
Delawares in colonial Pennsylvania, the Quakers struck up a partnership with the U.S. 
federal state in an effort to achieve their own political and philanthropic ends. Indeed, 
Friends' willingness to engage with public philanthropic projects continued after the 
American Revolution, and they resumed, once again, their diplomatic work in Indian 
Country.103 Friends and Delawares' relationship during the Seven Years War was one that 
bred continuity between the eras of the British and American empires in North America. 
The situation in the Ohio Country was tense, and with the outbreak of war in 1790s, 
individual Friends once again perceived an opportunity to benefit Indian peoples, serve 
the public, and remain true to their religious principles.   
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Chapter 2 
Resurrecting the "Chain of Friendship": The International Politics of Intercultural 
Diplomacy 
 
 
 In the heat of June 1791, Quaker John Parrish dined with Colonel Timothy 
Pickering, then a U.S. commissioner to the Six Nations, "12 or 15 Sachems and head 
wariors of the Six Nations," and an interpreter in western New York. Conversation was 
friendly, and the food, in Parrish's opinion, somewhat too lavish given both his Quaker 
taste for simplicity and the fact that a war was on. After several servers cleared the table, 
Parrish solicited the group's interpreter to aid him in offering the diners a speech on 
behalf of the Philadelphia Society of Friends. Parrish informed the Haudenosaunee men 
that he was of the "peaceable people called Quakers," and that he and his brethren had 
come "with a design to see our Bretheren the Indians and take them by the hand and 
brighten the Chane of friendship agreeably to the Custom of their friends our Ancestors." 
He explained that "the People called Quakers came into this country with Wm Penn a 
bout 108 Years ago and in consequence of which lived together a bout 70 Years in 
uninterrupted Peace & fellowship." In his opinion, "if the Indians desire[d] to perpetuate 
the same friendly disposition...a peace of still longer continuance may be the happy 
consequence of the Presant Treaty." Towards the end of this speechmaking, however, 
another commissioner interrupted him and insisted, "there was none but men of Peace 
presant." Parrish later reflected that the statement "occationed me to stop shorter than 
otherwise I should have done."104  
                                                
104 John Parrish journals, William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan, Journal, 
"Concerning Treaty at Newtown Point Indian Treaty 1791," 5th day 30 [June 30], 1791 (hereafter 
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 Despite this latter commissioner’s brusqueness, Parrish’s inclusion at the 
diplomatic dinner was purposeful, though his role was ill-defined. Friends’ history of 
cooperation with Native peoples rendered Quakers useful both to the U.S. government 
and to Native polities and their leaders, but Friends’ inclusion in official proceedings was 
a relatively new phenomenon. Some, like the second commissioner, were not yet 
accustomed to the prominence top U.S. officials like Pickering afforded non-
governmental diplomats. Even Parrish—whose diplomatic speech irritated at least one 
Oneida diner that evening—lacked familiarity with his new position. Indeed, shortly after 
Parrish spoke the Oneida Good Peter informed him that "we ware now in a free freindly 
conversation between Brothers it was not the business of the Treaty we ware not at the 
Council Fire.”105 Parrish erred by speaking of official business at an informal gathering—
a rare mistake given that Friends were, by the 1790s, savvy diplomats. But his mistake 
was born from his position in flux. During the 1790s the Society of Friends operated as a 
private organization that, unlike during the 1750s, cooperated openly with the U.S. 
federal government. The federal state was still small and, similar to the ways of the 
French empire in North America, the legitimization of U.S. overtures of peace by a few 
well-connected missionaries was essential to the early United State’s ability to assert and 
exert authority in far-flung locales—particularly in the Ohio Country where a host of 
Native nations vied for power.106 Friends’ usefulness and their emerging partnership with 
                                                
referred to as vol. 2). John Parrish compiled a memoir and five journals between c. 1790 and 
1793. The consistency of dating and pagination within each volume vary. 
105 Parrish journal, 5th day 30 [June 30], 1791. 
106 With men like John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and William Eaton acting as peace 
commissioners in Europe and North Africa during these years of war, missionary men became 
useful stand-ins in Indian Country, and they established a paradigm of U.S. missionary diplomacy 
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the U.S. government thus was born from necessity, and it encouraged a paradigm of 
federal cooperation with non-governmental organizations.  
As Good Peter’s criticism of Parrish’s speech reveals, however, the Quaker’s 
status was confused not simply because of the society’s increasing connection with the 
federal state, but because of Native polities’ uncertain political status in U.S. politics. On 
paper, they were neither foreign or domestic, while in practice, Native peoples were, for 
all intents and purposes, necessarily treated as sovereign nations. At the 1791 table, 
Pickering was aware of Haudenosaunee diplomatic politics, and he acceded to their 
desires, expectations, and standing alliances. The Six Nations had a long history of 
working with—though sometimes against—the Society of Friends, and Friends were 
useful allies to have. As a result of Native nations’ power on the ground, the U.S. 
government allied itself with the Society of Friends, Parrish its representative, and, 
ultimately, the Society’s agenda. Native nations, their authority intact as evidenced by 
Pickering's inviting a Quaker diplomat to dinner, ensured that they both checked and 
shaped the United States' imperial ambitions in the Ohio Country. They forced the United 
States to recognize Native sovereignty in the dinners and pipe-smoking affairs that 
                                                
that enabled the United States to extend its diplomatic presence in North America and abroad by 
expanding its diplomatic contingent. 
One may also draw parallels between the Spanish Empire and the United States. Like 
Spanish efforts to evangelize Indian peoples, the U.S. state explicitly supported a federal program 
of "civilization" that both wove together and exported religious and social ideals. For analyses of 
missionaries and imperial states, see J.H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and 
Spain in America, 1492-1830 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), in particular, 57-87; 
Carole Blackburn, Harvest of Souls: The Jesuit Missions and Colonialism in North America, 
1632-1650 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000); Elizabeth Jones, Gentlemen and 
Jesuits: Quests for Glory and Adventure in the Early Days of New France (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1986); Robert H. Jackson and Edward Castillo, Indians, Franciscans, and Spanish 
Colonization: The Impact of the Mission System on California Indians (Albuquerque, NM: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1995). 
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characterized U.S.-Indian diplomacy—even if U.S. officials had other ideas on paper—
and they ultimately compelled a partnership between the U.S. federal government and 
non-governmental organizations like the Society of Friends.107  
 
* * * 
In 1789, Secretary of War Henry Knox wrote to President George Washington, 
"Indians ought to be considered as foreign nations, not as the subjects of any particular 
state." He penned the words within a broader dialogical context of the struggle between 
federal authority and the power of the states, with an argument for the "foreign" status of 
Native nations uttered, in part, to bolster the Federalist viewpoint. Knox’s statement was 
also, however, a consequence of wartime exigency. The Treaty of Paris ending the 
American Revolution attempted to obliterate Indians’ claims to Ohio Valley and 
southeastern lands, but it ultimately failed in its aim. In the southeast, the Creeks 
effectively played Spanish interests off of American, and for a time, they maintained their 
lands in the region. Alexander McGillivray, a Creek with Scottish heritage, was crucial to 
that effort, and he, like the Shawnee Blue Jacket and Miami Little Turtle in the Ohio 
Country, maintained connections with competing Euroamerican officials to do so.108 For 
a republic that struggled to raise revenue or field militias adequate to the task of quieting 
citizen rebellions such as Shays’s Rebellion in Massachusetts, the ongoing persistence of 
                                                
107 Parrish was one among several other missionary brokers during this period: the Moravian John 
Heckewelder and other members of the Society of Friends were also occasionally among the 
government’s dinner guests. 
108 The ongoing Spanish presence in Florida after the American Revolution enabled the Creeks to 
continue to play imperial powers off of one another. See Thomas D. Watson, “Strivings for 
Sovereignty: Alexander McGillivray, Creek Warfare, and Diplomacy, 1783-1790,” The Florida 
Historical Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Apr., 1980), 400-414. 
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Native peoples—complete with skirmishing in the Ohio Valley during the 1780s—
pushed Knox to articulate a relationship between Indian nations and the federal 
government, just as it had pushed him to conceive of the civilization plan in 1789. 
That relationship, however, was a contested and confused one. Knox’s claim that 
Native nations were “foreign” was a novel one, particularly in comparison to the 
Constitution’s suggestion that Native polities were neither foreign or domestic. John 
Parrish’s inclusion as part of the U.S. diplomatic apparatus, however, suggests that during 
the 1790s the United States recognized Native nations' sovereign power (and its 
subsequent need to court that power) in practice—the United States’ own diplomatic 
apparatus was insufficient—while treaty relationships similarly showcased the 
international nature of U.S. dealings with various Native American polities.  
The early national understanding of a hierarchy of nations, however, influenced 
the articulation of Native nations' place in the Constitution's all-important commerce 
clause. The clause lists "the Indian tribes" as distinct from "foreign nations" but also from 
"the several States." They were a uniquely ambiguous political entity, at least in the 
rhetoric of U.S. statecraft, and here it is evident that the founders' understanding of 
foreign relations collided with their North American imperialist desires. Native nations 
were foreign nations, but something more uncertain on paper and in practice. Indeed, one 
of the central elements of U.S. Indian policy, for example, the 1790 Trade and 
Intercourse Act, was built upon the ambiguous status of Native polities as articulated in 
the commerce clause. The act endeavored to control U.S. citizens' ability to buy and sell 
goods in Indian Country, and it prohibited Americans or individual U.S. states from 
buying Indian lands. It ultimately attempted to bolster the power of the U.S. state in its 
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dealings in Indian Country and also over its citizenry. Because the act asserted the power 
of the federal government to buy lands and issue trading licenses, however, it 
simultaneously recognized Native nations' sovereignty. The federal state dealt with 
Indian nations, and that, in turn, rendered individual Native nations the federal 
government’s diplomatic equivalent. With the Trade and Intercourse acts the federal state 
attempted to articulate its own powers and, by necessity, those of Native polities.109   
The United States issued the Trade and Intercourse Act in an attempt both to ward 
off British traders and to regulate settler colonization of Indian lands. The acts also 
exposed the republic’s commitment to building its fledgling economy. Indian affairs 
became crucial to that task—a trend that proved enduring. The federal government seized 
upon its ambiguous relationship with Native nations in order to ensure that trade revenues 
became federal revenues.  
Native polities’ political status remained contested for decades after Knox’s 
statement. Indeed, Chief Justice John Marshall's infamous 1831 ruling in which he 
declared the Cherokee Nation and all other Indian nations "domestic dependent nations," 
contributed to an on-going argument concerning North America's Indian polities. He 
ultimately declared that they were considered and treated by the U.S. government as 
"foreign nations" prior to Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia:  
They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our 
country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States 
                                                
109 For histories of the Trade and Intercourse Act, see Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian 
Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts 1790-1834 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). Deborah Rosen highlights the role of the states and courts 
in Indian policy shaping U.S. Indian policy and in sometimes pushing against the federal trade 
and intercourse acts.  See Deborah A. Rosen, “Colonization through Law: The Judicial Defense 
of State Indian Legislation, 1790-1880,” The American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 46, No. 1 
(Jan., 2004), 26-54. 
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recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace 
and war, of being responsible in their political character for any violation 
of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of 
the United States by any individual of their community. Laws have been 
enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our government plainly 
recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those 
acts. 
 
Marshall went on to declare Native nations "domestic dependent nations" as a 
consequence of his reading of the U.S. Constitution, and as the result of his wondering 
"whether the Cherokee constitute a foreign state in the sense of the constitution." That 
document, at best, couched relations with Indian nations in vague terms and, at worst, 
endeavored to utilize Indian policy in the creation of a powerful state. Knox's declaration 
that Native nations were "foreign nations," coupled with U.S.-Native diplomatic 
protocols, however, reveals the extent to which the U.S. Constitution's framers not only 
sought to create the U.S. state, but sought to create the U.S. imperial state predicated 
upon fictions that transformed Indian sovereignty into an uncertainty.110  
 Indeed, there was a tension between policy and law on the one hand and the actual 
workings of U.S -Native relations on the other: encounters revealed that the U.S. state's 
imperial policy—and the government’s inclusion of missionaries into its diplomatic 
apparatus—was produced as a result of Native nations' sovereignty. For men like Knox 
and Parrish—the people conducting the actual work of diplomacy in Indian Country—
Native polities had to be treated as foreign nations. Indeed, despite the historiographical 
trend to interpret the rise of the U.S. nation-state in conversation with the decline of 
                                                
110 Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, italics mine. 
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Native sovereign authority, U.S.-Native relations show that Natives' sovereignty 
remained intact after the American Revolution and into the nineteenth century. 
While officials debated, disagreed, and harbored inconsistent ideas regarding 
Indians’ status vis a vis the United States, they constructed Indian policies in the context 
of their dealings with other polities. The Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, 
supported a foreign policy that simultaneously promoted a global United States 
reputation of strength and increased government revenues. He advocated for 
congressional regulation of foreign commerce—like he did the Indian trade with the trade 
and intercourse acts—in an attempt to ensure that the federal government reaped the 
financial benefits of global trade. Revenues and centralized power were the primary goals 
of both Indian policy and foreign policy more broadly.111  
 Beyond financial policy, federal officials treated Indian nations in ways 
reminiscent of their relations with the North African states. With the Treaty of Paris in 
1783 and the subsequent loss of British imperial protection in the Mediterranean, the 
United States negotiated treaties with the various Barbary States in order to avoid the 
seizure of American ships' cargoes and crewmen. Such treaties were similar to captive 
exchange negotiations in Indian Country. What was more, the United States continued to 
engage in practices of federally-funded gift-giving and ransom payments to the North 
African nations into the nineteenth century. Given its still-small state apparatus and 
limited budget, it is not surprising that the U.S. balanced its engagements among both 
Indian nations and the Barbary States with isolation from European conflicts as a matter 
                                                
111 Douglas A. Irwin, "Revenue or Reciprocity?: Founding Feuds over Early U.S. Trade Policy" 
in Douglas A. Irwin and Richard Sylla, eds., Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in 
the 1790s (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 89-120. 
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of imperial necessity. Native polities—like their North African counterparts—forced the 
United States to construct a very particular foreign relations agenda, one of balanced—
and selective—military and diplomatic engagement. In the discourses and policies of 
statecraft, Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, and the Indian nations were sovereign, but, in 
keeping with a commitment to ambiguity and the advantages that accompanied that 
status, U.S. officials also deemed these polities as among the more "barbaric" nations of 
the world.112  
Knox’s need to frame Indian affairs in the context of federal power was a 
consequence of his understanding of both Native and global diplomatic politics, and it 
was also the result of U.S. officials’ familiarity with the potency of Native authority in 
                                                
112 In an excellent contextualization of Washington's "Farewell Address," Marie-Jeanne Rossignol 
argues that ideas of "isolation" were related to U.S. desires to expand in North America and 
protect economic interests in the Mediterranean. See Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, "Early Isolationism 
Revisited: Neutrality and Beyond in the 1790s," Journal of American Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 
(Aug., 1995), 215-227. There were also parallels, namely treaty agreements concerning captives, 
between U.S. responses to captive-taking practices in the Barbary States and Indian Country. One 
Moroccan emperor, moreover, captured American sailors after failing to receive a present from 
the United States; gift-giving, then, was just as important in the Mediterranean world as it was in 
Indian Country. For Barbary captives, see Gary E. Wilson, "American Hostages in Moslem 
Nations, 1784-1796: The Public Response," Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 2, No. 2 
(Summer, 1982), 123-141; Martha Elena Rojas, "'Insults Unpunished': Barbary Captives, 
American Slaves, and the Negotiation of Liberty," Early American Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 
2003), 159-186, see in particular pp. 165, 170. 
 President Jefferson opened his "First Annual Message to Congress" with a survey of U.S. 
relations with European nations, followed by Indians, and then the Barbary States; his description 
of each belies a hierarchical ordering of their perceived sovereignty, with Indian nations, 
conveniently for dreams of U.S. empire in North America, appearing the least sovereign. See 
"First Annual Message" (December 8, 1801), in Thomas Jefferson, Writings, Merrill D. Peterson, 
ed., vol. 15 of The Library of America (New York, 1984), 501-502. See also Eliga H. Gould, 
Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a New World 
Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). For a comparative analysis of Britain's 
hierarchy of nations see Edward Keene, "A Case Study of the Construction of International 
Hierarchy: British Treaty-Making against the Slave Trade in the Early Nineteenth Century," 
International Organization, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring 2007), 311-339; 
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practice.113 Parrish observed diplomatic pageantry that suggested both federal and Indian 
sovereignty—as well as his own conception of both. Prior to the treaty proceedings in 
1791, for example, Parrish witnessed three to four hundred Senecas marching into 
Colonel Pickering's encampment. The "wariers...came in Indian file with their Rifles on 
their sholders and drew themselves up in a line by the [colonel's] Tent and gave him 2 
Sallutes by the discharge of their guns, which the Colonel received as a mark of respect." 
Not only was this a show of Seneca military power, but Pickering's reception of their 
army, along with the Seneca salutes, suggests that the Senecas, in the eyes of both 
Pickering and Parrish who interpreted the events, were incorporated into the 
Euroamericans' own framework of state-backed military power.114  
 On yet another occasion of Seneca military parade, "about 50 Indians" formed "a 
line near the Coln." and "sent and fired 3 sallutes & informed that their was as many 
more on their way." The marching indicated that the Seneca Nation possessed an army, 
even if it was not, at the moment, hostile; the assurances that more warriors were 
available conveyed a claim to power but also a subtle threat. The Senecas' military 
showing demonstrated that they possessed the power of arms, men, and respect, and it 
served as a means to translate Native sovereignty into a performative diplomatic space 
that was easily understood by U.S. officials. Such a show facilitated Senecas' ability to 
minimize their cultural differences while also asserting their place—and thus both 
                                                
113 Historian Leonard Sadosky's work on early American diplomacy situates both Indian affairs 
and U.S. relations with European empires in a single conversation, but it does so by privileging a 
top-down view of history, and it thus tells a tale of high-level statecraft, leaving Knox's statement 
fixed in the realm of Federalist-Democratic Republican politics. See Sodosky, Revolutionary 
Negotiations: Indians, Empires, and Diplomats in the Founding of America (Jeffersonian 
America) (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2010), in particular, chapter 5. 
114 Parrish, 4th day, the 29th [June 29], 1791, vol. 2. 
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eroding and maintaining political difference—among the many nations that the United 
States government recognized as sovereign. The meeting of two sovereign polities—each 
foreign to the other—created such spaces, and they were representative of each power’s 
attempt to find a common performative language that would render one intelligible to the 
other.115  
  These elaborate spaces of diplomacy further complicated—and enshrined—U.S. 
officials' already ambiguous perceptions of Native leaders and Native nations' political 
standing. For John Parrish, Native leaders were the equivalents of the most prominent 
European statesmen. Parrish described the Shawnee Blue Jacket's "person and 
appearence" as "much like the great men such as an Admiral or General." When, in 1791, 
moreover, the Seneca Red Jacket spoke to Pickering and others of the U.S. diplomatic 
entourage, Parrish reflected that the chief's "appearance and maner his eliquence and 
person I concluded would out no inconsiderable figure on the flore of a British Parliment 
or an American Congress I do not remember have seen any states man make a more 
magisterial appearence." The Quaker understood Red Jacket as belonging to the realms of 
diplomacy and international politics, while Pickering, who received the Seneca statesmen 
in the company of Parrish and an interpreter, legitimated the Seneca's claim to authority 
by engaging in Six Nations diplomatic traditions of speech-making. Parrish's presence, a 
consequence of Pickering's appeal to Six Nations' alliances and protocols, likewise 
underscored the power of the Six Nations in western New York; Colonel Pickering 
                                                
115 Parrish, 6th of the 7th month [July 6], 1791, ibid. Like dress, these military parades were 
central to performing diplomacy. See Timothy J. Shannon, "Dressing for Success on the Mohawk 
Frontier: Hendrick, William Johnson, and the Indian Fashion," The William and Mary Quarterly, 
Third Series, Vol. 53, No. 1, Material Culture in Early America (Jan., 1996), 13-42. 
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encouraged the Quaker's participation in the meeting and thereby recognized the 
legitimacy of the Senecas and their diplomatic networks.116 
 Some private U.S. citizens likewise recognized the potency of Native sovereignty. 
One worried citizen, for example, perhaps a student, penned an essay in 1794 in an effort 
to answer the query "Is the prosecution of the present Indian War an advantage to the 
United States?" The answer reveals this citizen's understanding not only of the politics of 
states and war but of Native nations' relationship with the United States. The author, in 
prose that suggests a reading of Vattel's Law of Nations, contended that when "bodies of 
people have united themselves together in civil society" they may, "in order to answer the 
purpose of self-preservation more effectually," engage in war "against other bodies of 
people, who have encroached upon their liberty and rights....The prosecution of the 
present Indian war is in defence of personal safety. For, if we did not send an armed force 
to impede their incursions and savage cruelties, our frontiers would daily be diminished 
in number." Though the widely-read Law of Nations left the question of Indians’ political 
status ambiguous and suggested that Europeans had a right to Native lands because of a 
failure on the part of the latter to "cultivate the earth," this essayist nonetheless reveals 
that war was necessary for Americans' "self-preservation," and that Native nations and 
the United States were both "bodies of people." They were equals engaged in war 
because Native nations' threatened the United States' preservation; Indians threatened to 
"diminish" the "frontiers." Even if the essayist cultivated his or her opinion because of a 
desire to eradicate Native peoples or claim Indian lands, it remains that the politics of war 
                                                
116 Parrish, 3rd day, the 9th, 1793, vol. 4, 43; Parrish, 6th day, the 1st, 7th month [July 1], 1791, 
vol. 2. 
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necessitated an understanding of Native nations as "bodies of people”—an understanding 
that combined with their presumed inferior status based upon ideas of supposed 
"savagery" or "heathenism”—to render Native peoples’ status confusing in the eyes of 
common Americans as well. This provides a glimpse of early U.S. citizens' understanding 
of the international politics of war with Native nations.117 
 William Eaton, future U.S. consul to Tunis, similarly understood Native nations 
and their leaders as sovereign equivalents of the United States. Writing in 1793, he 
informed Stephen Jacobs that "the Indians are determined not to talk of a peace so long as 
one Federal American lives on the N West side of the Ohio." Here, Eaton revealed, 
somewhat unwittingly, that the U.S. desired peace with the Indians; this is especially 
significant given that treaty rhetoric usually involved presumptions of Native nations' 
desires for friendship. U.S.-Native diplomacy and the writings of U.S. citizens, however, 
reveal that such presumptions were the products of imperial fiction. Moreover, Eaton 
went on to tell his correspondent that he "heard the Cornplanter (a Commissioner & 
Chief from the Six Nations)" refuse to speak of peace "in the presence of, and in a talk 
with our Commander in Chief." Native "commissioners" and leaders, then, had a direct 
line of communication with the President of the United States. Many presidents did, in 
fact, receive visits from Native leaders in meetings and gatherings not unlike later U.S. 
                                                
117 1794 October 29. Unknown AD. Native American History collection, William L. Clements 
Library, The University of Michigan. Emer de Vattel's Law of Nations, widely read during this 
period, opens its first chapter with a description of states and sovereigns thus: "A nation or a state 
is, as has been said at the beginning of this work, a body politic, or a society of men united 
together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by their combined 
strength." See Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied 
to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and 
Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury, Bela Kapossy and Richard Whatmore, eds., (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2008). 
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state dinners, and Eaton's report reveals that he too envisioned Cornplanter as a statesman 
who dealt with the U.S. head of state.118 
 Eaton also understood Native nations, however, as possessing close ties with 
Britain; Friends were not, then, the only links in the Six Nations' chain of alliances. Like 
many Native North American nations, the Haudenosaunee, Shawnees, Wyandots, and 
others cultivated close ties with the British Empire and its representatives. The Seneca 
diplomat Red Jacket, for example, reminded Pickering in 1791 that diplomacy with his 
people—or any Indian nation—was not as simple as professing friendship. After 
Pickering asked the Seneca why his people sought the alliance of the British—a question 
that, alone, reveals Pickering's awareness of Native sovereignty—Red Jacket informed 
the colonel that "the British are our Anchant friends, they live near us when we treat with 
them they make use of Wampum which we understand they give us good advice...they 
make use of waighting when they speake to us." Since, according to Red Jacket, "not one 
man among us can read," when the United States violated Natives' customs of wampum-
giving and speechmaking during U.S. treaty-making, "then we are oblige to go to our 
Kneghbours the British to get them explaind us." Not only were the Six Nations' ties with 
the British the product of proximity, then, but it was because British officials made use of 
their knowledge of Native diplomatic protocols such as the exchange of wampum belts. 
When, on another occasion, the Seneca insisted, "we have our anchant customs I have 
one in my hand, (meaning the belt)," he emphasized that the meeting between the United 
States and his nation was one between two nations with diverse—and equally 
                                                
118 1793 April 15. William Eaton ALS to Stephen Jacobs, Native American History Collection, 
William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan. 
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significant—traditions. The Seneca’s insistence upon “anchant” customs likewise 
suggested his own conception of Senecas’ sovereignty, one grounded in a long past. As 
Pickering well knew by the 1790s, courting Native authority—and thus Native 
protocols—could produce a myriad of advantages in both the political and military 
realms. The United States' continuance of speechmaking, gift-giving, and other traditions 
in Indian affairs, then, was derived from an understanding that such appeals to Native 
traditions, along with the recognition that Native nations commanded power that required 
such appeals, fostered strong diplomatic relations. Appeals to Native authority were, 
simply, the product of smart foreign relations; enlisting Friends as unofficial diplomats 
who possessed vast knowledge of Native protocols was the same.119 
 Red Jacket's speech to Pickering also reveals much, moreover, about his own 
perceived power and that of his nation. The Seneca continued to explain "we desire you 
to appoint an agent for Indian Affairs to whom we may go to [tell] every thing that 
happens to us and from whom we may hear what concerns us as this used to be in old 
times." In responding to Pickering's query regarding the Six Nations' relationship with the 
British, Red Jacket made an appeal: he recognized the extent to which Pickering and the 
United States required the friendship of the Six Nations, and he used that knowledge in 
an attempt to acquire an Indian agent who would engage in reconnaissance for his nation. 
Such an individual would also serve as an ambassador between his nation and the United 
States. Though Red Jacket was no doubt aware that the United States commanded 
                                                
119 Parrish, 4th day, the 13th [July 13], 1791, vol. 2. Native nations wielded their alliances with 
Britain to assert political power in ways similar to those undertaken by African Americans by 
1830. See Van Gosse, "'As a Nation, the English Are Our Friends': The Emergence of African 
American Politics in the British Atlantic World, 1772-1861," The American Historical Review, 
Vol. 113, No. 4 (Oct., 2008), 1003-1028. 
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formidable power and that his people needed to work with that power (just as he knew 
that the United States needed to work with him), he nonetheless understood, rightfully, 
that the Six Nations were not a colonized people; they were a sovereign power.120 
 Native nations showcased their power when making appeals, but also in 
making clear—or purposefully obscuring—their own political agendas. Like the Society 
of Friends, the Mohican Hendrick Aupaumut was a useful ally of the United States, but 
he was also acted on behalf of his people. In 1791 Aupaumut visited the Ohio Indian 
nations "having agreed with the great men of the United States to take a Tour with their 
Message of peace." Six Nations leaders opposed his trip, yet still he went. To his mind, 
"if the western nations could be rightly informed of the desires of the United States—they 
would comply for peace." Such information, he argued, would be delivered best by "an 
Indian to whom they look upon as a true friend." Like Parrish and other diplomatic 
members of the Society of Friends, Aupaumut relied upon a peaceful past to make claims 
to power in a violent present. Indeed, his nation, the Mohicans, possessed a reputation for 
peace-making, and in describing the kinship relationships between the Mohicans, 
Miamis, Shawnees, Delawares, and others, he explained that "it was the business of our 
fathers to go around the Towns of these nations to renew the agreements between them—
And tell them many things which they discover in among the White people in the 
east."121  
                                                
120 Parrish, 4th day, the 13th [July 13], 1791, vol. 2. 
121 Hendrick Aupaumut, "Hendrick Aupaumut narratives of his mission to the Western tribes of 
Indians undated," p. 1, 4, Am. 573, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. For more on Aupaumut see, Rachel Wheeler, “Hendrick Aupaumut: Christian-
Mahican Prophet,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer, 2005), 187-220; Alan 
Taylor, “Captain Hendrick Aupaumut: The Dilemmas of an Intercultural Broker,” Ethnohistory, 
Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), 431-457. 
 
 
77 
 Aupaumut's travels through the contested Ohio Country as a diplomatic 
messenger reveal his close ties with the United States, but also his own political 
motivations. Indeed, the Mohican informed Delawares:  
since the British & Amaricans lay down their hatchets—then my Nation 
was forgotten. We never had had invitation to set in Council with the 
white people.—not as the 5 Nations & you are greatly regarded by the 
white people but last winter was the first time I had invitation from the 
great man of the United States...according to that invitation I went and 
after we arrived at Philadelphia—I find that the business was for the 
wellfare of all nations—and then I was asked whether I would carry a 
Message of peace to you, here.  
 
Aupaumut's statement appealed to Delawares' egos—they were, after all, "greatly 
regarded by the white people" unlike his own nation—but it also belied his desire to give 
the United States reason to remember the Mohicans. Lamenting that his "Nation was 
forgotten" after the American Revolution, Aupaumut undertook the work of peace that 
was central to his nation's historical identity, and he allied himself with the U.S. 
government. His motives were thus born of a desire for peace but also for political 
authority. Aupaumut hoped that alliance with the United States would offer the Mohican 
nation advantage.122 
 Aupaumut's work and motivations reveal the international nature of 1790s 
diplomacy. Like Friends, Aupaumut's diplomacy aligned with the desires of U.S. 
officials, and they recruited him for their purposes, but he undertook his mission for the 
Mohicans. Indian Country, like the United States, was not a united place; rather, it was 
fractured by alliances and viewpoints. The "western nations" so often mentioned en 
masse in U.S. government correspondence were conflicted. Some wished to broker peace 
                                                
122 Aupaumut, narratives, 30. 
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with the United States but remained firm that no further land sessions should be made; a 
pan-Indian union of nations, meanwhile, fought for their lands under the leadership of the 
Miami Little Turtle and the Shawnee Blue Jacket; "back nations" as Aupaumut called 
them, meanwhile hated the Shawnees and "wished to see the Shawannese [on] one side 
by themselves...and have washed their kittles [sic] to boil the Shawannese so as to have 
Good broth." There were other views too. The Six Nations, like all the Indian nations, 
engaged the United States, Britain, Shawnees, Delawares, and others of the allied Ohio 
Nations in talks, sometimes to broker peace, other times to push for war, but always with 
the political future of the Six Nations in mind. These were the international politics that 
combined with U.S. imperial ambitions to produce the political landscape of 1790s North 
America.  
Those same politics, however, were the very politics that produced the U.S. 
government’s relationship with the Society of Friends. With Native leaders affirming 
their sovereign status in speech, appearance, and pageantry throughout the 1780s and 
1790s, missionary partners such as John Parrish grew in importance. Such figures offered 
a means to treat with Native peoples peacefully while satisfying and recognizing Native 
claims to authority—as Pickering did when he invited Parrish to dinner—yet Friends’ 
status was ambiguous enough that the United States could maintain its fickle official 
stance regarding U.S.-Indian relations. The U.S. government’s relationship with the 
Society of Friends, then, was one born of compulsion and imperial expediency.123 
 
* * * 
                                                
123 Ibid., 59. 
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 During the 1790s years of war in particular, men of friendly reputation like John 
Parrish and his fellow Quakers—William Hartshorne, Joseph Moore, William Savery, 
and others—were indispensible to U.S. hopes for peace with Native nations.124 Like the 
go-betweens who brokered relations between Euroamericans and Native peoples in 
decades past, Quakers’ indeterminate relationship with the United States and their history 
of diplomacy in colonial Pennsylvania combined to render them malleable actors whose 
ambiguity enabled them to find usefulness among both Native and American leaders. 
Also like many of those go-betweens, Friends found ways to carry out their own 
agendas—the pursuit of peace and political capital. Theirs were efforts to create a godly 
society on Earth through peaceful relations and labor, and when proselytizing in Indian 
Country they focused on work, virtue, and civility while de-emphasizing Bible 
instruction. This appealed to many Native communities both on a spiritual level and 
because Friends' message was practically applicable to their daily lives. Friends 
continued to invoke historical memory in diplomacy as they had during the Seven Years 
War, and, as a consequence, their reputation among and partnership with Indian peoples 
endured into the nineteenth century.125 
                                                
124 Indeed, another Friend, William Hartshorne, attended the treaty councils near Detroit in 1793, 
and his journal, though less detailed, corroborates those of John Parrish. See W.M. Hartshorne's 
Journal of Journey to Detroit, 1793, 1 vol., MSS 003/152, Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore 
College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. While Friends' documents were often written with the 
presumption that they would be read by fellow Quakers (and, indeed, Parrish himself wrote that 
his journal was intended for public consumption), we should not assume that such sources are 
entirely exaggerated. The fact that Friends such as Parrish acquired access to both the inner 
diplomatic workings of U.S.-Native relations and Native communities offers evidence that 
Friends were esteemed among many Native peoples and deemed useful by U.S. officials. 
125 Minute book of the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians 
by Pacific Measures, Indian Papers (Am .525/Collection 310), The Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; Samuel Parrish, Some chapters in the history of the Friendly 
Association for Regaining and Preserving the Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures 
(Philadelphia, Friends’ Historical Association, 1877), 10; Minutes of the Friendly Association, 
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When violence escalated in the 1790s Ohio Country, Friends wrote a memorial to 
President Washington, the Senate, and the House of Representatives indicating that they 
were "deeply affected with the distressed situation of the frontier inhabitants," and that 
they "desire[d] a solid and careful enquiry may be made into the cause." They claimed it 
had been their "uniform care to admonish and caution our members against settling on 
lands which have not been fairly purchas'd of the original owner," insinuated that the 
government should do the same with its citizens, and promised that "as far as our 
influence extends, we mean to maintain this our ancient testimony inviolate, which from 
experience has been found effectual to the preservation of peace with the natives, who 
with great hospitality, cherished and assisted our forefathers in their early settlement of 
this country." Friends thus reminded the federal government of their previous history 
with Native peoples on the continent, encouraged officials to work toward peace, and, in 
turn, asserted their unique ability to promote peace. They also, however, carefully trod 
the line between support for Indian peoples and the United States, which bolstered both 
their appeal and ability to function as a neutral non-governmental organization.126  
                                                
HSP. James Merrell and Jane Merritt’s scholarship, in Into the American Woods and At the 
Crossroads, respectively, illuminates the incredible significance of the Seven Years War in 
Pennsylvania both in terms of the pivotal role that cross-cultural negotiation played in diplomacy 
and in the consequences that diplomatic successes and failures had on the political order that 
emerged post-1763. In sketching a declension narrative, however, both miss an opportunity to 
evaluate the continued importance of "go-betweens" and negotiation in late eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century North America's ever-evolving, still uncertain, political landscape. See James 
H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiations on the American Frontier (New York, W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1999); Jane Merritt, At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-
Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007).  
126 The Baltimore Evening Post (Baltimore, Maryland), November, 23, 1792, Vol. 1; Issue 115; 
pg. 3. 
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 Though the Society of Friends in Philadelphia engaged in the national politics of 
Indian affairs and war with their petitions, from the perspective of the debt-ridden federal 
government, Friends' most valuable work took place on an individual basis in Indian 
Country. Peace was, after all, far less expensive than war, and it encouraged regular 
trade. As a consequence of the Quakers’ already-extensive dealings in Indian Country 
and the constant migrations of Native communities and individuals during the latter half 
of the eighteenth century, knowledge of Friends and their friendships with Native peoples 
circulated throughout eastern North America by the 1790s. In 1793 Detroit, for example, 
John Parrish encountered several local traders who informed him that "our cuming will 
be usefull as a number of the tribes have a Knowledge of friends of whom they have a 
faverable oppinion from their haveing nothing to do with the sheding of Blood and their 
honest deeling with them in the first setling [of] the Country." A Shawnee in western 
New York likewise knew of Friends' past work in Indian Country, as did "18 Onados 
[Oneidas]" who visited the Quaker and several other Friends in 1793. Friends conversed 
with these latter Oneidas "to mutual Sattisfaction" akin to "a time of brighting the Chain 
of friend-ship which they exprest their gladness to find that the fire which was kindled by 
our fore fathers was not quite gone out."127  
 Such encounters reveal that Friends had a special reputation among Native 
peoples, and that repute proved useful in furthering friendly interpersonal and diplomatic 
networks. Most other religious-minded men, conversely, often were lumped with 
                                                
127 Parrish, 5th day the 4 [July 4], 1793, Journal, "John Parrish's Journal 1793 No. 2, Indian 
Treaty 1793," 33 (hereafter referred to as vol. 4). On indigenous migrations in the region see, in 
particular, Laura Keenan Spero, "'Stout, bold, cunning and the greatest travellers in America': The 
Colonial Shawnee Diaspora, Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2010; Stephen Warren, The 
Shawnees and Their Neighbors, 1795-1870 (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2008). 
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negative connotations of "white people." Indeed, in 1751, the renowned Presbyterian 
missionary David Brainerd wrote, "[the Indians] understood that the white people were 
contriving a method to deprive them of their country in those parts" and "that I was sent 
on purpose to accomplish that design." Of course, Parrish and other Friends glorified 
their friendly reputations in their writings to some extent, but their consistent ability to 
interact with Native leaders and their countrymen, coupled with many other missionaries' 
comparatively few successes during the 1790s, demonstrates that they did, in fact, 
possess a special reputation for diplomacy among Native nations.128 
 Though Friends were the most adept in their diplomatic encounters with Native 
nations, other missionaries, particularly the Moravians, were also successful. John 
Heckewelder and David Zeisberger, like Friends, attended treaty councils and often 
discussed Indian affairs with colonial and then U.S. officials, and both their treaty 
attendance and mission work offered them ample opportunity to gain intimate knowledge 
of their pupils. Heckewelder and Zeisberger's journals offer detailed ethnographic 
information, and they reveal their ability to cultivate close ties with Native peoples. 
These men were, however, nearly unique among late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century Ohio Country Moravians. Other Moravian missionaries, such as Abraham 
Luckenbach and John Kluge, failed to cultivate workable relations among the Delawares 
in 1806 Indiana Territory.129 Moravians' mission work—with its emphasis on theology—
                                                
128 Thomas Brainerd, The Life of John Brainerd, the Brother of David Brainerd, and his 
Successor as Missionary to the Indians of New Jersey, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Publication 
Committee, 1865), 234-235. 
129 Instead of a robust diplomatic and religious partnership, these latter two missionaries became 
central witnesses to and verbal targets for Delaware and Shawnee witch-hunters. See The 
Moravian Indian mission on White River; diaries and letters, May 5, 1799, to November 12, 
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appealed to some Native communities. Those communities who did not wish to adopt the 
tenets of Christianity could however, find use for Quakers' friendship.130   
 Also appealing, from both Indians’ and U.S. officials’ perspectives was the 
Society of Friends’ hierarchical organization. Yearly meetings at Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
and London oversaw Quarterly and Monthly meetings which, in turn, supervised 
individual meetings that consisted of local Friends. Moreover, Friends' various 
committees appointed clerks with whom federal officials and Native peoples alike could 
communicate, in consultation with the committee. That clerk could also call upon 
volunteer committee members for various tasks among Indian nations—including travel, 
diplomacy, and, eventually, mission work and its requisite reconnaissance. Like the 
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG), the Society of Friends 
thus offered a relatively efficient means to coordinate communication and labor in Indian 
Country. Friends’ organization also underscored their ambiguous status vis a vis the 
United States. The Society of Friends operated as a non-governmental organization that 
nonetheless possessed the efficiency, funds, and labor necessary to effectively offer the 
United States diplomatic—and later mission—support in Indian Country. 
It was a model that later caught on in the United States. The American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), established in 1810, adopted a similarly 
hierarchical structure. Importantly, however, Friends became the United States’ most oft-
                                                
1806, Lawrence Henry Gipson, ed., Harry Emilius Stocker, Herman T. Frueauff, Samuel C 
Zeller, trans. (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1938). 
130 John Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations Who Once Inhabited 
Pennsylvania and the Neighboring States (New York: Arno Press Inc., 1971); David Zeisberger, 
Diary of David Zeisberger, a Moravian Missionary among the Indians of Ohio, edited and 
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recruited missionary partners, particularly in the first quarter of the nineteenth century—
but also during President Ulysses S. Grant’s “peace policy” in the postbellum years—due 
to their history of working alongside Native leaders and their people. Friends enjoyed and 
capitalized upon their appeal to those Indians who saw value in the economic and 
diplomatic benefits that came with alliance with the Society of Friends.  
 Indeed, Friends’ reputation for usefulness and diplomacy preceded them in the 
1790s Ohio Country. It was not unusual for Quakers traveling through western New York 
or the Ohio Country to encounter Haudenosaunee, Delaware, or Shawnee individuals 
with whom they or a member of their society had already formed friendships. Near 
Detroit in 1793, for example, John Parrish crossed paths with a Nanticoke, John White, 
who lived among the Christian Indians under the tutelage of the Moravian missionary 
John Heckewelder. White, who visited Philadelphia on several occasions prior to 
encountering Parrish in Detroit, exchanged pleasantries with the Friends and asked after 
several other members of the society, including John Pemberton, Robert Parrish, and 
Isaac Zane—all men who had been involved with Indian affairs prior to the crisis of the 
1790s. Thomas King, one of the "neighbouring Indians" Parrish encountered during his 
travels to western New York, likewise "inquired perticularly after his freinds [sic] Isaac 
Zane & Israel Pemberton." Such memories of Israel Pemberton and others were the 
consequence of Friends' efforts among the western nations and, in particular, members of 
the Delaware nation during the Seven Years War in Pennsylvania. When Parrish 
encountered a Shawnee in Detroit, he later noted in his journal that the Shawnee knew 
"as most of the Shawneys do a good deel a bout friends, as well as the Delawares." The 
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Delawares were among Friends' closest—if not the closest—of their Native allies, and 
they were central to the creation of Quakers' reputation in Indian Country.131 
 Like the Shawnee who possessed knowledge of both Friends and Delawares, 
Wyandots, who similarly had close relations with Delawares in Ohio and Indiana, too 
possessed knowledge of the Society of Friends. By the 1790s, however, one Wyandot 
linked the society with the U.S. federal government. Just prior to treaty proceedings in 
1793, Parrish "received a visit from a Wyondot Chief" who had an interest in reaching an 
eventual "accomedation between their people and those of the U. States." The man "said 
he remembered the old friendship that subsisted in time past that they had still a large 
Belt in possession as I understood him from Pennsylvania." For this leader, the 
Pennsylvanian colonial past—Friends' past—lived on in the present and had the power to 
shape the relations between his nation and the United States; he understood Friends as 
diplomatic extensions of the U.S. federal government—people with whom he desired a 
friendly, working relationship.132 
 Memories of Pennsylvania's past and Friends' work with the Delawares became 
not only a useful means to build and spread Friends' reputation for peaceful negotiation 
with Native peoples, but they also served as powerful diplomatic tools. Indeed, just as 
Parrish did at the 1791 dinner table, Native and Quaker diplomats often invoked rhetoric 
of a "chain of friendship" in their messages between one another. Six Nations' rhetoric 
may have referenced memories of the "covenant chain" in eastern North America, and 
                                                
131 Parrish, May 1793, Journal, untitled, April 30, 1793-June 1, 1793 (hereafter referred to as vol. 
3); Parrish, Memoir, undated [c. 1790]; Parrish, Vol. 4, the 29th [June 29], 1793, 19-20. The 
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Parrish and other Quaker journalists may have conflated their own understanding of 
Pennsylvania's founding with this rhetoric. Nonetheless, the chain metaphor became a 
mutually intelligible language for both Friends and Native peoples, and it appears in 
sources originating from military officials and both the Baltimore and Philadelphia yearly 
meetings of the Society of Friends. The Oneida Good Peter, for example, asserted the 
power of the Six Nations by using the chain metaphor to assert a Haudenosaunee 
diplomatic agenda. At a 1791 meeting between the Six Nations and the United States he 
remarked, "it is the voice of the 6 nations that the chain of friendship be made Bright, we 
dont intend to sell any more of our lands." Here, Good Peter invoked the historical to 
resurrect both past alliances but also former Haudenosaunee power—power that, while 
by no means extinguished, was nonetheless threatened by the growth of United States 
authority. Such rhetoric was, like material goods and military pageantry, crucial to the 
ongoing development of cultural and political spaces within which Native polities and 
Americans could converse in metaphor.133  
                                                
133 Parrish, 1st day the 10th [July 10], 1791, Vol. 2. On the Covenant Chain, see Daniel K. Richter 
and James H. Merrell, eds., Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in 
Indian North America, 1600-1800 (State College, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003); Daniel 
K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of 
European Colonization (The Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 
Williamsburg, Virginia, The University of North Carolina Press, 1992). Timothy Shannon, 
moreover, notes that clothing allowed for similar dialogue between diplomats on the eighteenth-
century Mohawk frontier. See Timothy J. Shannon, "Dressing for Success on the Mohawk 
Frontier.” 
 Colonels William Preston and William Fleming wrote to the Shawnees in 1778 that "The 
Governor and Council will appoint Commissioners to talk with you, and endeavour to Cover the 
Blood that has been Spilt upon the Path of Peace, and brighten the Chain of Friendship." Col. 
William Preston and Col. William Fleming, "Address to the Shawnee," April 3, 1778 in Reuben 
Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, eds. Frontier Defense on the Upper Ohio, 1777-1778 
(Madison, WI: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1912), 260. 
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 Indeed, diplomats such as Parrish and Good Peter and political leaders such as the 
Wyandot Tarhe used the chain metaphor to articulate and achieve their own political 
objectives, and it also invoked a binding political relationship. Tarhe, for example, 
informed Philadelphia Friends in a 1799 letter that they "told us at that time when we met 
together...That you then formed a Chain of Frienship: You said it was not a Chain of Iron, 
but that it was a chain of precious metal, a chain of silver, which would never get 
rusty….We have no records or place of security for our Speeches as you have—nor can 
we write as you do….But if you examine your old Books and papers you will there find 
written all that passed between your Forefathers and ours." By 1799, after the birth of the 
Baltimore Yearly Meeting, Baltimore and Philadelphia Friends divided philanthropic 
work among Native peoples into separate jurisdictions presumably for the sake of ease 
and efficiency of resource-use: relations with Wyandots and Shawnees, Delawares, and 
others in the Ohio Country were in the hands of the Baltimore Yearly Meeting of the 
Society of Friends, while Philadelphia Friends handled relations in New York. When 
Tarhe offered his speech to the Philadelphia Friends he was either unaware that his lands 
fell under the philanthropic jurisdiction of the Baltimore Yearly Meeting or he failed to 
care.  The Wyandot's business concerned the Society of Friends writ large and he, for the 
time being, associated Friends with Pennsylvania; in his mind, it was to that group that 
his memory-infused language was intelligible.134 
 What was more, in a calculated diplomatic stroke, Tarhe emphasized his relations 
with Philadelphia Friends' former allies, the Delawares. He informed Friends that his 
                                                
134 Minutes of the Baltimore Yearly Meeting Standing Committee on Indian Concern, Vol. I, 3 
mo. 23 1799, 34-35 (Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore), hereafter 
BYMIC minutes. 
 
 
88 
people were "much pleased to hear that you still hold in remembrance our nephew the 
Delaware nation, The promisses and obligations made between your grandfathers and 
ours included our two Nations (Wy andots [sic] and Delawares) in the Chain of 
friendship and brotherly love, concidering us as one and the same people, which ...pray, 
that the great Spirit will never permit to be divided." While the Delaware Teedyuscung 
presented himself as a leader of the Delawares and of a political confederation that he 
referred to as the "Ten Nations" during the Seven Years War—a coalition that may have 
included some Wyandots among those supposedly confederated nations—the Wyandots 
were not present at Penn's treaty in 1682. Indeed, for most other purposes and despite the 
conglomerated nature of Ohio Country Indian villages by the late eighteenth century, 
Delawares and Wyandots would still have insisted on their separate identities. Tarhe thus 
proved himself a master politician: Quakers had allied themselves with Delawares in the 
past and, by resurrecting the chain of friendship metaphor and asserting his people's 
political alliance and fictive kinship with the Delawares, the Wyandot hoped to capitalize 
on that partnership and ensure that his people would not confront United States officials 
alone.  
Native nations' memories of diplomatic friendship with Friends thus shaped the 
character of American imperialism by ensuring that the nation's leading philanthropists 
aided state officials in their empire-building project in North America. They compelled 
the United States to develop a brand of empire that relied, in many ways, upon the 
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reputation-cultivating and labor-intensive diplomacy, mission, and educational work of 
non-governmental societies.135  
 
* * * 
 The reputation and malleability of the Society of Friends and its members 
contributed to its value as a government partner, but so too did Friends' years of 
diplomatic experience in Indian Country. Indeed, that experience rendered Parrish’s 
misstep at the 1791 dinner table a rare occurrence that was the product of his society’s 
changing role in official U.S. diplomacy. Quakers understood the importance of Native 
nations' protocols, and they willingly undertook the sometimes-tedious work of 
cultivating partnerships with the various Native nations that they encountered. Friends' 
copious meeting minutes, epistles, and publications ensured that knowledge of diplomatic 
protocols and Native alliance networks survived within the meeting. Since men of 
varying ages served on Friends' committees, the committee system likewise ensured that 
knowledge passed from one generation to the next to become an essential foundation for 
Friends' diplomatic work in Indian Country.136   
                                                
135 BYMIC minutes, 3 mo. 24 1799, 34-35; For Teedyuscung, see Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 
274; Anthony F.C. Wallace, King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, 1700-1763 (Syracuse: 
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136 The Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians, active during 
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detailing their efforts among Delawares during the 1750s and 1760s. Such documentation 
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Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures 
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 Relationships sometimes formed when delegations of Native leaders visited 
Philadelphia or met Friends during the treaty councils of the 1750s and 1760s. It is likely 
that these meetings further lumped all Friends together in Native peoples’ imaginations 
since they occurred before Maryland Friends—some of whom migrated southward from 
Philadelphia—founded the Baltimore Yearly Meeting. When Parrish visited the 
Tuscaroras in 1793, for example, he was pleased to find that "divers of the inhabitants 
came in and seemed pleased to see us, and what made our Visit more agreeable one of the 
Chiefs I know who had been several times at my house."137 Friends' connections with 
various Indians also, however, blossomed as a result of Friends' open curiosity. During 
his 1793 voyage from western New York to Detroit "a bord the Schooner Dunmore," 
Parrish observed that there were "representitives of 5 different Indian Nations on Bord, 
some Mohocks Mossesogers, Mohickins, Kighugers, & Stockbridge." The Quaker likely 
gleaned such particular information through word of mouth, but also from the onboard 
exchange of pleasantries. Captain John, one of the Mohawks aboard the Dunmore, made 
the effort to visit Parrish in his Detroit lodgings after their journey together and "exprest 
his sattisfaction in his acquaintance with us and wished we could make it in our way to 
return by the Bay of Canty that we might see him at his [own] house that he might make 
us welcome." Never one to miss an opportunity to develop closer ties with a new contact, 
Parrish "red to him Friends missage to the Indians which he much approv'd of" 
whereupon Captain John "said he would communicate the substance to the Indians at 
their council where he expected to set out for next day." What began as a casual, chance 
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acquaintance aboard a schooner, quickly developed into the interpersonal foundations for 
diplomacy.138 
 Sometimes, however, Friends' attempts to cultivate their international networks 
failed due to unforeseen circumstances. When Zebulon Heston, a Friend traveling with 
Parrish to the eastern Ohio Country fell ill along the way, Parrish settled for sending a 
letter to the Shawnees and Wyandots rather than paying them a personal visit. He wrote, 
"we should have been glad to have come and seen you...but one of us Zebulon 
Heston...being far advanced in age & in a poor State of helth & our horses forspent, we 
are not [at] liberty to go any further then...Newcommers Town." He then conveyed his 
affection for the nations and reminded them that Friends "had no other motive meaning 
then your good and the Peace of our own minds  we seek nothing that is yours, but you 
unto God." Episodes such as this reveal not only Friends' persistence, but that they were 
aware both of the importance of their connections and of the diplomatic protocols 
common to many Native nations. Failing to pay a promised visit to an ally could have 
devastating consequences in Indian Country, and thus a letter was required to ensure that 
relations remained strong. Through years of alliance and observation, Friends knew how 
to maintain relationships with Native nations.139 
   Friends cultivated knowledge through experience, and the time required for the 
acquisition of such knowledge and experience increased Friends' value to the U.S. federal 
government by the 1790s. The Society of Friends’ relationships with various Native 
nations facilitated, for example, traveling Friends’ intelligence-gathering work. Before 
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setting out for Detroit, Parrish reflected that "we should be likely to have an opertunity to 
see a number of Indians and such others that might give us some necessary inteligence to 
facilitate the Business we are ingaged in." Once in Detroit, the Quaker did, indeed, gather 
intelligence "which was not the most favourable," and he then wrote to various 
commissioners working with Colonel Thomas McKee near Grand Rapids "informing 
them the Inteligence we had received since we came heare." By the 1790s, Friends were 
crucial links between Native nations and the United States; by using their own 
interpersonal networks to promote peace, they facilitated U.S. diplomatic reconnaissance 
and constructed a valuable international information network that linked Philadelphia, 
western New York, the Ohio Country, and the Great Lakes.140 
 By the 1790s, Quakers such as John Parrish made this work appear simple; in 
reality, however, Friends’ efforts were only feasible after acquiring both years of 
experience and knowledge of Native diplomatic protocols. Failure to abide by Natives' 
rules of alliance making could make things awkward, if not dangerous during treaties 
with various nations. In 1761 Pennsylvania, one Quaker woman described a particularly 
uncomfortable interaction that was the product of Friends’ ignorance. A Delaware leader, 
Papoonan, informed the Quakers that "God had been so kind to them" so as to ensure 
"that his young men had success in hunting & killed a great many Deer,” and the 
resulting skins he wished Friends "to accept as a token of his love." Unaccustomed to 
Native politics of gift-giving and consequently caught off guard, one Friend explained 
that "as Providence had favoured us with abundance, he thought we ought rather to be 
helpfull to them, & excused friends from receiving their presents." Papoonan, appearing 
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noticeably "uneasy" then, again encouraged Friends to accept the skins, "that this was 
their practice, of their forefathers, therefore they had brought those skins, & again 
requested friends would accept of them." Sensing their mistake, the Quakers quickly 
replied that they "desired him not to take it amiss, that we did not at once receive them." 
Two days later Papoonan, still "uneasy," visited Friends' lodgings to revive the issue, 
whereupon the Quakers explained "that we were sorry that any thing that was said 
respecting their presents should give him uneasiness." Friends were savvy enough to 
learn from their mistake, and immediately set about repairing their relationship with the 
Delaware leader.141 
 Native nations' politics thus shaped missionaries' abilities to work with their 
peoples, and diplomatic blunders could render relationships between missionaries and 
Native nations untenable. In 1802, Joseph Patterson, a Presbyterian missionary near 
Chillicothe in the Ohio Country, experienced great frustration when a group of Shawnees 
refused his primers, books, and preaching. A man unknown to the chiefs there, Patterson 
"went to the chiefs who were assembled, and...informed them of the design of my 
mission, and that tomorrow was our day of worship, and signified my intention of 
[preaching] to any who would attend." Rather than offering Patterson statements of 
friendship and invitation as Friends often received, the Shawnees "answered roughly that 
they would hear nothing from me till the great council determined, nor should any of 
their people." These Shawnees ultimately decided that Patterson should go home.142 
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 Patterson blamed his failure upon his interpreter's lack of commitment, the 
Shawnees' being too "alarmed and confused" to engage him in formal speech at the 
chiefs' council, the ill effects of alcohol among the Indians, and, somewhat closer to the 
truth, his own inability to speak their language. Missing from this laundry list of excuses, 
however, is the fact that Patterson arrived at the Shawnees' town lacking the foundations 
for meaningful relations with its inhabitants. Though he frequently commented in his 
journals that the Shawnees offered him food and lodging—gifts that suggest their 
willingness to bring Patterson into their network of alliances—Patterson was ultimately 
too hard-headed to realize that mission work required patience as well as a willingness to 
engage Native nations and their leaders on their political terms. Waltzing into the chiefs' 
council without first laying the groundwork for meaningful conversation did not produce 
faithful converts, and such episodes reveal the great tenuousness of diplomacy in early 
America. British and then U.S. relationships with Native peoples were fragile, and they 
required constant—and experienced—cultivation; Friends, with their history of 
experience in Indian Country, thus became useful in nurturing U.S. relations with Native 
nations.143 
 As Patterson's experience among the Shawnees suggests, because of Native 
nations' political authority, gifts were essential to diplomatic relations and in the smaller 
exchanges between Native and non-Native individuals, as well as between missionaries 
and their targeted flocks. U.S. officials and their partners drew upon earlier empires' 
modes of gift-giving practices in their own efforts to engage with Native peoples. Gifts 
ranged from small to lavish and included food, clothing, and an assortment of smaller 
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items such as needles or tobacco. John Parrish in 1791, for example, offered his friend 
and fellow diplomat the Mohican Hendrick Aupaumut and two of his companions "a flag 
hankerchef which was received with gratitude." The gift of a flag symbolized Parrish's 
association with the United States, and it cemented his status as a partner and 
representative of that polity. Such items were political symbols, and they were also the 
material markers of reciprocity, the tangible symbols of interpersonal relationships. It 
was significant that the failed Presbyterian missionary Joseph Patterson arrived at the 
Shawnee chiefs' council with nothing but primers when they had already offered him 
generous (though to him rather less than ideal) lodging and several meals. Gifts were the 
means by which friendships developed, but, as in the case of Patterson or the Quakers at 
Easton, they could also stifle budding relationships.144 
 Food was also central to Native politics of gift giving, and successful diplomats 
engaged in the rituals of food diplomacy. Knowing these rules, in 1793 Detroit Parrish 
offered "the Moravian Indians that came to us" several items to "releive their presant 
necessities," including "a bout 27 Bushels of corn & a bout 400 of flower." He followed 
this offering with a letter—"in couraging them to persevere in a life of Sivilization and 
Christian fortitude"—to carry with them back to their Moravian community. Though 
these Moravian Delawares were already "converted," Parrish wasted no time in 
maintaining his networks with them since his society had already had extensive dealings 
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that gift-giving was intricately connected with assertions of Native power. See, for example, 
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96 
with the Moravian Delawares during and after the Seven Years War in Pennsylvania. In 
the turbulent years of the later eighteenth century, all friendly alliances were crucial, and 
Friends' overtures paid off. The Delawares later sent Parrish a letter extending "hearty 
thanks" for the "Provisions to the Amount of one hundred dollars, which we acknowledge 
as a testimoney of your former Love and friendship toward us."145  
 In 1790, moreover, the Delaware Captain White Eyes "sent a message to request" 
that Parrish and other Friends "would make him a visit." Upon arrival, they found that not 
only had the Delaware "had the logs cut that was fell a cross the road...out of the way" for 
their coming, but that he "had a Calf killed" whereupon they enjoyed several items "rost 
and boiled & were entertained with much kindness & hospitality." Immediately after 
dinner, Friends and White Eyes "smoked our pipes together," and Parrish reflected that 
"it was like a time of brightening the chain and renewing of friendship agreable to the 
Easton of our forefathers."146  
 White Eyes, an old friend and political ally of the Quakers in Pennsylvania, made 
a point to solicit Parrish's company and offer him gifts of sustenance, but this encounter 
extended beyond the bounds of mere friendship. When in his journal he connected the 
dinner and subsequent sharing of tobacco with the "the Easton of our forefathers," Parrish 
revealed that the meeting was simultaneously personal and diplomatic. That was not an 
unusual experience in the eighteenth century. The lines between friendship and official 
diplomacy often blurred because effective diplomacy was impossible without friendship. 
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Indeed, as Parrish's 1791 blunder at Pickering's dinner table reveals, even experienced 
diplomats stumbled from time to time precisely because friendship and diplomacy were 
so intermingled. 
 Such instances of gift-exchange long characterized both Native-non-Native 
interpersonal relationships as well as, more broadly, diplomacy in colonial America, and 
they remained at the center of U.S.-Native relations throughout the nineteenth century. 
When he was not at the dinner table of Colonel Pickering or attending the treaty 
deliberations at Newtown in western New York in 1791, John Parrish spoke with locals 
and distributed gifts among the Senecas who camped nearby. He offered Senecas "600 
seames of thread with 300 nedles to the women & girls" and "about 100 fish hooks & 
some lines to the men & boys which highly delighted them for which they gave many 
thanks." Several days later, Colonel Pickering and the interpreters likewise attempted to 
distribute "the publick Present." The Senecas were the recipients of private and public 
gifts, but because Parrish was allied with Pickering and the U.S. government, all of the 
gifts supported the United States' goal of maintaining friendly diplomatic relations with 
the Six Nations.147 With help from the Society of Friends and its members, then, the 
United States government continued the British imperial tradition of appealing to the 
various nations on Natives' terms.  
 The power of Friends' diplomatic past, together with their relationships with the 
many Indian nations they encountered during their experiences in Indian Country, meant 
that, by 1791, events such as John Parrish's dinner with Colonel Pickering and others 
were relatively commonplace. The Quaker dined with Pickering on several occasions, 
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often with Native men in attendance as well. He shared a meal, for example, with the 
colonel, an interpreter, and the Seneca Red Jacket "& several other Indians" in 1791. 
Members of Native nations, however, were not always in attendance. In 1793 Detroit, 
Parrish dined with Colonel England and "a company of wellbehaved genteelmen mostly 
officers" and "with the Officers at their Mess" on another occasion. Men like Parrish, 
then, were important diplomats among Native and non-Native men, but they also worked 
to maintain their relationships with their American connections.148  
 Such dinners among Quakers and U.S. army men involved, however, more than 
mere pleasantries: Parrish was often privy to official government information. At one 
meal, he learned that the U.S. interrupted a council between Britain's ally, the Mohawk 
Joseph Brant, and the western Indians, while another evening's talk was "on the Subject 
of war & the Slave trade." Dinners and informal conversations rendered Parrish not only 
useful to Pickering among Native leaders, but they also sowed the seeds of trust between 
the Quakers and the U.S. government. Not long after dining with Colonel England in 
Detroit, for example, Parrish found himself in "the Garden of Coln. England a beautifull 
airy Place where we spent some time in Looking over Some papers relative to Indian 
Affairs." Friends' relationships with top U.S. officials gave them intimate knowledge of 
official policy, and they served to blur the lines between their roles as private citizens 
concerned with peace and official United States diplomats.149  
 Indeed, those lines were so blurred that Parrish himself often struggled to define 
whether he was a private citizen or an official U.S. diplomat. He informed the Seneca 
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Red Jacket that he, along with his fellow Quaker companion, was "here in a privit [sic] 
capacity." He continued to explain that "we had nothing to do with Government affairs, 
but we ware heartly united with the Commissioners for promoting the work of Peace." He 
then again felt it necessary to state that "although we ware in a private capacity yet it was 
a matter of much concern that we had obtained the concurrence of our Bretheren at 
home...& like wise our proceeding was approved of by the Presedent of the U.. States." In 
a single message to Red Jacket, then, Parrish twice informed the Seneca that he was there 
on private business, and twice informed him that his work was done in conjunction with 
the official leadership of the United States. Parrish's status relative to the U.S. 
government was confusing.150 
 Indeed, Parrish often contemplated the nature of his relationship with the federal 
government. Parrish, a private U.S. citizen, attended treaties in a self-described "privit 
capacity," yet he kept his journal of events with the awareness that they were "disigned 
for publick Views." This understanding of public and private underscored the Society of 
Friends’ work as a non-governmental organization: the society’s papers were not 
officially policed by the government—the Society of Friends was “private”—but 
Parrish’s papers were intended for public consumption by other Friends. Parrish and the 
Society of Friends understood their role as a spiritual one of promoting peace and uplift 
among Native peoples, but also as one wherein Parrish and the society acted as liaisons 
between the federal government and the broader U.S. citizenry. Parrish, by calling 
explicit attention to his presence in a “privit capacity,” revealed the ambiguous—if 
increasingly defined—relationship between the Society of Friends and the U.S. 
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government. Friends’ non-military status also underscored the emerging qualifications for 
diplomats. 
It was in the function as liaisons between government and citizens that Parrish 
took the most liberties in his writing. The issue of alcohol, in particular, occasioned 
Parrish to question whether he had the authority to confront Colonel Pickering and the 
U.S. commissioners with his concerns for Native leaders' sobriety. The Quaker, deciding 
it most appropriate to address the issue in a letter to Pickering, insisted that he "came 
heare from a apprehention of duty and with the Concurrence of our friends of Philada. to 
attend the Treaty without any intention to Interfeer or meddle with the publick business." 
Continuing on in his letter, however, he reflected that, "as Subjects of the United States 
equally concernd in it[s] wellfare with our fellow Sitizens," he had a duty to ensure that 
the treaty was conducted "to the general benifit of the white Inhabitants and the good of 
the Indians."151  
 The Quaker, also, however, included his opinions of the government's official 
policy towards Native nations. Though he was usually pleased with Colonel Pickering's 
efforts, he did not shy from offering scathing criticism of federal Indian policy. He wrote, 
for example, that "many People it may be said Lement the steps that was taken by 
Goverment after the war Ceased with Great Brittan that insted of singly attending to the 
Establishing a Peace (with the Natives) measure ware persued to procure Large & 
extensive tracts into their Country, and making them believe they ware a conquered 
People and that all their Lands in reallity was the Property of the United States, which 
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only tended to raise their resentment and become a [?] Enemey." As the word "believe" 
reveals, Parrish undertook his work for reasons of perceived benevolence, but also 
because of a fundamental political disagreement: he did not buy into the imperial fiction 
that Native peoples "ware a conquered People." As the words of both William Eaton and 
the anonymous essayist revealed above, in that assessment, Parrish was not alone.152 
  
* * * 
Understanding the partnership between the United States and the Society of 
Friends during the 1790s forces us to consider together the breadth of Native sovereignty 
during the era of the early republic and both the limits of U.S. state power and the ways 
in which that power grew during the same period. Parrish's presence at the 1791 dinner 
table reveals that the federal government cultivated an entire diplomatic apparatus in 
order to effectively treat with Native nations, and the Society of Friends played a defining 
role in the development of that diplomatic schema. As U.S. officials well knew, among 
the Shawnees, Delawares, and others, there existed a division between the power of 
"civil" leaders and "war" leaders. Indeed, prior to the meeting of a treaty council the 
Shawnee Blue Jacket informed Pickering and Parrish as much when he stated that if "he 
was presant he had no voice in the Council he was of the war department...he said he had 
heard of the Quakers and had come on purpose to see us and he believed a peace would 
take place but he had no voice in the Civil department." Such a statement reminded the 
U.S. commissioners of the violent realities of previous Euroamerican disagreements with 
Native powers in North America. For Pickering and Parrish both, memories and stories of 
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1760s warfare—as well as the ongoing violence that characterized the Ohio Valley 
during the 1780s—informed their understandings of diplomacy and war with Native 
nations: U.S.-Native diplomacy required both war and civil chiefs.153 
 U.S. diplomatic relations with Native nations required knowledge regarding 
Native protocols of gift-giving and alliance networks but also savvy human symbols of 
peace—missionaries. These essentials were premised upon both Native polities’ 
sovereign and ambiguous diplomatic status with the United States. Partnering with a non-
governmental organization like the Society of Friends offered the United States the 
ability to cultivate peace and authority through Friends’ interpersonal networks, but it 
also offered opportunities to exert imperial influence in Indian Country via unofficial 
means. Friends’ diplomatic work continued into the nineteenth century, but in the Ohio 
Country—and in western New York as well—it was coupled with agricultural mission 
work that further connected Indians’ economies with that of the United States. Such 
mission work also served to chip away at the United States’s practical need to court 
indigenous sovereignty. With agricultural missions and the growth of a mission complex, 
the Society of Friends offered “evidence” of Native peoples’ “dependence” on U.S. 
goods and services. As will be seen, such economic “dependence” translated into political 
dependence for many Americans as the nineteenth century wore on. 
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 Indeed, after the defeat of the allied Indian nations at the Battle of Fallen Timbers 
in 1794, the United States Senate ratified the Treaty of Greenville in an effort to assert, 
once again, authority over the Ohio Country's Indian populations. While the treaty 
established a boundary line between the United States and Indian Country in the region, it 
also ushered in a renewed effort to "civilize" the Indians. Friends were, by 1795, reliable 
partners of the U.S. War Department, and they took the lead in civilizing efforts with the 
support of none other than John Parrish's dinner mate, Timothy Pickering. Warfare gave 
way to redoubled efforts to obscure the entrenchment of ideas of difference—as well as 
Indians’ sovereignty—altogether. 1795 marked a change in Ohio Country Indian 
relations, but it did not usher in the decline of the region's Native peoples. Instead, 
Indians' ongoing political power and persistence forced the United States to embark upon 
the hard work of empire in the Ohio Country—“civilizing” work that was intimately 
connected with efforts to define what precisely it meant to be a citizen and a young 
republic. 
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Chapter 3 
"Useful Knowledge" for "Good Citizens": The Society of Friends' Educational 
Philanthropy in Baltimore and the Ohio Country 
 
 
 
 Some of Philadelphia's Quakers migrated southward to northern Virginia and 
Maryland during the latter half of the eighteenth century, and they brought their 
memories of William Penn, the Friendly Association, and their fellow Quakers' recent 
diplomatic efforts with them. Baltimore Friends continued Philadelphia's tradition of 
working among the continent's Native peoples, and one of the first tasks of the Baltimore 
Yearly Meeting was to establish an Indian Concerns committee. That the meeting wasted 
no time doing so reveals the importance they placed upon participation in Indian affairs. 
Baltimore corresponded regularly with Philadelphia Friends on matters of reform.154 
Indeed, in 1796, the year of the establishment of Baltimore Friends’ Indian Concern 
Committee, the Philadelphia Committee on Indian affairs sent a letter to Baltimore 
Friends asking them to relay any important information regarding Indian affairs to the 
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting. Philadelphia Friends assured Baltimore that they would do 
likewise writing, “[a]s in our attention to this concern any thing shall arrise that may be 
deemed useful & proper to communicate we mean to impart the same desiring like care 
may rest with you, that what may occur as useful herein may be intimated to your loving 
friends." Friends' history of contributing to Indian affairs in Pennsylvania, western New 
York, and the Ohio Country, and their cooperation with Philadelphia Friends informed 
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the Baltimore committee's decision to cooperate with the U.S. federal government and its 
new strategy for dealing with the “Indian problem.” 
Henry Knox first proposed a general "civilization plan" that would transform 
Indian peoples in 1789, but the 1790s War for the Ohio Country necessarily put those 
plans on hold in the region. With peace, however, the United States confronted the 
problem of how to transform a diverse region still populated by indigenous polities into 
territories aligned with the federal state. The civilization plan offered a means to deal 
with the government’s Indian problem in the aftermath of war, and it offered a means to 
commodify Indians’ lands. It also ensured that ideas regarding citizenship and morality 
traveled between the urban coast and the interior of the continent. Those ideas, carried by 
the government’s missionary partners, ultimately reinforced notions of Native peoples’ 
“otherness.” 
Baltimore Friends corresponded with now Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, 
and they eventually agreed to work as civilizing agents, accepting federal funds for 
establishing agricultural missions. With peace in 1795, Baltimore and Philadelphia 
Friends essentially divided the northeastern portion of the continent into two 
philanthropic jurisdictions in order to begin civilizing reform. The Philadelphia Yearly 
Meeting began work among the Haudenosaunee and other peoples in the northeast while 
the Baltimore Friends endeavored to reform the Ohio Country's Native populations.155 
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 From the federal perspective, Friends remained useful allies into the nineteenth 
century. They maintained their knowledge of indigenous networks and cultures, and they 
possessed a hierarchical organizational structure that facilitated the coordination of long-
term projects in remote regions. Friends were not, however, mere pawns of the federal 
government. They carried with them their own goals, motivations, and ideas when 
traveling among Delawares, Miamis, and their neighbors. They used their partnership 
with the War Department and the still small federal state in order to instruct Native 
peoples how to labor toward morality and supposedly to save Indians from extinction. 
Friends drew upon emerging ideas of poverty and alcohol use to claim that liquors, in 
particular, left Ohio's Indian peoples "destitute and miserable, their morals 
corrupted...their minds embittered against the white people."156 Such observations were 
exaggerated—Ohio Indians boasted corn fields that prevented them from being 
completely "destitute and miserable”—but those observations were compelling, and they 
encouraged the maintenance of the civilization plan during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Friends’ ideas and experiences thus relegated Native peoples to the bottom of the 
republic’s social hierarchy and ensured that class-based assumptions became an inherent 
piece of the federal civilization plan, a consequence of the federal government’s need for 
missionary assistance. The ideas of race, class, and gender developing in urban Baltimore 
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traveled to the Ohio along with Quaker missionaries, and, in turn, Friends—along with 
other Euroamerican immigrants who moved westward—offered Native peoples direct 
access to those ideas. To understand Friends’ agricultural mission work and federal 
Indian policy more broadly in the nineteenth century, we must examine the emerging 
ideas that ultimately gave the U.S. civilization plan its gilded aura of benevolence. 
 
* * * 
 In 1796, several of the Baltimore Friends went to the Ohio Country "for the 
purpose of learning [Natives'] situation and disposition and thence to judge of the 
practicability of introducing among them the simplest and most useful arts of civil 
Life."157 They carried with them—as they would on subsequent trips and in their 
correspondences—their religious tenets, assumptions regarding Native peoples’ potential, 
and ideas regarding both race and class that were cultivated as a result of their 
experiences living in the booming and diverse city of Baltimore. Those ideas had shifted 
since the days when Fox and Penn noted Delawares’ polite mannerisms, a consequence 
of ongoing changes in U.S. political economy. The Friends' old partner in Indian 
Country, Timothy Pickering, relayed President Washington's approval and applauded 
Friends' actions because, in his view, "[m]ost attempts at civilising the Indians...have 
been preposterous—We have aimed at teaching Religion & the Sciences before we have 
taught them the simple and essential labours of civil life."158 Federal support for Friends’ 
                                                
157 Timothy Pickering to St. Clair, May 31, 1796 (Quaker Collection, Magill Library, Haverford 
College, Haverford, PA). The letter is also included in an entry dated 10th month, 1796 BYMIC, 
13-14. 
158 Ibid. Karim Tiro's suggestion that Pickering endorsed Quaker missionaries because they 
focused on agricultural rather than theological instruction is likely correct. Friends' early 
 
 
108 
efforts only grew as time wore on. In 1801, the Secretary of War Henry Dearborn 
thanked Friends for their previous work among Native peoples and expressed his hope 
"that by a Steady and persevereing application of the means provided by the Government 
of the United States, powerfully aided by the constant exertions of your Society, the 
Savage tribes will ultimately form a useful part of the great family of the United 
States."159 The Secretary, impressed by Philadelphia Friends' burgeoning agricultural 
work among the Haudenosaunee in western New York, was also "induced to ask whether 
it is probable that suitable characters for the above mentioned purpose could be found in 
your society who would ingage to go into the Choctaw Nation...on condition of receiving 
a reasonable compensation from the public."160 Both the Secretary's promise of funds and 
Pickering's support for Friends' efforts among Ohio Indians reveal that the federal 
government was eager to continue its relationship with the Society of Friends generally. 
Indeed, Dearborn failed to distinguish between Philadelphia and Baltimore Friends, and 
both meetings considered his letter. Ultimately, Baltimore Friends did not missionize in 
Choctaw Country, but they did set their sights on the Ohio Country. 
U.S. claims to authority in the Ohio remained tenuous even during the earliest 
years of the nineteenth century, and the federal government—as elucidated by both 
Pickering and Dearborn’s request for Friends’ aid—still required missionary 
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assistance.161 The United States managed a military victory with the Battle of Fallen 
Timbers in 1794 and subsequently gained a large tract of land in southeastern Ohio with 
the Treaty of Greenville the following year, but still the region remained contested. The 
endurance of the Miamis, Shawnees, and their neighbors, particularly in the northwest of 
what became the state of Ohio and also Indiana, meant that U.S. domination remained 
elusive, and that the hard work of empire remained. 
 The federal government, still reeling from the expenses of war with Ohio Indians 
and keen to establish peace, hoped that Friends would offer a means by which to pacify 
Native peoples, and agricultural education seemed the key. For members of the Society 
of Friends, however, the purpose of mission work was more profound. Their agricultural 
initiatives were deeply connected with their religious principles. Friends saw in the 
materiality of the world an opportunity to labor towards godly perfection, and they 
looked in horror upon those who "suffered the plantation of God to be as a field 
uncultivated, and a desert."162 Baltimore Friends’ celebration of work as well as of 
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Press: 2012), see especially chapters six and seven. 
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cultivation ultimately provided a powerful impetus behind their mission to Ohio Country 
Indians.  
 So too, however, did their experiences in urban Baltimore. Baltimore was one of 
the early republic's most diverse cities, and it boasted a robust and evolving economy. 
Walking through Fells Point or down Market Street, Friends encountered stevedores, 
seamstresses, slaves, and street sweeps—all of whom labored for the wages that provided 
basic sustenance and shelter or, in the case of the enslaved, lined the pockets of those 
who claimed ownership of their labor. Friends witnessed both demographic and 
economic growth on an unprecedented scale: between 1790 and 1830, Baltimore's 
population grew by 497%. Much of that growing populace provided labor that 
transformed eighteenth-century Baltimore Town into the thriving metropolitan Baltimore 
whose harbor was one of the most important ports in the United States.163 That harbor 
attracted the United States' rural population, refugees from Saint Domingue, and other 
travelers, all of whom made the city diverse and its harbor the second-most popular 
destination for immigrants arriving from Europe, after New York City. What was more, 
Baltimore boasted the largest African American population in the United States by 1820, 
and with "two of every five people of color in the city...enslaved," this made for 
complicated race, class, and labor relations.164  
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Baltimore's diversity meant that it nurtured a robust economic hierarchy. 
Historian Seth Rockman's analysis of class in the early nineteenth-century city reveals in 
stark terms the material conditions of poverty that accompanied economic development. 
The city, straddling the worlds of both North and South, was integrated—and becoming 
more so on a daily basis—with an economy that was reliant upon both enslaved and 
waged labor. Baltimore's labor hierarchy was uncertain—particularly at the bottom. 
Wageworkers sought out and answered ads seeking labor for hire, and some managed to 
string together enough opportunities that enabled them to survive on their own or to 
survive with the assistance of public services.165 Employers' needs, however, added to the 
challenge of finding and maintaining work. They often hired and fired workers depending 
upon both seasonal and daily business needs.166 It was an employers' market, and it meant 
that there was a growing sense of difference between laborers and their employers. 
Friends, in many ways, occupied central positions in this developing economy that left 
wageworkers "scraping by" in the otherwise thriving city. Members of the Society of 
Friends employed free African Americans in their homes and many became prominent 
merchants and businessmen. Like their Philadelphia counterparts, they manumitted their 
slaves relatively late. The Maryland Yearly Meeting (which later became the Baltimore 
Yearly Meeting) did not threaten to disown Friends for slave-ownership until 1777, three 
years after Philadelphia took such action.167 
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This stratified socio-economic world was the foundation upon which the 
republic’s developing economy was built, and that hierarchy infiltrated most aspects of 
daily life in both subtle and obvious ways. Historian Jack Marietta suggests that Friends 
sought to distance themselves from worldly politics and the emerging market economy, 
and he explains Friends’ eventual emergence as a revitalized group set to reform 
American society by pointing to Friends’ “turning inward” during the late-eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century.168 Importantly, however, Friends had actively sought to reform 
Indian affairs since the seventeenth century. Friends’ eagerness to engage in reform in the 
early nineteenth century had a number of origins. Most importantly, Friends’ reform 
work was, in part, a product of their experiences with the labor market in Baltimore, and 
that engagement had profound consequences for their efforts in the city as well as in the 
Ohio Country. As will be seen, social hierarchy—a notion that seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Friends openly disavowed—infused the core of Baltimore Friends’ 
reform philosophy by the early nineteenth century. The “benevolence” with which 
Friends approached their work among Ohio Indians was built on an assumption of 
difference: Indians, like wage workers, were in need of assistance not merely because 
they were supposedly “savage,” but because Friends deemed them impoverished, and 
thus they were in some way corrupted and susceptible to immorality. 
Quakers’ place within a robust social and economic hierarchy reveals the extent to 
which ideas of difference formed a part of their daily lives. Though Friends made up a 
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tiny fraction of Baltimore's inhabitants, many occupied powerful positions in the city's 
social and political circles and were active entrepreneurs. Prosperous Friends on 
Baltimore Yearly Meeting's Indian Concerns Committee, like other wealthy members of 
Baltimore's religious denominations, occupied the leadership positions in their 
meetings.169 Philip E. Thomas (the eventual president of the B&O Railroad), and Elisha 
Tyson and Elias Ellicott (prominent businessmen in Baltimore's flour industry), for 
example, were highly visible members of the Indian Concerns committee during the first 
decades of both the committee's existence and its work among indigenous peoples.170 
These men benefitted mightily from others' labor, and, though their faith demanded that 
they embrace simplicity, they showcased their success in a number of ways.  
Many elite Quakers exhibited their status by engaging in philanthropic efforts. 
Indeed, one's visibility within the meeting corresponded with the extent to which one 
engaged in its public outreach. Participation on committees translated into a form of 
"moral capital" that not only elevated one's status within the meeting but in the city as 
well.171 Philanthropy served as a means to engage with the public and leave one's mark 
upon urban life. Because philanthropy required time, however, it was often the wealthiest 
Friends who participated most extensively in meeting causes by serving as committee 
clerks and conducting correspondence with the federal government. It was also these 
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individuals who garnered the most political "capital” fit for Quakers who openly avoided 
the more obvious political posts.172  The wealthy Baltimore Friend Elisha Tyson, for 
example, served on the Baltimore committee for Indian Concern as early as 1803 and 
contributed to the attempt to found the Baltimore School (and later, House) of Industry 
for the urban poor in 1804. He also found time to travel to the Ohio Country in 1808 to 
visit Friends' agricultural missions then underway as well as actively pursue abolitionist 
politics until his death in 1824.173 Tyson's philanthropic exploits garnered him a position 
of prestige within the meeting, and it also provided ample material for a memorial penned 
by John Tyson after his death. That his efforts became enshrined in print meant that a 
wide audience of Friends—and others—knew of his charitable work.174 His philanthropy 
was a means by which Tyson cultivated both his public image and his political capital.175  
While Friends like Tyson and Philip E. Thomas occupied the leadership roles in 
their meetings and committees, more middling men, like farmer Baltimore Phillip 
Dennis, performed the actual labor of civilization in the Ohio Country. Friends were not 
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immune to Baltimore's class hierarchy, instead they internalized it. Ideas of class and 
material difference influenced the character of Friends’ benevolence.  
 
* * * 
Thanks to Friends’ experiences in urban spaces, Baltimore Quakers’ agricultural 
reform work grew out of an assumption that Native peoples and laboring poor shared 
much in common. Indeed, those Friends who traveled to Shawnee or Miami Country 
soon saw that the problems that bedeviled wage workers in Baltimore also plagued 
Native Americans. The Baltimore committee and its traveling representatives often took 
pains, for example, to contrast Native peoples' supposed poverty with the richness of the 
lands. Friends wrote that Ohio's Indians "suffered all the miseries of extreme poverty, in a 
country, which, from its great fertility, would, with but little cultivation, abundantly 
supply them with all the necessaries of life."176 Gerard T. Hopkins, Elisha Tyson, 
William Kirk, and other Baltimore Friends who travelled to the Ohio attributed this 
dissonance to Indians’ “laziness.” Elisha Tyson wrote in 1808, "[h]ere is a proof of 
Indian industry, William Kirk last built a house and cleared a corn field for this old 
Indian. The field is entirely neglected though the land is excellent. A part is grown up 
with spear or bluegrass so that it would mow."177 In a similar vein, another Baltimore 
Friend explained to Miamis living near Fort Wayne:  "Brethren There are some amongst 
us who are not industrious and will not work; these cannot earn the comforts for 
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themselves which industrious people do: but are often in great distress and poverty so that 
we clearly see it is by industry that a comfortable living must be obtained."178 That this 
Friend compared Ohio Indians to “some amongst us” further reveals the extent to which 
Friends’ experiences in Baltimore informed their observations of Native peoples. 
Ohio Indians were impoverished, Quakers claimed, not only because of their 
supposed lack of industry, but because of their predilection towards drinking. Alcohol 
consumption, these Quaker men believed, distracted the region's Native peoples from 
properly employing their lands. Baltimore Friends contended that if the region's "traders 
could not be restrained from furnishing them with this destructive article, in exchange for 
their skins and furrs, they would not be easily persuaded, to turn their minds toward 
agriculture and the useful arts."179 The distracting qualities of alcohol paralleled what 
Friends saw as one of the primary reasons why urban laborers struggled to care for their 
families. Friends informed the Shawnee Captain Lewis that "[s]pirituous Liquors not only 
corrupts the minds of those who drink it, but it also occasions great poverty & distress in 
the families of those men who get drunk because it destroys their reason and disqualifies 
them for work, it has this effect upon the white people who drink it and it will have the 
same effect upon you."180 Indeed, Friends’ concerns over alcohol were so pronounced 
that they lobbied the Ohio legislature in 1808 to prohibit the sale and trade of alcohol to 
Indians.181 
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Notions of family and masculinity were at the heart of Friends’ critiques of Native 
men’s supposed laziness and alcohol abuse. In Baltimore, at the precise moment when 
ideas of work and home grew increasingly distinct, men were expected to be the primary 
providers for their families—at least in the visible labor market—while women, ideally, 
remained at home to raise, educate, and care for children as well as perform the essential 
duties of running a household. Scholars such as Jeanne Boydston demonstrate that 
women’s work contributed to the early republic’s economy by enabling men to leave the 
home, but as historian Karin Wulf demonstrates, the prevailing assumption by the 
nineteenth century was that women relied upon men for their well-being.182 Those 
women who were unfortunate enough to have to work outside of the home were among 
the distressed poor in the urban republic. As Baltimore Friends’ wrote, alcohol use 
“occasions great poverty & distress” among the families of “white people,” and it had the 
same affect upon Native women and children.183 Indeed, when Friends, U.S. officials, 
and other Euroamericans encouraged Native men to pick up the ax and plough, they often 
appealed to the conditions of the men’s families.  
Friends' efforts to alter Indians’ conceptions of labor were in line with 
government officials' efforts to transform Native peoples' gendered relationships. Native 
societies often delegated agricultural work to females, and thus the "civilizing" work of 
both the government and Quakers hoped to force Native men to accept what was, for 
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many Ohio Indians, "women's work." Baltimore Quakers, however, did not see their 
efforts as doing so much. Instead, they were combating the image of the "squaw drudge" 
who toiled in the fields.184 Agriculture, reformers contended, was a manly pursuit.185 
Quakers, famously "non-conformist" in the social and theological sense, nonetheless 
emphasized, like many of their fellow nineteenth-century Americans, that the proper 
place for Indian women was in the home. As Gerard Hopkins explained to Miamis and 
Potawatomis in 1804, 
brothers the white people in order to get their land cultivated find it 
necessary that their young men should be employed in it and not their 
women. Women are less than men They are not as strong as men. They are 
not as able to endure fatigue and toil as men. It is the business of our women 
to be employed in our houses. to keep them clean to sew knit--spin--and 
weave...for themselves and families to make clothes for the men and the rest 
of their families to keep the clothing of their families clean and to take care 
of their children.186 
 
The seamstresses and poor women of Baltimore were largely responsible for the making 
of clothes, spinning, and weaving with which Quakers were familiar and to which they 
referred in this passage. Most of their wives, while often occupied in the home, took part 
in Baltimore Friends' public reform culture and even served on the Indian Concern 
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committee by 1815.187 Moreover, Friends' belief in the Inner Light ensured that Quaker 
women enjoyed spiritual equality and constituted a significant portion of the Society of 
Friends' ministry. Baltimore Friends claimed to be exceptional (and, in many aspects, 
were) when it came to their views of women in society yet these Friends wrote and 
uttered the line "women are less than men" in their message to Miamis and 
Potawatomies. Such a statement may be attributable to a number of factors. Notions of 
labor and gender changed in rural and urban areas during this period and in different 
ways.188 What was more, Friends were likely attempting to convince men that agriculture 
required strength that women did not have. Nonetheless, the sentiment was yet another 
indication of the extent to which Friends incorporated ideas of difference into their 
“benevolent” work. Many Friends encouraged white elite or "middling" women to take 
on public leadership roles and, by the forties, some pushed to expand female claims to 
citizenship by fighting for the right to vote; they encouraged Native women, however, to 
remain in the home.189   
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This reorganization of gender roles also corresponded to efforts to organize the 
United States' non-native population according to patriarchic norms. Among the non-
Indians in the United States, men were most often the individuals with whom the 
government formed an explicit relationship. Census records, for example, usually placed 
the eldest male as the “head of household," and beneath his name were listed the others 
living in his home and under his care. With explicitly labeled patriarchs, the government's 
bureaucratic apparatus could more efficiently deal with its growing population. The 
federal government's partnership with Quakers in the Ohio Country—particularly once 
Quaker women began accompanying their husbands to the region to teach spinning and 
weaving in 1815—facilitated the exportation of this system of governing and, moreover, 
conformed with the social dynamics of the developing market economy in the east and of 
Americans’ settler colonialism. Like the white, "middling" women whose domestic labor 
supported men’s wage labor outside of the home, Baltimore Friends encouraged Native 
women to support their husbands' work by laboring within the home.190  
The language of treaties between the United States and Native Americans, 
moreover, involved rhetoric of protection, promises of peace, and broad notions of 
friendship—all of which implicitly challenged Native masculine diplomatic roles. An 
1805 treaty with the Wyandots, for example, states “[t]he said Indian nations do again 
acknowledge themselves and all their tribes, to be in friendship with, and under the 
protection of the United States.”191 The United States thus presupposed both that Native 
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Americans required “the protection of the United States” and that they desired friendship 
with the U.S. government. With the United States demanding peace from Native people 
and presuming friendship, Native peoples’ own diplomatic powers of making war and 
crafting military alliances were, according to treaty rhetoric, subjugated beneath United 
States authority.192 Indeed, such a loss of diplomatic and military authority had once 
rendered Delawares “women” in the eyes of the Six Nations.193  
Native leaders like the Miami Little Turtle, the Wyandot White Loon, and others, 
however, far from being passive recipients of Quakers’ messages, capitalized upon 
Euroamericans’ assumptions regarding poverty and gender. When it suited them, they 
employed language of pity and charity to gain access to wares or assistance.194 Indeed, 
like laborers in Baltimore, Native Americans possessed bargaining power that enabled 
them to negotiate for authority.195 The Wyandot Tarhe, for example, informed Friends 
that his people were "poor & needy" when he contemplated the advantages of accepting 
aid from Quakers in 1805.196 The Miami Little Turtle, moreover, employed a discourse of 
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poverty in his dealings with both the Society of Friends and U.S. government officials. In 
doing so, he made claims upon the U.S. state. Speaking in regards to traders in 1802, for 
example, the Miami chief told Baltimore Friends, "Our repeated entreaties to those who 
brings this evil [liquor] amongst us, we find, has not the desired effect. We tell them; 
brothers, fetch us useful things—bring goods that will clothe us, our women, our 
children."197 Here, the Miami claimed impoverishment in order to secure economic 
advantage—he did not want just anything that traders or the U.S. government might feel 
like offering, but rather he wanted "useful things" like textiles. Little Turtle went on to 
say that the liquors that were often obtained in exchange for furs, "made us poor" and that 
it caused "our young men to go without clothes, our women & children to go without any 
thing to eat."198 Like Friends, Little Turtle emphasized the Miamis’ desire to care for 
their women and children. He appealed to Friends’ own assumptions in an effort to 
secure what he wanted.  
When Friends received Little Turtle's pronouncements in 1802, they moved to 
send Gerard T. Hopkins and Matthew Dennis to Miami lands in order to begin an 
agricultural mission. Dennis began his mission work among the Miamis two years 
later.199 While some historians rightly connect such rhetoric of pity and poverty with an 
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older mode of Native diplomatic condolence speechmaking, we should not assume that 
such rhetoric was static.200 Native leaders' expressions of poverty took on new meanings 
in the early republic and blended with older modes of Native-European diplomacy and 
gift-giving. They enabled Little Turtle and others to secure philanthropic assistance and, 
as chapter five makes clear, initiated a relationship within which Native Americans 
asserted the power to make claims upon the state and its recruited laborers. Little Turtle 
adapted missionaries' notions of impoverished Indians for his own devices by connecting 
his own rhetorical overtures of poverty with the gendered model of poverty with which so 
many Euroamericans—particularly urbanites like the Baltimore Friends— were 
increasingly familiar.201 This gendered model of poverty, featuring male breadwinners 
and female and child dependents, cultivated in places like Baltimore, traveled to the Ohio 
along with Quaker missionaries where Native peoples appropriated them, remade them, 
and facilitated their entrenchment. 
Thanks in part to both Friends and some Native men, then, gendered ideas 
regarding labor and authority, again grounded in a sense of difference, became central to 
the U.S. civilization plan. Quaker reformers, often deservedly, possessed a reputation for 
progressive thinking; their efforts among Native American women, however, revealed the 
extent to which they were, nonetheless, influenced by and contributed to the development 
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of U.S. social hierarchies. These views colored Friends’ work in the Ohio Country, and 
traveling Friends ensured that ideas regarding eastern cities’ developing social hierarchy 
migrated westward. Friends’ reform work in Baltimore and Ohio, among wage workers 
and Indians, thus was built on myriad assumptions of difference, and it sought to offer 
correctives. Rather than eliminate difference through uplift, however, Friends’ 
prescription—“useful knowledge”—served to reinforce emerging ideas regarding labor, 
morality, and poverty in both Baltimore and the Ohio Country. 
  
* * * 
 Friends’ agricultural mission work, with its goal of offering Indians “useful 
knowledge” for their betterment, was, at its core, an educational initiative. It was one that 
relegated Native peoples, however, to the bottom of the republic’s emerging social 
hierarchy. Baltimore Friends, like their counterparts throughout the Atlantic world, 
engaged in efforts to aid the city's poor, and they regarded both labor and education as 
central, intertwined elements of their work. Friends in Wilmington, Delaware were in 
many ways the most ardent in their philanthropic work, and they managed to raise 
impressive sums of money that ensured that poor children—African American and 
Euroamerican alike—could attend Quaker-run schools.202 Philadelphia Quakers, with 
whom the Baltimore committee on Indian Concern corresponded regularly, likewise 
participated in numerous efforts to provide poor relief and charity schooling. In doing so, 
they not only contributed to the development of Indian policies in North America, but 
they rendered educational reform among American Indians and working men and women 
                                                
202 James, A People Among Peoples, 274. 
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central to the development of ideas regarding morality, citizenship and the young 
republic's national character.  
Ideas regarding education, still contested in the United States, traveled to Indian 
Country with Quaker agricultural instructors, and they provided some of the most 
fundamental intellectual underpinnings of the U.S. civilization project more broadly. 
Indeed, Friends’ agricultural missions were an effort to rescue “poor Indians” from the 
vagrancies of a destitute life, and they offered Native peoples a tool—“useful 
knowledge”—for combating poverty. For many early Americans, ignorance of the ways 
in which one might lead an industrious and sober life bedeviled the whole of the nation's 
"poor"—white, black, and "red" alike. For some Friends, a belief that ignorance lay at the 
root of the nation's inequality and moral degeneracy constituted the philosophical core of 
their benevolence. Combining with that belief, however, was a movement towards ideas 
of humanitarianism, born out of the age of Enlightenment and emerging conceptions of 
sensibility in the early republic.203 Novels such as the British work Clarissa instilled 
within many middling and elite early Americans a sense of duty towards those who 
struggled to make ends meet.204 Far from prescribing simple financial assistance, 
however, education became a means by which budding philanthropists could do their part 
to help their fellow citizens—as well as Indians and enslaved Africans—while garnering 
                                                
203 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: Norton, 2007), see in particular 
35-69. 
204 Lynn Hunt, among others, also sees the rise of the novel as a central to the cultivation of 
sensibility in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa and 
Pamela are exemplars of such works. 
 
 
126 
their own “moral capital.” What was more, many thought that acts of humanitarianism 
would contribute to the betterment of the young republic as a whole.205  
Reformers’ insistence upon offering certain peoples specific forms of “useful 
knowledge” was ultimately bound up in ideas of race, class, and gender. Baltimore 
Friends traveled to the Ohio Country with the promise of "[r]eligious Instruction, 
Knowlege of Agriculture and useful Mechanic Arts," but they did so without offering 
complimentary instruction in the skills of reading, writing, or numeracy—skills many 
deemed "useful" for others and taught as part of a transition towards "practical" education 
by the late eighteenth century.206 “Useful knowledge” was based upon one’s station, and 
educational reform efforts among “poor Indians” and those facing poverty was both born 
from and in fundamental tension with the early republic’s emphasis upon universal 
                                                
205 Much of this discussion is informed by Lynn Hunt’s work but see also Sarah Knott, Sensibility 
and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early 
American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 2009). 
Many U.S. officials viewed the civilization plan as a benevolent, humanitarian project. It 
is impossible to disregard the notion that for many white inhabitants of the U.S.—particularly 
those invested in western land sales and speculation—"civilization" policies and agricultural 
education were a means to limit Natives' occupation of western lands and to eliminate, through 
assimilation, the existence of Native Americans altogether. Yet, at a time when "removal" 
policies were not yet official, pinpointing Native peoples' "usefulness" through education in 
particular "mechanic arts" was also a means of ensuring that history would smile upon the 
expanding nation. This was certainly true for Quaker philanthropists in the Ohio Country. Even 
Secretary of War Henry Knox contended, however, "[h]ow different would be the sensation of a 
philosophic mind to reflect that instead of exterminating a part of the human race by our modes of 
population that we had persevered through all difficulties and at last had imparted our Knowledge 
of cultivation, and the arts, to the Aboriginals of the Country." ("Henry Knox to George 
Washington, July 7, 1789" in Lowrie, Walter and St. Clair Clarke, Matthew, eds. American State 
Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, Vol. IV, 
Indian Affairs. 38 Vols. (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832)).  
206 BYMIC Minutes, Vol. I, 10 mo. 1795, 1. For practical education among women see Margaret 
Nash, "Rethinking Republican Motherhood: Benjamin Rush and the Young Ladies' Academy of 
Philadelphia" Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer, 1997): 171-191; see also 
Mary Kelley, Learning to Stand and Speak: Women, Education, and Public Life in America’s 
Republic (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and 
Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 2008). 
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education. Plans for universal education—schemes thought up by the likes of Thomas 
Jefferson, Benjamin Rush, and Noah Webster—ultimately emphasized the utility of 
education in creating a moral citizenry.207 These men believed that an educated citizenry 
was necessary to ensure that the best representatives served the federal government. At 
stake, then, was not just the nation's political future but also its moral future. Indeed, for 
most thinkers, morals were inseparable from politics. Education, from the earliest days of 
the republic then, was at the center of a U.S. national project. Along with ideas of the 
nation’s moral future, however, came fears about the nation’s corruption: “failures,” 
those who experienced the conditions of poverty, appeared to be a threat to the moral 
health of the republic—a corruptible force that could render the body politic diseased.208  
Indeed, reformers attached an array of assumptions to their educational efforts 
such that stereotypical ideas of laziness or corruption plagued urban workers and their 
children. In 1805, for example, the trustees of the newly established Free School in New 
York wrote, "Children thus brought up in ignorance, and amidst the contagion of bad 
example, are in imminent danger of ruin; and too many of them, it is to be feared, instead 
of being useful members of the community, will become the burden and pests of 
                                                
207 See Benjamin Rush, "Thoughts Upon the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic" (1786); 
Thomas Jefferson, "Second Inaugural Address," March 4, 1805 in Thomas Jefferson, Writings, 
Merrill D. Peterson, ed., (New York: Viking Press, 1984), 520-521, see also "Letter to Peter 
Carr," September 7, 1814, 1348 in the same; Thomas Jefferson, "A Bill for the More General 
Diffusion of Knowledge" in Roy J. Honeywell, The Educational Work of Thomas Jefferson 
(1931); Carl F. Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American Society, 1780-
1860 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983). Keith Whitescarver, "Creating Citizens for the Republic: 
Education in Georgia, 1776-1810" Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter, 1993): 
455-479. Whitescarver's work points out the links between developing ideas of U.S. citizenship, 
nationalism, and education in the early republic. Perhaps most interesting is his analysis of 
Georgia's effort to label those educated abroad as "aliens." See, in particular, page 460. 
208 See especially Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution, chapter two. 
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Society."209 The Free School’s young pupils were thus supposedly in danger of becoming 
useless either because of the parents' "extreme indigence...their intemperance and vice, or 
to a blind indifference to the best interests of their offspring."210 What was more, these 
children—and the nation more broadly—were susceptible to the “contagion of bad 
example.” Immorality, then, was a disease that required rooting out. The parents' 
supposed incompetence, however, meant that others needed to educate their children in 
order to provide for the common good and to stamp out the scourge of vice. Indeed, "it 
becomes the duty of the public," the Free School trustees wrote, "and of individuals, who 
have the power, to assist them in the discharge of this important obligation."211  
For Free School reformers and many others—including Friends—education was a 
matter of practical and immediate importance. In no other way was this made clearer than 
in the very discourse surrounding "useful knowledge" and its acquisition. Free School 
reformers feared that laborers’ children would fail to become “useful members of the 
community,” while Baltimore Friends consistently declared their intentions to offer 
Native peoples “useful knowledge.” Indeed, the language of "usefulness" was 
                                                
209 Joseph Lancaster, Improvements in Education, as it Respects the Industrious Classes of the 
Community: Containing Among other Important Particulars, An Account of the Institution for the 
Education of One Thousand Poor Children, Borough Road, Southwark; and of the New System of 
Education on which it is Conducted. From the Third London Edition, with Additions. To which is 
Prefixed a Sketch of the New-York Free School (New York: Collins and Perkins, 1807), xix. 
210 Ibid., xviii. 
211 Ibid., xix. Friends in North America had similar concerns for their own children and, in 
consequence, expended great energy in considering the schooling of Quaker children more 
generally. Owen Biddle penned a narrative in 1790, for example, that discussed the possibility of 
modeling John Fothergill's London Quaker school in Philadelphia. See Owen Biddle, A Plan for 
a School on an Establishment similar to that at Ackworth, in Yorkshire, Great-Britain, varied to 
suit the Circumstances of the Youth within the Limits of the Yearly-Meeting For Pennsylvania 
and New-Jersey: Introduced with the Sense of Friends in New-England, on the Subject of 
Education; and an Account of some Schools in Great-Britain: To which is Added, Observations 
and Remarks, Intended for the Consideration of Friends (Philadelphia, Joseph Crukshank, 1790). 
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omnipresent in the discourse on proper education. Politicians debated whether a military 
education was "useful" for a successful and morally upright life, and prominent men of 
Baltimore formed an association in an effort to define and attain "useful knowledge."212 
When Baltimore Friends used the term "useful" to describe the particular arts and 
employments that Native people could learn, then, they connected their work among 
Ohio Indians to the early republic’s broader discourse surrounding notions of 
"usefulness," morality, and education.213  
                                                
212 With regards to the military, by 1826 Secretary of War, James Barbour, proclaimed citizens' 
labor to be more important than military service. He wrote, "at least a million and a half of our 
most useful citizens would be relieved from the unprofitable pageantry of military 
parade...constituting so injurious a draft on their industry." “Annual Report of the Secretary of 
War, Showing the Operations of the Military Establishment of the United States in 1826; and 
Report of the Board of Officers on the Organization of the Militia,” 4 December 1826, American 
State Papers Class V (Military Affairs) (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832-61), III: 388-9 in 
John Dwiggins, "The Military Establishment and Democratic Politics in the United States, 1783-
1848" Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2012.  
Far from performing intensive manual labor themselves, several prominent members of 
the Baltimore meeting's Indian Concerns committee instead spent their evenings debating just 
what constituted "useful knowledge." For the "Society for the Attainment of Useful Knowledge," 
a social group to which several members of the Baltimore Friends' Indian Concerns committee 
belonged, "useful knowledge" could mean a number of things, and their schooling in literature, 
history, and the like meant that their own "usefulness" was quite different than that of others. 
Their meeting minutes offer a glimpse into the questions that were, at the time, both deemed 
worthy of debate and crucial to prominent Baltimorean men's "attainment of useful knowledge." 
On January 6, 1798, for example, the men asked "Is a Man of Good morals & Sound 
Constitution—Justifiable in passing the prime of life in a State of Celibacy?"212 After lively 
discussion they decided in the negative; procreation was, instead, advisable. Similar deliberation 
ensued when, on October 28 1797, the men debated whether, "In Case of a general emancipation 
of the Slaves in the United States by Law—Ought Government to indemnify the present 
Holders."212 Debate ended with an answer in the affirmative. Over the course of the group's three-
year existence the men debated the issues of a land tax, the armament of merchant vessels, debt 
prison, and "the mental faculties of the Ladies" (they found, according to Enlightenment 
principles, that "the Ladies" were the mental equals of men). See Society for the Attainment of 
Useful Knowledge Minute Book, 1797-1800, The Constitution By-laws and Minutes of The 
Society for the Attainment of Useful Knowledge Baltimore, 1797-1800. Maryland Historical 
Society, Baltimore, Maryland, 32-33; 19-20; 57. 
213 On broader discourse, see, for example, Boudreau, "‘Highly Valuable &Extensively Useful’: 
Community and Readership Among the Eighteenth Century Philadelphia Middling Sort,” 
Pennsylvania History, vol. 63, no. 3 (July 1996): 302-329. 
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That discourse was also grounded in developing notions of class. Historian Seth 
Rockman rightly understands the emergence of class concepts as fundamentally 
connected to the material conditions of poverty. Such conditions—observed by reformers 
partially as the result of stereotypes and racial assumptions—also rendered educational 
reform efforts hierarchical. By limiting "useful" pursuits to agriculture and the 
"mechanical arts,” Friends defined the limits, from their perspective, of Native peoples' 
utility. Baltimore Friends thus included Native peoples in the discourse regarding 
usefulness and, ultimately, the public good, even as they excluded Indians from the 
republic proper. In 1807, for example, civilizing agent and Quaker William Kirk 
proclaimed that his civilizing efforts possessed the power to transform Ohio Country 
Native peoples into "peasible good citizens on our fronteers" who would "become a 
strength to our Government."214 While his words revealed that he envisioned a nation that 
would one day include Native peoples, they also revealed that that day was not yet at 
hand. By emphasizing Indians' potential for transformation, Kirk excluded them from the 
nation, and, in doing so, contributed to the process of defining the young republic's 
citizenry, as well as of the American empire’s subjects. Friends’ agricultural mission 
work ultimately employed a discourse of humanitarianism and perpetually ongoing 
education in order to ensure that indigenous peoples would act as “useful” non-citizens. 
 Ideas of education and “usefulness” aided in the creation of ideas of class as well 
as gender. “Republican mothers”—also non-citizens—required education so as to 
cultivate good male citizens, but again, these women required only a certain form of 
                                                
214 Kirk to Dearborn, 20 July 1807, Letters received by the Secretary of War, Main Series, 
Records of the Office of the Secretary of War (Record Group 107), National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 
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education.215 Eighteenth-century Quaker schools offered their pupils a well-rounded 
education that aimed to cultivate both practical skills and knowledge of the sciences, 
languages, and history. The Ackworth School in Britain, for example, served Quaker 
children who were "not in affluent circumstances," and Dr. John Fothergill insisted 
"[t]hat the English language, writing and arithmetic, be carefully taught to the sexes."216 
Still, one nineteenth-century historian of the Ackworth schools explains "[t]hat the girls 
[would] also be instructed in housewifery and useful needlework."217 The school thus 
taught girls the practical arts of eighteenth-century domestic life, and it also contributed 
to the entrenchment of gendered and classed ideals of labor. Again, as with agricultural 
education among Native men and women, “poor,” non-citizens received a labor-based 
form of education.  
                                                
215 The literature on women, motherhood, and citizenship in the early republic is increasingly 
vast. See, in particular, Linda K. Kerber, "The Republican Mother: Women and the 
Enlightenment-An American Perspective," American Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Summer, 1976), 
187-205; Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Rosemarie Zagarri, "Morals, 
Manners, and the Republican Mother," American Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2 (June 1992), 192-215. 
216 Biddle, A Plan for a School, 17; John Fothergill, Letter to a Friend in the Country, Relative to 
the Intended School, at Ackworth (London, 1779), 61. 
217 Thomas Pumphrey, History of Ackworth School (Ackworth, 1853), 34-35. One historian points 
out that while the school originally encouraged its pupils to engage in manual labor, the school's 
overseers abandoned the plan after worrying that the students might suffer "moral evil...by 
associating with the labourers employed" to carry out the chores full-time. These children were 
Quaker; their religion set them apart from other children in similar circumstances, and it certainly 
set them apart from non-Quaker laborers. Walvin, The Quakers, 96. 
Memorialists in 1807 New York similarly saw religion as a means to set certain children 
apart from others. They wrote, “Your Memorialists have viewed with painful anxiety, the 
multiplied evils which have accrued, and are daily accruing to this city, from the neglected 
education of the children of the poor. They allude more particularly to that description of children 
who do not belong to, or are not provided for, by any religious society; and who therefore do not 
partake of the advantages arising from the different charity schools, established by the various 
religious societies in this city. The condition of this class is deplorable indeed..." While the 
practical problem of not being able to attend religious charity schools was real, these 
memorialists deemed non-religious children to be of a separate "class" altogether. Lancaster, 
Improvements in Education. 
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Similarly, early nineteenth-century Philadelphia charity school reformers—many 
of them Quakers—provided more than vocational training but nonetheless provided an 
education tailored for pupils who were not among the affluent Euroamerican inhabitants 
of the United States. Friends' Philadelphia Adelphi School—a school intended primarily 
for African American children—used the Lancasterian method of instruction wherein 
older students taught younger students in order to cut costs. In contrast to other Quaker 
schools, the school's overseers did not endeavor to teach Quaker doctrine, but rather basic 
spiritual concepts.218  Indeed, Adelphi School reformers believed these children required 
no more than the "laws of morality, the obligations of virtue and the more obvious truths 
according to the Bible."219 Anything beyond that, they contended, would "not be doing 
justice to the motives and views of the association."220 These reformers believed that all 
youths of Philadelphia should receive education, but also insisted that laboring class 
students required "the more obvious" version. Education thus became a means by which 
reformers "other-ed" wage laborers, African Americans, and their children. Universal 
education, in other words, had its limits. 
The proposed Baltimore School of Industry likewise endeavored to provide 
Baltimore's poor technical training that would enable them to earn a wage in the 
                                                
218 See Joseph Lancaster, Improvements in Education. A particularly thoughtful piece on the 
Lancasterian schools in the United States is Dell Upton's on the schools and "spatial 
imagination." His argument, however, renders Friends' focus upon agricultural education work 
among Ohio Indians all the more perplexing compared to other republican educational initiatives. 
See Dell Upton, "Lancasterian Schools, Republican Citizenship, and the Spatial Imagination in 
Early Nineteenth-Century America," Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 55, no. 3, 
(Sept. 1996), 238-253. 
219 William C. Kashatus III, “The Inner Light and Popular Enlightenment: Philadelphia Quakers 
and Charity Schooling, 1790-1820,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 118, 
no. 1/2 (January 1, 1994): 87–116, quotation, 100. 
220 Ibid.  
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developing city. The school's proponents hoped to provide struggling individuals with a 
place to live while teaching them skills to bolster their ability to earn a living.221 The 
school never opened its doors but it was, nonetheless, symbolic of Baltimore leaders' 
efforts to find a place for wage laborers at the bottom of the emerging economy. The 
implicit philosophy undergirding the School of Industry and other similar efforts was that 
certain individuals were impoverished because of a lack of industry, knowledge, and, 
often, morality. Such institutions, however, provided education for work only and did not 
equip workers with the knowledge to advance above earning a "living wage."222 
Likewise, Quakers' agricultural missions did not provide Ohio Indians with basic literacy 
or numeracy skills, and they thus relegated Native people to the bottom of the U.S. socio-
economic hierarchy. The forms of education offered by the missions and by urban 
institutions alike, then, reinforced assessments regarding both laborers’ and indigenous 
peoples’ potential. By emphasizing the acquisition of certain skills—often physically 
labor-intensive ones—reformers further entrenched a social hierarchy grounded in ideas 
of labor, virtue, and, increasingly, race. 
Quakers' agricultural missions, like urban educational reform efforts, thus 
emphasized the acquisition of particular kinds of knowledge and "habits of industry," and 
they similarly framed the “Indian problem” as a moral problem. According to Baltimore 
Friends, however, Indians’ failures were not solely their fault. In 1796, the Baltimore 
                                                
221 Seth Rockman, "Work, Wages, and Welfare at Baltimore's School of Industry," Maryland 
Historical Magazine, Vol. 102, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 572-607. 
222 Historian Seth Rockman rightly argues that the school "suggests a second, seemingly 
contradictory pattern in the emergence of a wage-economy—the persistence of coercive labor 
relations. The School of Industry sought to add the city's 'free' wage-earners to the ranks of 
enslaved, indentured, and imprisoned laborers from whom work had long been compelled." Seth 
Rockman, "Work, Wages, and Welfare at Baltimore's School of Industry," 575. 
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Indian concerns committee wrote, "[t]he distresses and difficulties which these poor 
people labour under we believe may in a great degree be attributed to their propensity to 
the use of Spiritous Liquors introduced among them by Traders and Evil-minded 
men...and through this their attachment to this debasing and destructive Enjine of Satan, 
they are left destitute and miserable, their morals corruped...their mind embittered against 
the white people."223 Here, Friends made clear that it was also corrupt Euroamericans 
who were responsible for Indians' "poverty." Instead of setting a moral example, traders 
"corrupted" Indians in much the same way that the New York Free School’s "indigent" 
parents corrupted their children. This, again, contributed to the notion that there were 
those within the American nation—some white men—who actively spread the disease of 
vice. Indeed, those Euroamericans whom reformers labeled immoral or corrupt were in 
danger of being banished from the nation all together. One Friend wrote that some 
Americans’ 
mannor of living contributes to produce ferosety being continually 
engaged in hunting savage beasts...these people live between the law & 
the Indians, & as settlement cultivation & law extends further, The wild 
game & the Indians retreat, these people keep thier possition & follow the 
game & the Indians, & in thier commerce with the latter have borrowed all 
thier Vicess, & neglected thier Virtues.224  
 
According to this Friend, these settlers were not "poor Indians" but they were not truly 
American "citizens" either. Instead, they lived "between the law & the Indians," a 
consequence of their "whiteness," "ferosety," and lack of proper virtue and occupation. 
They needed to cease "hunting savage beasts," learn the proper ways of settlement and 
                                                
223 5th month 22, 1796, BYMIC minutes, 3-7. 
224 Anonymous Friend, "A Journey to the Northwestern terretory the 2d of the 10th mo 1797," 
MSS 003/005, Swarthmore College, Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore, PA. 
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cultivation, and, instead of keeping "thier possition," they needed to pick a side. Like 
Native Americans, these "white savages" (also described as witchcraft-practicing “Arabs” 
in at least one early republic textbook) needed to learn to live within the law and become 
civilized for the good of the republic.225  
That traders and settlers spread the contagion of vice in lands on the fringes of the 
empire was equally disturbing as the problems plaguing the republic’s cities. From 
Friends’ point of view, both had the power to affect the nation’s future; Native peoples 
did possess, after all, the potential for becoming “good citizens.” Framing Indians' 
problems in this way thus was, in part, a neat way of pinpointing the problems plaguing 
the republic. It meant that Friends could combat Ohio Indians' problems—and those 
facing the republic—by sharing with them their “useful knowledge” of farming, and, 
through farming, virtue. With knowledge and virtue the Ohio Country and its inhabitants 
would become a healthy portion of the growing republic.226 
 
* * * 
                                                
225 Elijah Parish, A Compendious System of Universal Geography, Designed for Schools. 
Compiled from the Latest and Most Distinguished European and American Travellers, Voyagers 
and Geographers (Newburyport, MA: Thomas & Whipple, 1807), 86. The image of the "white 
savage" becomes all the more powerful when considering that Peter Silver's "anti-Indian sublime" 
groups most militant, white Europeans together as a sector of society united by their hatred of 
Native people. See Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early 
America (New York: W.W. Norton  & Company, 2009). 
226 Daniel Richter's work on Quaker ideas of Indians in Ohio adds to our understanding of the 
development of ideas of race in the early republic. Framing Friends' work in the context of 
educational reform—and connecting that reform to urban reform efforts—however, enables us to 
consider issues of class and citizenship as well. Richter, "Believing That Many of the Red People 
Suffer Much for the Want of Food.” 
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  Quaker reformers’ readiness to provide Native peoples only with agricultural 
instruction reveals that by the early nineteenth century Friends embraced an economic 
and social hierarchy built upon assumptions of Natives’ ignorance and material 
difference. At an earlier point in their history, Friends once refused to show deference 
when addressing their supposed social superiors, and men like George Fox and William 
Penn took pains to comment upon Native peoples’ similarities with non-Natives. By the 
early nineteenth century, however, Friends’ educational and reform movements embraced 
the recognition of a clear difference between Native Americans and African Americans, 
and the poor more generally, on the one hand and everyone else on the other. Ohio 
Country Native Americans needed to heed the instructions of Friends in order to learn to 
raise food that could ensure their survival; Baltimore's African Americans and urban poor 
were to go to the School of Industry in order to learn to earn a living wage; all were to 
learn to take their place in the developing economy. The most prominent members of the 
Baltimore Society of Friends, therefore, were fully entrenched in the new political 
economy of the early republic and their benevolence reveals the ways in which these 
former social and theological outcasts became, at least in part, simultaneously part of and 
contributors to a mainstream culture built around the assumption of inequality. While 
some state officials disagreed with their inclusive—albeit stratified—vision of the nation, 
it nonetheless shaped U.S. imperial Indian policy. Agricultural education and technical 
training remained a centerpiece of Native American boarding schools into the twentieth 
century. 
Hope for the future was also at the heart of Friends’ mission. Even as traveling 
Quakers closed their eyes to Ohio Indians' corn fields, they saw with clarity the region's 
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potential to become like the more familiar urban coast. They made frequent references, 
for example, to the small villages they encountered during their travels, and they 
projected upon them their own prospective visions. One traveler, for example, described 
a place on the eastern shore of the river in Virginia, as containing only three houses but 
quickly added that "thier was a time when the cittys of London & philadelphia did not 
contain more, & I see no reason which it may not grow as large as them or any place, if it 
do not it is neither for want of room or Materials."227 Another Friend proclaimed that 
"Many difficulties attend new settlers—though the soil in most places is luxuriant beyond 
the conception of those who live in our eastern Counties, yet the labour of clearing is 
great and the pinching times they experience before they can get much returns ought to 
be weightily attended to."228 Life in the "west," Friends contended, was difficult at first, 
but they could develop that wide expanse through which they traveled in a way that 
would resemble life near home.  
 Traveling Friends carried visions of their home in Baltimore with them on their 
journeys. Friends’ experiences in that booming metropolis influenced their observations 
of Native peoples, their dreams for the western lands, and, ultimately, U.S. Indian policy. 
Baltimore was a thriving city, however, because of its position as an urban center through 
which goods moved: it connected the agrarian lands of rural Maryland with a thriving 
harbor. Baltimore Friends understood the importance of economic infrastructure in the 
development of lands; their own flour and textile successes were built upon economic 
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projects akin to that underway in the Ohio Country. They also understood, however, the 
importance of workers and consumers—black, white, and, in the Ohio Country, "red"—
in building cities. Their reform work, then, could build a moral, industrious nation and a 
powerful empire, and it could transform a vast west into a place resembling home, one 
farm at a time.  
 
 
139 
Chapter 4 
The Mission Complex: Economic Development, “Civilization,” and Empire in the 
Early Republic 
 
 
 
Friends’ agricultural mission work offered them a means to better the supposedly 
wretched situations of Native peoples. It also, however, offered a way to remake the earth 
in God’s image, to cultivate the “outer plantation” by encouraging habits of industrious 
virtue among Native peoples and Friends alike, and to spread “moral beauty over the face 
of the desart.”229 Ultimately, however, Quakers’ missions had far-reaching economic and 
political consequences that extended beyond even their own explicit goals. Agricultural 
education offered a means by which to include Native peoples in the republic’s emerging 
social hierarchy, and agricultural mission work facilitated the growth of the U.S. 
economy. Indeed, agricultural missions transformed landscapes, mobilized capital, and 
supported a national effort to build a "great and united empire" through commerce by 
both requiring goods and labor and promoting socioeconomic "conversion." With federal 
direction and investment, missionaries like the Friends, Indian agents, blacksmiths, 
merchants, and manufacturers contributed their work and wares toward efforts to civilize 
indigenous peoples in the Ohio Country. In turn, they linked urban and rural economies 
and produced agricultural goods, laborers, markets, and, so officials hoped, increasingly 
marketable—and taxable—land. When the U.S. federal government recruited and paid 
Quaker missionaries for their efforts to "civilize" Native peoples, then, it employed them 
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as imperial agents in a mission complex that linked the economies of Indian Country with 
those of New Orleans, the urban U.S. coast, and the world.230  
 The mission complex expanded the influence and power of the United States in 
the Ohio Country, the North American southeast, and beyond through mission work and 
economic development by linking missionaries, humanitarians, manufacturers, federal 
employees, and indigenous peoples through networks of markets and capital. It was 
imperial, and by supporting Indians' agricultural education, it endeavored to render—if 
temporarily—the region's Native Americans an agrarian working class. As chapter five 
will show, it also offered opportunities for Native peoples to manipulate U.S. economic 
development for their own purposes, even as it transformed landscapes and bolstered the 
United States' ability to reap the rewards of expanding agricultural markets in lands that 
remained in Indians' hands. In the Ohio Country—a territory of fertile land that banned 
U.S. slavery with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787—this state-directed project provided 
a cost-efficient means of imperial economic development, and it reveals the federal state's 
importance as a pivotal actor in the developing U.S. market economy and its social 
                                                
230 William Henry Harrison to the General Assembly, July, 29, 1805, Logan Esarey, ed., 
Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, Volume I (Indianapolis, 1922), 152-158. 
Francis Prucha, Jill Kinney, and Diane Rothenberg view the missions as sites of paternalistic 
cultural assimilation or cultural negotiation, while Matthew Dennis and Claudio Saunt emphasize 
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U.S. economic development. See Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States 
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Field': Quaker Schools Among the Seneca Indians on the Allegany River, 1798-1852" (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Rochester, 2009); Diane Rothenberg, "Friends Like These: An Ethnohistorical 
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City College of New York, 1976); Matthew Dennis, Seneca Possessed: Indians, Witchcraft, and 
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relations. Attention to the mission complex thus adds to our already rich understanding of 
market expansion and economic change in the early republic.231  
 Like Philip Curtin's "plantation complex," the mission complex was, at its core, a 
"political and economic order" that fostered economic development, and viewing Friends 
and Natives through this lens enables us to situate two central facets of U.S. 
colonialism—civilizing plans and mission work—within the social, political, and 
economic strategies that advanced U.S. colonialism. What is more, the concept forces us 
to recognize missions' power to facilitate broad economic change as well as produce the 
more familiar episodes of cultural negotiation in the early republic. The mission complex 
was central to the layered economic, social, and political development of the Ohio 
Country, and it reveals that there were alternative—though not necessarily competing—
forms of economic development at work in North America. Evidence of the simultaneous 
existence of the state-driven mission complex, Native economies, and slavery in the 
North American southeast makes this clear. Attention to the complex's functioning in the 
Ohio Country, however, allows us to chart the sinews of market development in lands 
further removed from the South's developing slave markets. Such analysis then elucidates 
the fact that peoples, politics, and policies in Indian Country played critical roles in 
producing dynamic ideas of wage labor, private property, and class in the early republic 
and its continental empire—and beyond. Attention to the functioning of this system based 
                                                
231 For defining texts and frameworks for understanding economic development in the early 
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1991); Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-
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upon free yet hierarchical relations of power ultimately illuminates how the early U.S. 
empire thrived off of economic growth, and it reveals that imperial state policy, as well as 
a myriad of Native and non-Native actors like the Friends, facilitated the development 
and expansion of capitalist markets and forms of labor in the early republic.232  
* * * 
                                                
232 Indian Country was thus crucial to U.S. imperial and economic development, and as U.S. 
missionaries representing a variety of societies traveled abroad more frequently as the nineteenth 
century wore on, lands and peoples in the Pacific and Atlantic worlds likewise grew and shaped 
the U.S. economy and empire. For the utility of the "plantation complex," see in particular, Philip 
D. Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History (Cambridge, 
1990); Jack P. Greene, "Early Modern Southeastern North America and the Broader Atlantic and 
American Worlds," The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Aug., 2007), 525-538.  
 For other scholars' calls to analyze the importance of indigenous peoples in the 
development of early American economies see Stephen Aron, "The Significance of the Frontier 
in the Transition to Capitalism," in Christopher Clark, ed., "The Transition to Capitalism in 
America: A Panel Discussion," The History Teacher, Vol. 27, No. 3 (May, 1994), 263-288; 
Alexandra Harmon, Colleen O'Neill, and Paul C. Rosier, "Interwoven Economic Histories: 
American Indians in a Capitalist America," The Journal of American History, (December 2011), 
698-722.  
Recent scholarship linking slave markets, labor, and investment with the development of 
U.S. capitalism offers a useful model for linking Indian Country—and the mission complex—
with the development of the U.S. economy. Like slavery, missions, boarding schools, and the 
civilization plan more generally were connected with nineteenth-century paternalistic notions of 
"benevolence," and they were, similarly, hinges for economic growth. See Walter Johnson, River 
of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge, 2013); Edward E. 
Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism (New 
York, 2014). 
 Agricultural missions fostered an imperial market system under the guise of 
"benevolence," even as they became the visible markers of an imperial "government out of sight." 
Historians Brian Balogh, Gautham Rao, and Stephen Rockwell similarly analyze the power of the 
state by examining its administrative apparatus, while others, such as William Bergmann, 
emphasize the role of the army in expanding U.S. power. Bethel Saler, moreover, offers an 
excellent treatment of both state power and how settlers and Indian affairs shaped state-building 
in the upper Northwest territories and Wisconsin. See Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: 
The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America (Cambridge, 2009); Gautham 
Rao, “Administering Entitlement: Governance, Public Health Care, and the Early American 
State,” Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Summer 2012), 627-656. (Lincoln, 1998); Stephen 
J. Rockwell, Indian Affairs and the Administrative State in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 
2010); William H. Bergmann, The American National State and the Early West (Cambridge, 
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When Friends traveled to the Ohio Country at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
they ventured into a world created by the region's Native communities, British and 
French inhabitants, and migrating Americans. The regional economy was built upon the 
rules of neighborly reciprocity and the politics of collective economic advantage: it drew 
upon the communal labor practices embraced by regional Native peoples for their utility 
in efficiently clearing lands and harvesting crops. Euroamerican immigrant families 
adopted these practices and similarly sent members to community events such as 
logrollings in order to assist new arrivals in the difficult work of clearing and building on 
land. The civilization plan in the Ohio Country likewise borrowed and built upon the 
region's cultural labor relations: it brought together Quakers and members of Native 
communities to transform the landscape, and it thus modeled, at first, existing economic 
practices.233 
Friends used their government connections to gather information regarding travel 
and communication before embarking on their journeys to the Ohio Country. Secretary of 
War Dearborn responded to Friend Isaac Tyson's 1808 query regarding his Ohio 
destination and informed him that the government had “no messenger going to Fort 
Wayne, but the trail for that Quarter leaves the City every Sunday & Thursday. No Post 
Office being established at Fort Wayne, you will have to direct to that place by the way 
of Staunton, Ohio.” The secretary's response revealed that Tyson would experience a 
                                                
233 On regional political economy see Christopher Clark, "Ohio Country in the Political Economy 
of Nation Building" in Andrew R. L. Cayton and Stuart D. Hobbs, The Center of a Great Empire: 
The Ohio Country in the Early Republic (Athens, OH, 2005); Andrew R. L. Cayton and Peter S. 
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deprivation of government facilities in the west, but that there was enough administrative 
support to make an organized departure possible. Friends were more fortunate than most 
early Americans by virtue of their well-connected government partners, and they used 
them to gather information that facilitated their journeys.234 
En route to their Ohio missions, Baltimore Friends passed through a region 
marked by layers of economic development. Mounds—remnants of the Mississippian 
cultures of the Mississippi and Ohio valleys—dotted their path and caused befuddlement 
as some struggled to ascertain whether they were the residue of an old European colony 
or rather built by northward roaming Indians from "Mixico" fleeing civil war. Surely 
"northern Indians," as one Friend wrote, did not build them. Nor did the region's Native 
peoples, so Friends thought, produce the abundant fields of corn that appeared so 
impressive. By the time Baltimore Quaker Gerard T. Hopkins passed through the eastern 
portion of the upper Ohio Valley in 1804, however, westward travel was in the process of 
adding another layer of change to the lands already altered by millennia of economic 
development, centuries of fur trading, and imperial conflicts. Friends' journeys, like those 
of others, bolstered the economic development of a number of Quaker and non-Quaker 
towns between Baltimore and Ohio or Indiana by feeding local economies that profited 
from an increasing stream of provision-seeking, migrating travelers.235  
Indeed, the Ohio River was the primary artery westward, and towns such as 
Wheeling and Marietta reaped the profits by offering wares, boatmen, and guides. One 
                                                
234 Henry Dearborn to Isaac Tyson, Apr. 16 1808, Miscellaneous Letters Sent by the Secretary of 
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Washington, DC. 
235 Anonymous Friend, Journal of trip to Northwest Territory, 1797, MSS 003/005, Friends 
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Friend traveling near the Scioto River, for example, remarked that “the people in the 
town endevour to suply them & make them pay well for it." Though traveling Friends 
made up a small percentage of westward-bound immigrants, their federally sanctioned 
travel contributed to the small-town profits that, in turn, encouraged both migration to 
and settlement in the region. Legal settlement had the potential to generate federal 
revenues and expand emerging markets, and federal officials endeavored to divide the 
Ohio lands into townships and expedite their sale for such purposes. At the turn of the 
century, however, land sales were slow; legitimate migration to the region proved 
insufficient to produce relief for the debt-ridden federal government. With squatters 
filling the region, the government failed to reap its desired revenues even after the 1787 
Ordinance opened the lands to large speculation. Congress initiated a system of credit 
with the Frontier Land Bill in 1800 in an effort to attract smaller purchasers, but such a 
scheme likewise failed to open the lands to small buyers who too frequently failed to pay 
off their debts.236 
                                                
236 Anonymous Friend, Journal of trip to Northwest Territory. In 1804, for example, Hopkins and 
his Quaker companion Philip Dennis hired “an old Indian and his Squaw” to guide them across a 
river. Gerard T. Hopkins, Journal, 1804-05, March 29, 1804, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 
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Government officials, hopeful that migrating settlers would buy and fill the lands, 
conceptualized plans for the lands even if revenues, because of loan defaults, were less 
than expected. Governor Harrison's 1802 scheme for Jeffersonville near the Ohio River in 
Indiana Territory, for example, resembled a checkerboard with open lots adjacent to those 
that were to be occupied. President Jefferson found Harrison’s idea "handsome, & 
pleasant," believing "it to be the best means of preserving the cities of America from the 
scourge of the yellow fever which being peculiar to our country must be derived 
from...our cloudless skies, [for]...Ventilation is indispensably necessary." Jefferson 
envisioned "the cities of America" flourishing in the region, and, with keen interest, he 
sent a sketch of the proposed town for Harrison's perusal since he could not "decide from 
the drawing you sent me, whether you have laid off streets round the squares thus or only 
the diagonal streets therein marked. The former was my idea, and is, I imagine, more 
convenient." Not surprisingly, Jeffersonville's original design was abandoned by 1810 
due to the impracticalities of so many open lots in a state that saw massive population 
growth—a staggering 413%—during the first decade of the nineteenth century.237 
While the federal government struggled to determine the best means of reaping 
revenues from settlement in the region, land speculators such as John Armstrong and 
William Wells (the latter was a speculator in the 1790s and an Indian Agent for the U.S. 
in the 1800s) endeavored to turn a profit by buying extensive tracts and offering loans to 
individuals with signed contracts. Like federal policies, Wells' correspondence reveals 
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not a lack of settlers but rather a frustrating lack of legitimate settlers in the region. Wells 
informed Armstrong that he encountered "numbers of people" wanting "to purchase lands 
but they are mostly poor, destitute of money, and wish to purchase on long credits." As a 
result, "the sales of lands at Cincinnati were very small, when we consider the number of 
settlers, and the immense quantity of superior lands there offered for sale." With 
legitimate settlement and land purchases, speculators and the government alike hoped to 
reap revenues and manage squatters.238 
Federally directed economic development promised to boost the evolution of the 
regional economy already underway and generate revenues for the government and 
speculators alike. Friends' missions thus complemented the federal and speculator quest 
for legal settlement in both the long and short term. And not simply because farming 
would free Native nations to sell much of their increasingly commodified lands to the 
United States—though that was, of course, part of the story. The Northwest Indian War 
was a still-fresh memory to many Americans—particularly in Ohio and Indiana 
Territory—and Friends' work offered a means by which the federal government could 
deal peacefully with Native peoples. Friends' work targeted, in particular, Native nations' 
young men, and those men were often in fact and certainly in Euroamericans' 
imaginations the warriors who wrought bloody havoc among settlers and their property. 
Many government officials, Friends, and settlers hoped Natives’ “transition” to farm life 
would secure peace. With peace—or with the illusion of peace—secured by educators 
who enjoyed a positive reputation among the region’s Indian nations (as opposed to the 
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generally suspect reputation of government officials) would come, in the minds of many, 
regional stability; with that would come increased land sales, settlement, and state and 
federal tax revenues. Because peace was a protracted process, however, Baltimore 
Friends' agricultural mission efforts were also crucial to the United States' short-term 
economic policies: they aimed to convert to the ways of civilized economy those who 
many Americans deemed agriculturally-deficient "heathens." In turn, they created and 
expanded U.S. markets and consumerism.239 
 Indeed, in many ways the aim to convert was, for economic and political 
purposes, most important. Both the nation's finances and its humanitarian reputation were 
at the forefront of officials' thinking. Governor William Henry Harrison pondered in 
1801, for example, "Whether some thing ought not to be done to prevent the reproach 
                                                
239 Shifting federal policies reveal the problems of finance in the period and offer opportunities to 
examine how the state and individuals created economic change by confronting those problems. 
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which will attach to the American Character by the extirpation of so many human 
beings." Though he ultimately concluded that such matters were better left to the 
president to decide, his concerns echoed those of the first Secretary of War, Henry Knox, 
who in 1789 contended, “How different would be the sensation of a philosophic mind to 
reflect that instead of exterminating a part of the human race...[we] had imparted our 
Knowledge of cultivation, and the arts, to the Aboriginals of the Country.” Paternalistic 
rhetoric bolstered U.S. claims to benevolent power fit for a republic even as it facilitated 
the development of an imperial market system; it was "knowledge of cultivation," after 
all, that mattered most to men like Knox. Such an emphasis on agriculture not only 
required an expanded market economy, but it also contributed to the development of class 
hierarchy in the United States: Native peoples were fit for farming, these men 
determined, and so agricultural education alone would prove their savior. The veneer of 
benevolence was central to U.S. imperial economic transformation.240 
 As chapter three demonstrates, Baltimore Quakers' brand of mission work was a 
product of their experiences in their urban environment and its economy of wage laborers 
and slaves. They determined European-style farming to be the best means of eradicating 
Natives' "savagery," and, from their perspective, cooperation with the War Department 
and the small federal state facilitated the expansion of their efforts to save impoverished 
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Indians from extinction. Their work also, however, supported U.S. policies that, in turn, 
developed capitalist markets and forms of labor. Baltimore Friends’ mission work, 
focused on "useful" agricultural education, encouraged a commodification of Native 
labor that erased the individual and his need for numeracy as part of an agricultural 
education, even as it mobilized Friends' own work on behalf of their religious society and 
the state.241 Indeed, for their work they received pay from the federal government in ways 
similar to the tax benefits, grant money, and funds granted to other voluntary 
organizations in the nineteenth century and beyond. Though Friends' compensation was 
piecemeal at first, the Civilization Fund of 1819 institutionalized their pay and 
guaranteed that missionaries received $10,000 annually. State power mobilized Friends 
and, later, other missionaries in the effort to solve an ongoing "Indian problem."242 
 Indeed, similar to ideas of "disciplined labor" in other imperial contexts, the U.S. 
state worked with missionaries to define and class its labor force using categories of 
civilization and savagery. Quakers’ efforts helped shape nineteenth-century rhetoric that 
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proclaimed indigenous populations to be working toward civilization—they were never 
all quite "civilized" despite the rhetorical exceptions of the "five civilized tribes." The 
civilization project was, then, a constant work in progress, a never-to-be-completed work, 
and it set precedents for the federal management of labor on the continent and abroad, 
even as it contributed to economic transformation. The complex was a "benevolent," free 
labor answer to the problems presented by federal desires for land, revenue, economic 
development, and remaining indigenous communities: agricultural uplift produced 
agricultural production, markets for American manufacturers, and, in turn, increasingly 
valuable land.243 
 
* * * 
 Armed with both a mission and federal support, Baltimore Quaker Phillip Dennis 
arrived in Indiana Territory in 1804. He there embarked upon the first of Friends’ 
agricultural efforts by forming "Dennis's Station” for the benefit of Miami, Eel River, and 
Delaware Indians on the Wabash River thirty to forty miles southwest of Fort Wayne. 
Friends later formed at least two other missions at Captain Lewis Town (Lewistown) and 
Wapakoneta both among the Shawnees in western Ohio. The Miami chief Little Turtle 
positioned Dennis's Station or "Little Turtle's Farm School" at a location several miles 
away from the village in which the theoretical pupils lived, likely in an effort both to 
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assert control over the Quakers' work and keep the Euroamerican men at a distance. The 
mission was nonetheless just south of the Forks of the Wabash—a valuable location 
where the Little River joined the Wabash in Indiana. Though it took over twenty years for 
the United States to claim ownership of the spot, Dennis's work of clearing and fencing 
fields, producing crops, and constructing a cabin for his residence not only showcased for 
the local Miamis and some Delawares the intricacies of becoming a “proper” 
agriculturalist, but offered an opportunity to expand an agricultural market at a lucrative 
location.244 
By the end of 1804, only one Delaware family relocated to the farm school lands, 
but Dennis offered his colleagues in Baltimore hope for the future by noting "that 55 Eal 
river Indians had been at his station.” Such rhetoric of success encouraged the 
maintenance of the mission complex and ensured that the state continued its efforts to 
manage the labor of missionaries and their pupils. In 1807 Wapakoneta, Quaker William 
Kirk agreed to bring civilization to the Shawnees there for "one thousand dollars, as pay" 
along with a federal budget of $6,000 "on condition" that he would "undertake the 
Superintenency and...procure the necessary Assistants and labourers, together with such 
implements of husbandry and horses as [his] proposed system embraces." The Quaker 
kept Secretary of War Henry Dearborn informed of his progress and in doing so revealed 
the vast amount of physical work that he, his Quaker employees, and the Shawnees 
performed. After several months in Ohio, he had "placed all the young men among the 
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Shawnees (except while three of them were imployed in making a small improvement for 
a few Dellawares...)" and had high hopes that he was "likely to succeed as fast as the 
most Sanguine could have expected as they work constantly with my young men." 
Together, Shawnees and Friends "built several Cabins," "made Rails & fenced in about 
one Hundred Acres of Ground," "cleared about thirty" more "& planted in Corn better 
then two Hundred Acres." By 1816, moreover, Baltimore Friends' mission among the 
Shawnees at Wapakoneta yielded "between 7000 & 8000 Bushels" of corn, and they 
"found many of [the inhabitants] at work, in their fields" with "a considerable portion of 
them...becoming industrious" and raising poultry.245 
 Through missionary and indigenous labor, the federal government produced and 
managed workers but also transformed the landscape and expanded present and future 
markets. The missions were thus labor-intensive ventures that fostered U.S. economic 
development, and the federal state viewed them as worthwhile investments. Kirk's 
mission at Wapakoneta, located just north of the Greenville line that separated Indian 
Country from the United States in Ohio, offered an opportunity for the U.S. to reap 
economic benefits from lands that remained unceded by Native peoples. Though Kirk 
departed the region in 1808, Friends agreed to sustain the mission site in 1810 after 
Secretary of War William Eustis wrote that "the Government has consented to 
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relinquish...the public property at that place to [Friends'] discretion and management" and 
that "the Government is to be at no expense hereafter in conducting this establishment." 
The deal saved Friends the cost of buying land for their missions, minimized federal 
costs, and allowed the government to pay for services with a currency that was, at the 
moment, much more readily available than government cash—land. It also pleased 
regional Indian agent John Johnston who, prior to the agreement, argued that 
abandonment of the settlement at Wapakoneta would "give a stroke to the buisness in this 
country from which it will not soon recover." He explained that, "all the Tools necessary 
for the purpose of Farming on a large scale is on the spot," that "a waggon road from the 
Settlements in ohio to the Town is cut out," and that he knew "of no place in the Indian 
country where money could be so usefully expended as with the Shawanoes at Kirks 
Settlement."246 
 Johnston's words, coupled with the actions of Friends and government officials, 
reveals that the civilization plan in the Ohio Country promoted not just subsistence 
farming among "poor Indians" but "Farming on a large scale." Friends noted in 1813, for 
example, that 3,000 bushels of corn were sold that season but also explained that "when 
Peace is restored in that Country, these People will be more than Ever disposed to pursue 
the farming business." "Indian country," both Friends and officials thought, could 
contribute to the development of U.S. territory, indigenous communities, and agricultural 
markets, but it was no easy task. Missions required roads to connect the farms with 
                                                
246 William Eustis to John Johnston, Jan. 16, 1810, John Johnston Papers, 1801-1860, MIC125, 
reel 1, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, OH; John Johnston to P. E. Thomas, April 15, 1809 in 
Gayle Thornbrough, ed., Letter Book of the Indian Agency at Fort Wayne, 1809-1815 
(Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 1961), 40-42; 
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nearby towns, and the work of civilization required textiles, agricultural implements, and 
stores for Native peoples' future consumerism. Friends' agricultural education work 
bolstered trade in Indian wares, and by doing so, it incorporated Ohio Indian nations and 
their resourceful lands into the U.S. market economy.247 
None of this would have been possible, however, without U.S. government 
officials' efforts on the ground. These men sold and distributed farm implements such as 
rails for fences and supplies for the construction of mills. Moreover, they constructed 
political alliances with settlers, Native chiefs, Quakers, and government officials. Indian 
agents William Wells and John Johnston, for example, worked with Baltimore Friends 
and kept them abreast of developments in the region. Wells informed Quakers in 1805, 
that "there would be 100 acres of Land under good fence at the Little Turtles Town (15 
miles north of Dennis' Station) by the 1st of the 6 mo" and "that they had obtained a large 
number of Hogs and some Cows." When Philip Dennis returned to his family in 
Maryland, Friends asked Wells to place one of his men at Dennis's Station, at Friends' 
expense, until they could find another Quaker to carry out the work. Friends likewise 
informed Johnston that "we request thee to do us the favour to hire two suitable men...and 
draw on our Treasurer Elias Ellicott at sight for the amount of expence incured; we also 
request thee to write to us about the middle of the 7th mo (July) and let us know what aid 
                                                
247 BYMIC minutes, Vol. I, 10 mo 12 1813, 258-259. The minutes are silent on the distribution of 
profits and the precise location of sale. Friends report that the Shawnees had planted about 250 
acres of corn at Wapakoneta, putting the average yield per acre between 28 and 32 bushels. These 
yields approximate the average reported through the first half of the nineteenth century. An 1820s 
family farm, for example, yielded 30 bushels of corn per acre. See David M. Strothers and Patrick 
M. Tucker, "The Dunlap Farmstead: A Market-Dependent Farm in the early History of the 
Maumee Valley of Ohio," Archaeology of Eastern North America, Vol. 30 (2002), pp 155-188; 
see page 178 for chart on 1820 farm production. 
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is rendered." Wells, Johnston, and other Indian agents thus oversaw U.S.-Indian relations 
at Fort Wayne, Piqua and elsewhere in the region, but they also maintained connections 
with the society that provided diplomatic and educational support to the federal 
government's plans. They served as the crucial links between Friends, the federal 
government, and Native peoples on the ground.248 
These relationships, particularly those with high ranking officials, offered Friends' 
efforts the federal seal of legitimacy. Friends often arrived at western posts carrying 
letters signed by the secretary of war mandating that post officials welcome them and 
treat them with hospitality. Secretary Dearborn wrote to territorial Governor William 
Hull and John Johnston in 1808, for example, in order to ensure that they offered Elisha 
Tyson and James Gillingham a warm reception. The secretary informed his men that “any 
civilities you may afford them in the execution of their benevolent intentions will be 
grateful to them and their Society & pleasing to the Prest. of the U.S.” When Friends and 
other missionaries carried such letters they not only showcased federal officials' approval 
of their work, but they supported implicit federal claims to control citizens' movement. 
Such letters would not have been necessary if movement was entirely free in Indian 
Country. The federal government enhanced its authority over both citizens and non-
citizens by managing its laboring and administrative bureaucracy; Friends’ agricultural 
                                                
248 For correspondence with Wells see BYMIC minutes, Vol. I, 10 mo 15 1805, 109-113; P.E. 
Thomas to John Johnston Baltimore February 20, 1809, John Johnston Papers, reel 1. William 
Wells's presence in the region, however, was mired in controversy. See R. David Edmunds, "'Evil 
Men Who Add to Our Difficulties': Shawnees, Quakers, and William Wells, 1807-1808," 
American Indian Culture and Research Journal, Vol. 14 No. 4 (1990), 1-14. 
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mission work thus contributed to a western state-building project that took place in many 
forms.249 
 Baltimore Friends relied upon men like Johnston for assistance, but they also 
influenced agents' hiring. After Johnston replaced Wells as Indian Agent in Ohio, the 
War Department recruited Quaker John Shaw to serve as Johnston's paid assistant. Shaw 
continued the work at Dennis's Station after Philip Dennis and then William Kirk 
returned to Maryland. Baltimore Friends' influence, however, extended further. They 
encouraged federal officials to hire Hendrick Aupaumut as another of Johnston’s 
assistants in 1809. Friends deemed the experienced Mohican go-between "to be a 
judicious intelligent, worthy man, and well qualified for extensive usefulness" among the 
Miamis at Dennis's Station. Friends explained that "we so far interested ourselves in his 
behalf with the Government as to solicit some assistance for him, which has been granted 
and placed under thy superintendence, and we take the liberty to request thy friendly aid 
and attention to him, which will very much oblige us, and promote the benevolent view 
of Government." In part because of Friends' influence, Aupaumut found employment 
                                                
249 See Henry Dearborn to Governor William Hull, John Johnston, Samuel Tripper, Mar. 24, 1808 
(M15, reel 2, RG 75, NARA). For additional letters restricting missionaries' movements see, for 
example, Henry Dearborn to William Ewing, Mar. 18, 1805, ibid. 
 The control of movement extended to the region's Native people as well. The government 
required "passports" for traveling Native Americans who wished to venture to Washington, D.C. 
In 1802, Secretary Dearborn informed his Indian agents that they were “directed not to furnish 
any Indians with the means of travelling to the Seat of Government unless they have passports.” 
The reason for the passports, Dearborn claimed, was to minimize the “many inconveniences 
arising from Indians travelling through the country to the Seat of Government without passports.” 
By 1806, the president of the United States would only see traveling Native leaders during four 
months of the year—May, June, October, and November—since he deemed it “expedient to 
decline receiving visits from his red children, while Congress are in session. See Henry Dearborn 
to Brownson Apr. 19, 1802 (M15, reel 1, RG 75, NARA); Henry Dearborn to Charles Jouett, 
Sept. 6, 1802, ibid.; Henry Dearborn to William Wells, Nov. 3 1806 (M15, reel 2, RG 75, 
NARA). 
 
 
158 
with the War Department and maintained a vital presence in the Ohio Country during the 
War of 1812.250 
 Relationships with Indian agents, perhaps most importantly John Johnston, with 
the secretary of war, even with the president of the United States, were vital to Friends’ 
work, but so too was their connection with developing economic posts. Indeed, the early 
republic's Indian factory system connected eastern manufacturers and developing 
regional centers such as Cincinnati with the rural interior, and, the factory stores, along 
with the civilization plan, were key components of the mission complex in the Ohio 
Country. The factories offered for sale the manufactured agricultural implements, 
textiles, and other goods requisite for Natives civilized lifestyle—the Fort Wayne factory 
store, for example, had nearly 500 hoes on-hand in 1806. More broadly, however, the 
factories aimed to wrest control of the fur trade from private traders and establish stores 
and an administrative hierarchy of Indian factors and agents in Indian Country. By 
attempting to monopolize the sale of agricultural manufactures, linens, and other goods, 
moreover, it contributed to federal overtures of Native dependence on U.S. manufactures 
during the early nineteenth century. The stores, along with the Trade and Intercourse Acts 
that established the federal government as the overseer of the Indian trade, meant that the 
federal government controlled both trade and market expansion in Indian Country. 
Because "Indian Country" was so near the official boundaries of the United States in the 
                                                
250 Henry Dearborn to Captain Hendrick [Aupaumut], Dec. 27, 1808 (M15, reel 2, RG75, 
NARA). For more on Aupaumut see, Rachel Wheeler, “Hendrick Aupaumut: Christian-Mahican 
Prophet,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer, 2005), 187-220; Alan Taylor, 
“Captain Hendrick Aupaumut: The Dilemmas of an Intercultural Broker,” Ethnohistory, Vol. 43, 
No. 3 (Summer, 1996), 431-457. For John Shaw see P.E. Thomas to John Johnston Baltimore 
Feb. 20, 1809, John Johnston Papers, reel 1. 
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upper Ohio Country, federal expansion of markets there expanded both Euroamericans' 
access to markets and, in turn, the regional and national market economy.251 
 The work performed by the purveyor of public supplies and later the 
superintendents of Indian trade offered federal backing to the creation of an economy 
built upon the shared interests of agriculture and manufacturing. Tench Coxe, in 
particular, as one of the first to procure goods for the federal Indian trade and factory 
system, set the model for the later superintendents. Coxe was a strong supporter of 
manufacturing and industry, and he supported government regulation of "revenue and 
commerce." He argued that manufactures should aim at "accommodating the interests of 
agriculture, manufactures and commerce in such a manner, as to render them reciprocally 
a support to each other, and mutually beneficial to the interest of the nation." For Coxe, 
agriculture and manufacturing went hand in hand and, together, they contributed to 
national political independence and power.252  
                                                
251 For Fort Wayne accounts see Bert J. Griswold, ed. Fort Wayne, Gateway to the West, 1802-
1813 (Indianapolis, 1927), 405-663; see page 458 for 1806 figure. Linking Indian policy with the 
broader context of early federal economic policy is crucial to understanding federal power and 
economic development in the early republic. See, for example, Douglas A. Irwin and Richard 
Sylla, eds., Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s (Chicago and London, 
2009). Factory stores existed until 1822. The mission complex, however, was not always reliant, 
specifically, upon "factory" stores. Though the factory system was abolished, federal stores—
some, as in the case of Alaska, operated by Quakers—remained central to U.S. imperial power 
throughout the continent and, indeed, abroad. On the factory system see Ora Brooks Peake, A 
History of the United States Indian Factory System, 1795-1822 (Denver, 1954); William H. 
Bergmann, The American National State and the Early West; Stephen J. Rockwell, Indian Affairs 
and the Administrative State in the Nineteenth Century. For Quaker-run stores in Alaska see 
Nicholas E. Flanders, "Missionaries and Professional Infidels: Religion and Government in 
Western Alaska," Arctic Anthropology, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1991), 44-62. 
252 Secretary of War Dearborn to Coxe, Feb. 10, 1804, (M15, reel 1, RG 75, NARA); Tench 
Coxe, “An Address to an Assembly of the Friends of American Manufactures convened for the 
purpose of establishing a Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts, 
read in the University of Pennsylvania, on Thursday the 9th of August 1787,” (Philadelphia, 
1787), 29-30, accessed online at 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?type=search&tabID=T001&queryId=Locale%28en
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 The purveyors and later the Superintendents of Indian Trade procured goods from 
merchants and manufacturers in cities such as Philadelphia and Baltimore, or in western 
towns like Cincinnati, and they utilized the republic's rivers and fields to ship the wares 
to factory stores for both purchase and distribution as Indian annuities. In 1810, for 
example, Coxe paid one man $837.42 for "ironmongery," another $111.90 for "50 axes & 
40 grubbing hoes," and still another $1,426.35 for "axes, ploughs, etc." "Blacksmiths 
tools" from Philadelphian Nicodemus Lloyd and 120 medals from the silversmith Liberty 
Brown were also paid for with federal funds. In 1814, moreover, the Superintendent of 
Indian Trade John Mason informed then Secretary of War John Armstrong that "a 
considerable portion of Woolens can be bought at Cincinnatti on pretty good terms." As 
Mason's statement suggests, federal officials sought the best prices for their business. 
Once officials were satisfied with the specifics of procurement and shipment, the items 
traveled to the factory stores at Fort Wayne and Piqua in the Ohio Country and elsewhere 
throughout the heart of the continent, and the trade thereby supported U.S. manufacturers 
but also those engaged in occupations such as shipbuilding, road-building, and transport. 
The expansion of markets in Indian Country had far-reaching and often profitable 
economic consequences.253 
                                                
%2C%2C%29%3AFQE%3D%28BN%2CNone%2C7%29W011983%24&sort=Author&searchT
ype=AdvancedSearchForm&version=1.0&userGroupName=upenn_main&prodId=ECCO, 
3/17/2014; [Coxe, Tench], Observations on the Agriculture, Manufactures and Commerce of the 
United States (New York, 1789), 12; Jacob E. Cooke, "Tench Coxe, Alexander Hamilton, and the 
Encouragement of American Manufactures," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 
32, no. 3 (Jul. 1975), 369-392. 
253 Coxe family papers, 1638-1897, call no. 2049, Series I, vol. 28, 23-25, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; John Mason to John Armstrong, March 8, 1814, 198-
199, Letters Sent by the Superintendent of Indian Trade, 1807-1823, Records of the Office of 
Indian Trade (National Archives Microfilm Publication M16, roll 3, 198-199), National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. (hereafter M16). For "reasonable terms," see, for example, Dearborn to Israel 
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 Once procured, Native nations and individuals purchased and received trade 
goods with their annuity funds. In 1802, Wyandots, Delawares, Shawnees, Ottawas, 
Chippewas, and Potawatomies obtained $1,000 per nation in the form of "Thirty Rifles, 
Thirty pounds of Powder, sixty pounds of Lead, one hundred small corn Hoes, and sixty 
small axes." Eel River Indians, Wyandots, Weas, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and 
Kaskaskias received similar items but in proportion to their number such that each nation 
received $500 worth of goods. Offering such goods as Indian annuities translated 
rhetorical support of urban manufacturing into real federal financial backing: the 
purchase of goods aided manufacturers in the short term, while the potential to expand 
markets in Indian Country offered hopes for a new consumer base that included both 
Indians and, with regional peace, migrating Euroamerican settlers. The United States thus 
compensated Native peoples for their lands with annuities, but then used those annuities 
to invest in its own economy.  
Because the wares possessed the power to transform U.S. officials' economic 
aspirations into reality, their quality mattered. When John Johnston complained that some 
wares were defective, Superintendent Mason therefore informed him that "The Rifles you 
complain of were made in Philad....I request you will continue to make your observations 
on the goods sent, to forward samples, to describe the articles best suiting Indian Trade 
out of this much good will grow & every attention shall be paid in the soliciting." The 
stores' accounts thus reveal the simultaneously diffuse and centralized power necessary 
                                                
Whelen, June 5, 1802 M15, roll 1, 222-223. Tench Coxe, the first to procure goods for the U.S. 
Indian trade, set the model for later superintendents. His ideological support of the intertwining of 
U.S. agricultural and manufacturing sectors thus translated into policy. See Jacob E. Cooke, 
Tench Coxe and the Early Republic (Chapel Hill, 1978). 
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for the maintenance of the mission complex as well as the extent to which Native nations' 
consumerism influenced the development of the U.S. economy.254 
 Between 1807 and 1811, the factory store at Fort Wayne made a profit of 
$10,502.77—a pittance in terms of the national GDP but a large sum in Indian Country 
nonetheless. The decreased military activity in Indian Country, in part the result of 
Friends', Indian agents', and Natives' diplomacy in the region, combined with these 
profits and the expanding reach of U.S. markets to render the factory system and 
missionaries' efforts worthwhile, co-constitutive investments. In 1806, moreover, the 
factory's accounts reveal that more than one-third of the debts owed the store—
$1,203.00—belonged to Native American individuals. The stores therefore not only 
encouraged Native people to participate in the U.S. economy, but they also welcomed 
them—along with the Euroamericans who owned the remaining two-thirds of the debt—
into a cycle of credit and debt. Though the factory system stores' success was 
inconsistent, and "factory" stores ceased to exist after 1822, government-run stores and 
Indian agencies remained central to Indian policy throughout the nineteenth century, and 
their connection with officials' desire both to expand the U.S. economy and undermine 
private and foreign traders aligned with broader U.S. policy.255 
  Just as popular notions of the national defense supported both the development of 
the U.S. standing army and tariffs on domestic military manufactures, similar concerns 
                                                
254 Henry Dearborn to Israel Whelen, 4 March 1802, M15, roll 1, 177; John Mason to John 
Johnston, Jan. 3, 1808, M16, roll 1, 196. 
255 Griswold, ed. Fort Wayne, Gateway to the West, 405-663. Andrew Fagal similarly asserts that 
the early national arms trade was, in part, a push for government revenue that simultaneously 
undercut foreign traders. See Andrew J. B. Fagal, "American Arms Manufacturing and the Onset 
of the War of 1812," The New England Quarterly 87 (Sept., 2014): 526-537.  
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about the virtue and industry of the nation's republican citizenry rendered any state-
directed commerce required to "civilize" Native Americans commensurate with notions 
of the nation's benevolence. In many Americans' political imaginations, Indian factories 
and annuities likely were connected with the "Indian problem" and notions of U.S. 
benevolence—not to federal economic policy. Because of this, neither Federalists nor 
Democratic-Republicans bemoaned—or explicitly recognized—the expansion of the 
mission complex in the Ohio Country, and Indian policy changed little as a result of the 
"Revolution of 1800."256 
 So subtle—from the perspective of the average U.S. citizen—was the cost-
efficient development of the U.S. imperialist mission complex in the Ohio Country, that it 
facilitated the transformation of the region's political and economic order with little 
fanfare. Most contemporaries—and many historians—saw the 1795 Treaty of Greenville 
as the death knell for Native sovereign power in the region, but only because "peaceful," 
economic imperialism was less obvious—if no less violent for its social, economic, and 
political consequences—than war. Together civilizing policies, market expansion, and 
federal investment in Indian Country transformed Ohio Country inhabitants' ways of life. 
They also, however, enabled indigenous peoples to continue to shape the diffuse state's 
policies, the U.S. economy, and American imperialism. 
                                                
256 Though some argue to the contrary, Bernard Sheehan and Reginald Horsman rightly see 
continuity between Federalist and Jeffersonian Indian policies. Both emphasize the intellectual 
impulses behind federal Indian policy but fail to consider the connections—and continuities—
between federal economic policies and Indian policies. Bernard W. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: 
Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian (New York, 1974); Reginald Horsman 
Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812 (East Lansing, MI: 1967). Anthony Wallace, 
on the other hand, argues that Jeffersonian policies departed from those of the Federalists. 
Anthony F. C. Wallace, Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans 
(Cambridge and London, 1999). 
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* * * 
 The mission complex accelerated the incorporation of indigenous peoples into the 
U.S. market economy and offered them additional power as consumers in the early 
republic—even as it encouraged Native peoples’ disengagement with other Atlantic 
markets. Shawnees, Miamis, and their neighbors, however, continued to make daily 
decisions based upon their needs and desires as well as upon the opportunities at their 
disposal. U.S. policies constrained these opportunities, but they did not eliminate them. 
Indeed, the labor relations that accompanied the mission complex rendered Shawnees and 
their neighbors key creators, links in, and manipulators of the U.S. economy, and this 
continued even during the volatile years of the War of 1812. Because the War 
Department partially funded the civilization project by allocating annuity funds toward 
agricultural tools and missionary labor, in essence Native nations paid Friends and 
government officials to clear their fields, build mills, plant corn, fence lands, and build 
the roads that connected their crops with Euroamerican markets. Shawnees, Wyandots, 
and their neighbors therefore found ways to take advantage of the United States' 
commodification of their lands: they adopted the practices undertaken by missionaries 
and the federal state, blended those with their own ideas of economy, and used 
Euroamerican labor and resources, purchased with their annuities, to invest in their lands. 
They ultimately, then, helped shape the expansion of the U.S. market economy in the 
nineteenth-century Ohio Country before, during, and after the United States' war with 
Great Britain. Even more broadly, they continued to act as active participants, affected by 
the same squabbles, opportunities, and obstacles as their Euroamerican counterparts, in 
the politics and economy of North America. 
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 The economies of the Miamis, Shawnees, and their neighbors prior to U.S. 
mission work were subsistence based and built upon a foundation of agricultural 
production, hunting, and international trading networks. In addition to trading with 
indigenous polities, the Miamis, for example, cultivated especially close relationships 
with French traders, while the Shawnees historically traded with both the British and 
French. From the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, fur-trading partnerships, in 
particular, often blossomed as a result of intermarriage and the subsequent establishment 
of kinship ties by Euroamerican men and indigenous women. For some Ohio Country 
Indians, relationships with Quaker missionaries became an additional means by which 
their networks produced economic advantage. The mission complex in Indian Country 
thus enabled Native peoples to continue to employ Euroamericans and their policies for 
their own purposes, albeit in new ways, even as it fostered economic change.257 
 Indeed, for some Shawnees and Miamis, Friends' primary value was not in their 
instruction but in their ability to produce crops.  In 1808, for example, when the Miami 
chief White Loon complained to Friend Elisha Tyson that some Quakers and government 
officials were being dishonest, he contended that they worked their own fields for profit 
and that the corn "was all gone" when his "people went down to receive it." Upon Tyson's 
inspection of the mission, White Loon proclaimed, "You expected to find your young 
                                                
257 For more on Ohio Indians' economies, see Stephen Warren, The Shawnees and Their 
Neighbors, 1795-1870 (Campaign, IL, 2008); Hinderaker, Elusive Empires. For kinship, 
marriage, and trade see Susan Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking 
Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes (Amherst, MA, 2001). The Miami leader Jean 
Baptiste Richardville, for example, was the son of a Frenchman and a prominent Miami woman, 
and he used his connections with both the French and Miamis (and government agents) to 
cultivate wealth and political power during the early nineteenth century. See Bradley J. Birzer, 
"Entangling Empires, Fracturing Frontiers: Jean Baptiste Richardville and the Quest for Miami 
Autonomy, 1760-1841" (Ph.D. Diss., Indiana University, 1998). 
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men working in our fields; instead of which you found them working in a field by 
themselves, we would like it much better if they would work in our fields." If Friends’ 
efforts “taught” Native Americans anything, it was how to hire, deploy, and manage 
Euroamerican workers with both cash and their federal annuities.258 
 With missionaries and Euroamericans providing them with the agricultural 
infrastructure, labor, and goods that produced crops and further connected their lands 
with diverse markets, some individuals and communities sought to reap the benefits of a 
diversified, increasingly global economy while remaining on their lands. As a result, a 
myriad of competing political opinions regarding the extent to which individuals should 
engage with the Euroamerican economy developed. Indeed, just as one scholar deems the 
War of 1812, a "civil war" among Americans and British, so too were there divisions 
among the inhabitants of Indian Country.259 In a report concerning Tecumseh's visit to 
the Shawnees at Wapakoneta in 1810, for example, Indian agent John Johnston informed 
Governor Harrison that the Shawnee leader "made no impression on the [Wapakoneta] 
Shawanese, and went away much dissatisfied at their not coming into his views.” 
Johnston went on to say that he “indirectly encouraged their emigration westward, and 
told them that their annuity should follow them. They appear determined to remain, and 
are much attached to the town and the improvements, which are considerable." One 
should analyze such statements with care, but given that the Shawnees' appreciation of 
the town's "improvements" opposed Johnston's stated desire to push them west, and that 
                                                
258 BYMIC minutes, "The address of the Committee of the Yearly meeting of Baltimore dated 
19th of the third month 1808..." included in the minutes, Vol. I, 3 mo 19 1808, 180-189. 
259 For the "civil war of 1812" see Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British 
Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2010). 
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they also refused to join Tecumseh's war against the United States in 1812, it appears that 
the Shawnees at Wapakoneta not only wished to remain on their lands, but valued the 
results of Friends' labor. In part then, political divides between so-called 
"accommodationists" and "nativists" during this period were, just as among U.S. citizens, 
political debates produced by a changing economic world.260 
 Tensions among regional Indian leaders were on full display at an 1809 treaty 
between Indiana Territory Governor William Henry Harrison and the region's Miamis, 
Delawares, and Potawatomies. The United States endeavored to buy a tract of land 
inhabited by the Weas on the Wabash, and Harrison promised the Potawatomies a share 
of the proceeds if the Miamis agreed to sell. The Potawatomies consequently pressured 
the Miamis to give up the lands in exchange for annuity payments, and, though Little 
Turtle expressed interest in selling, the Mississinewa Miamis refused. By this time, the 
Miami Little Turtle's influence was on the wane while that of Jean Baptiste Richardville, 
chief at the Mississinewa villages, was ascendant. Richardville did not attend the treaty, 
but rather sent words of support for a treaty agreement, a move that suggests that he 
                                                
260 John Johnston to William Henry Harrison, June 24, 1810 in Esarey, Messages and Letters, 
431. Indeed, the labels "accommodationist" and "nativist," employed by historians such as 
Gregory Dowd, are insufficient. Debates among American Indians were not so clearly 
demarcated; they represented alternative economic and political views for the future. Gregory 
Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). Works by Kathleen DuVal, Stephen 
Warren, and Patrick Bottiger, however, illuminate the many options, problems, and opportunities 
presented Native peoples as a consequence of U.S. Indian policies and how, in turn, they 
confronted and shaped federal policies. Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and 
Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia, 2006); Warren, The Shawnees and Their 
Neighbors; Patrick Bottiger, "Prophetstown for Their Own Purposes: The French, Miamis, and 
Cultural Identities in the Wabash-Maumee Valley," Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 33, No. 1 
(Spring, 2013). R. David Edmunds's call for a reinterpretation of those leaders who cultivated 
relationships with the United States in order to benefit their own peoples, now decades old, is still 
valid. See R. David Edmunds, "Redefining Red Patriotism: Five Medals of the Potawatomies," 
Red River Valley Historical Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (March 1980), 13-24. 
 
 
168 
anticipated complications would arise that would potentially harm his own trading 
business relations with the British, Americans, or both. Both Richardville and Little 
Turtle supported a Miami political future based upon private property and wealth 
acquisition and also one situated in Indiana along the Wabash. Little Turtle, however, 
supported selling the Weas' lands in return for increased annuity payments, but the 
Mississinewa chiefs told Harrison that "you know when things are scarce they are dear, 
you know the price of lands. We are willing to sell you some for the price that it sells for 
amongst yourselves." The Mississinewas ultimately suggested that they would "sell their 
lands by the acre & that they should receive two Dollars for it."261 Though Harrison 
refused the latter offer and Miamis ultimately agreed to accept annuities, the 
Mississinewas' proposal nonetheless reflects the reality that some Native peoples wished 
to negotiate as inhabitants of Euroamericans' economic world while others, like Little 
Turtle, were content to accept annuity payments. 
 Just as Miamis, Shawnees, Delawares, and Stockbridges debated their economic 
and political futures, Euroamericans debated their own. In Philadelphia, the issues of 
profit and economic disparity intersected with the politics of embargo in 1813 during the 
height of the war with Great Britain. One citizen, William Groves, informed a friend that 
five hundred of the city's residents met in the city's Northern Liberties section to declare 
their abstinence from sugar, tea, and coffee. Brown sugar cost residents thirty-two cents, 
coffee, forty he complained—a good ten to fifteen cents above the standard price. All, he 
explained, was the result of "Acompony of speculaters to sett the People Agane the war." 
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Speculators' profits, gathered to push people against war with Britain, would not prove 
sufficient for men like Groves since he claimed that "the war party has Gott stronge by it 
for they See that the Big fish will eat them." Profit, speculation, consumerism, and war 
intertwined in Philadelphia and both reinforced and created political divisions: political 
debate often was cast in terms of economy and vice versa. And the same was true in 
Indian Country.262  
Natives’ political debate also centered around the question of how closely to ally 
with the Americans. Indeed, some Ohio Indian Nations attacked the United States before 
war with Britain broke out in 1812. The Shawnee brothers Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa 
endeavored to rally together a pan-Indian coalition of forces in an effort to halt 
Americans’ territorial encroachments in the region. The Shawnees at Wapakoneta chose 
not to participate in the attacks as did many others, particularly Delawares in the region, 
but some Ohio Indians did join the effort. The Shawnee Prophet Tenskwatawa 
established Prophetstown as a base from which allied Indians launched attacks between 
1809 and 1812. William Henry Harrison, former territorial governor of Indiana and new 
leader of the U.S. army, attacked the town during the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811, 
dealing Tenskwatawa and his allies a severe blow. Shortly after the United States’ victory 
there, regional Indian leaders who tended to ally themselves with Americans, gained the 
political upper hand among their people.263  
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 Politics remained largely divided, however, among Ohio Indians. The situation 
continued to deteriorate with the United States’ formal declaration of war against Great 
Britain in June 1812. That summer proved a tumultuous one: the Miami leader Little 
Turtle died, and the United States suffered a number of blows early on. The United States 
evacuated Fort Dearborn at present-day Chicago, and William Wells, former Indian agent 
among Ohio Indians, was killed during the evacuation. Fort Wayne endured a siege, 
though its factory buildings burned, and some forces, including some Miamis, attacked 
Fort Harrison that first year as well. For the most part, however, Miamis endeavored to 
remain neutral in the conflict. Nonetheless, the U.S. army attacked numerous Miami 
villages near the Wabash. Harrison’s army attacked Little Turtle’s Village as well as 
three others near the Forks of the Wabash. In December, Lieutenant Colonel John B. 
Campbell attacked the Mississinewa villages, though he received orders to avoid harming 
prominent leaders such as Richardville, White Loon, and Pacanne who were open to 
working with the Americans.264 
 The war continued into 1814. Tecumseh died at the 1813 Battle of the Thames, 
and, finally, in July 1814, most regional Native nations treated for peace with the 
Americans. The peace gave Americans the upper hand, and diminished Britain’s ability 
to pose a significant threat in the region. Though Native peoples’ politics shifted after the 
war, they were left by no means powerless.  
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Indeed, even during the years of conflict, individuals as well as groups found 
ways to benefit from the situation as best they could. Native peoples' connections with 
War Department officials and missionaries expanded their ability to take advantage of a 
variety of money-making opportunities in the region during the war. Like civilizing 
mission work itself, war with Britain provided an impetus for federally mobilized labor, 
and it stimulated the U.S. economy by requiring the increased production of wares, the 
shipment of manufactures, and the building of infrastructure. In short, it made available 
new economic possibilities for war-torn regions' inhabitants, even as it produced death 
and destruction in its wake. Thanks to the economic ties wound tighter by civilizing 
mission work, Miamis, Shawnees, and others too participated in the regional wartime 
economy. 
 During the war, the U.S. Army Quartermaster paid Ohio Wyandots forty-eight 
dollars for 1,200 pounds of beaver, it offered the Seneca Tommy Smith forty-eight 
dollars for "one grindstone, one drawing knife and one Chissel for helving & repairing 
axes," and it paid the Shawnee Chief Captain Lewis sixty dollars for "One Horse pressed 
into the public service." Some individuals thus combined their existing economies with 
the emerging trend toward work-for-hire labor, while others provided a good or service 
for individual profit. Emerging American economic practices traveled to Indian Country, 
and there combined with Native nations' understanding of economic relations to create an 
economic system that was marked, increasingly, by developing ideas of investment and 
production.265 Individuals like Tommy Smith, Captain Lewis and others who provided 
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goods or services for the U.S. government participated in the wartime economy in much 
the same way as did their Euroamerican neighbors.266 
 The War of 1812 thus created economic opportunities, but it also disrupted life in 
the region in profound ways. Baltimore Friends' mission work stalled during the years of 
the war, but John Johnston remained in the region. He retired from his post at Fort Wayne 
at the start of the war, but after removing to Piqua, Ohio, he nonetheless continued to 
serve the United States. The War Department, hoping to keep a man who maintained 
good relations with the region's Indian nations in its employ, opened an agency at his 
home.  Delawares who desired to remain neutral in the conflict sought the assistance of 
agent John Johnston to do so, and the Indian agent hosted many of them—to the chagrin 
of his Euroamerican Piqua neighbors—at his farmstead at Piqua during the height of the 
war. Acting on instructions from General William Henry Harrison, Johnston sold 
clothing, among other goods, and he reported in 1813 that such offerings would "take all 
that remains on hand." When wartime rendered Delawares wanting, their relationship 
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with Johnston enabled them to maintain their politics either in support of the war or of 
neutrality.267 Delawares' stay at Johnston's Piqua farm reveals not that they were 
"accommodationists" who sought either to support the United States or remain neutral 
but, rather, that they supported a policy of alliance with the United States and its 
representatives—whether missionary or Indian agent. Such an alliance, they determined, 
offered the best prospects for the future but also for their endurance during the war.  
 In a myriad of ways, then, members of the Ohio Country Indian nations continued 
to create, adapt to, and manipulate a dynamic economic world. The later history of the 
Friends' mission at Dennis's Station, however, illuminates the contentious trajectory of 
Natives' and federal power as well as U.S. economic development. Neighboring settlers 
destroyed most of the original mission infrastructure at the start of the War of 1812, and 
such actions suggest that they viewed the site as an economic and political threat. Native 
nations possessed the power to take advantage of the mission complex, but that power 
could also make them visible targets of an ambitious empire—an empire that profited 
from economic growth in Indian Country. 
Though Native peoples' manipulation of the mission complex threatened 
Americans' dreams of an empire whose economic heart lay in Ohio Country fields, it also 
bolstered U.S. claims to Indians' economic dependence. Though this dependence was 
mainly rhetorical, U.S. officials nonetheless used the notion to promote, in turn, fictional 
ideas of Native nations' political dependence. Much of Indiana Territory Governor 
William Henry Harrison's correspondence dealt with the problems of Indian affairs, and it 
reveals the extent to which Native nations continued to wield power in the Ohio Country. 
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Despite this reality, the governor informed his territorial legislature in 1805 that the 
region's benevolent Indian policies had secured Native nations' "entire dependence." 
Recognizing his territory's incredible potential and emphasizing peace, he continued to 
remark that, "the mighty river which separates us from the Louisianians will never be 
stained with the blood of contending nations; but will prove the bond of our nation, and 
will convey upon its bosom, in a course of many thousand miles, the produce of our great 
and united empire." Indian affairs, statehood, and economic production were linked in 
Harrison's mind, and the mission complex offered evidence of "dependence;" it offered a 
veneer of legitimacy to U.S. political claims in Indian Country.268 
 For Harrison, Natives' "entire dependence" led to increased land sales, "settlement 
and improvement," "produce," tax revenues, and economic stability. The mission 
complex was thus crucial because it aided in the distribution of farm implements, gave 
the federal government hope that those tools would, in fact, find use among Native 
populations, and offered officials like Governor Harrison evidence of Native economic 
and, in turn, political "dependence." Such "evidence" would, officials hoped, encourage 
the settlement of the "right sort" of people and, in turn, boost land sales and increase 
revenues. These points were crucial in the maintenance of the civilization project in the 
Ohio Country, and they explain why, despite the limited success of the explicit goal of 
complete assimilation, it endured and shaped U.S.-Indian—and, ultimately, foreign—
policy throughout the nineteenth century and beyond.  
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* * * 
When one travels through Wapakoneta, Upper Sandusky, and Lewistown, Ohio as 
well as Fort Wayne and Huntington, Indiana—all central locations of missions and Indian 
trading posts—the remnants of old railroads and canals still remain, many of which were 
built not long after Quakers and Native peoples helped build the mission complex and the 
U.S. imperial market economy. These remains reveal, however, that the layered 
development of the U.S. economy—but also American imperialism—was both a "top 
down" and "bottom up" affair. As such, tracing the federal state's power in building a 
mission complex reveals that Friends’ missions and the "civilization plan" not simply as 
tools for “assimilating the Indians,” but rather were crucial means by which the U.S. state 
consolidated its power and spread its economic influence in the early nineteenth century. 
At the same time, Friends’ mission work and the relationships that grew between Indians 
and officials as a result of federal Indian policies likewise offered ways by which Native 
peoples could make a living during the War of 1812, and they enabled Indians to use 
missionary labor to their advantage. Such trends continued even after the war. Indeed, 
Indian peoples employed and manipulated Euroamericans' ideas of "civilization" and 
economy for their own purposes beyond the War of 1812 in ways that had lasting 
consequences.269 
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Chapter 5 
“A Damnd Rebelious Race”: Native Authority in the Aftermath of War 
 
 
These Miamies Genl are a damnd rebelious race and I believe it true what 
Lafountain tells me that Richardville caries the Key and nothing can be 
done without his assent 
—Hugh B. McKeen, 1826270 
 
 When peace returned to the towns and fields of Ohio and Indiana in 1816, the 
economic and political changes underway in the region continued apace. For some, the 
year ushered in cause for celebration: the Euroamerican inhabitants of Indiana Territory 
found themselves citizens of the United States endowed with all of the political rights and 
privileges (if they were male) that accompanied statehood. Indiana's Indian peoples, 
meanwhile, continued to cultivate and dwell upon their lands much as they had prior to 
the state's incorporation into the official limits of the metropole. Statehood meant, 
however, that Indiana—and Ohio as well—boasted a robust population. And both states 
were growing. Surges in population continued after statehood, and it encouraged the 
ongoing development of interstate infrastructure that facilitated immigrants' movement 
and employment. In the ongoing struggle to give order to the chaos of U.S. immigration 
to the region, additional non-government agencies materialized to address the problems 
of labor and economy that accompanied U.S. colonialism. 
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 In 1817, for example, Nathan Guilford, Ethan Stone, and Daniel Roe organized 
the Western Emigration Society in order to facilitate American movement into this 
"Western Country," newly free from British occupation. They declared Cincinnati "the 
most proper place for such a Society" because of its size, "local situation," and the fact 
that it operated as "a thorough-fare through which much of the migrating population 
passes."271 By the time of the society's founding, Cincinnati contained a much larger 
population than either the more northern expanses of the state or its neighbor to the west, 
Indiana. One inhabitant estimated that the city boasted "about 9,000 inhabitants, 15 
lawyers, not the most eminent, 20 physicians" and that "the number of emigrants that are 
daily arriving are imense."272 The emigration society eased the "great uncertainty and 
embarrassment" in "not knowing where to seek employment, where to apply for 
information," or knowing "where they can find a situation best suited to their 
circumstances."273 The society thus functioned as a matchmaker in the business of 
employment, receiving applications from "persons wanting to employ Mechanics, 
Tradesmen, Labourers, &cs.," as well as from "persons wishing for employment of any 
kind," and it connected them with employers seeking to bolster their fortunes through 
hired labor.274 These connections proved essential to the practical functioning of 
everyday life in the nineteenth-century Ohio Country, and by the 1820s, the practical 
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problems of making ends meet shaped the lives of Euroamericans and Native peoples 
alike.  
 Native nations and individuals used their market and government connections to 
earn a wage and assert authority during the War of 1812, and they continued to do so 
through the 1820s and 1830s. The mission complex established a space within which 
indigenous peoples could still, even after statehood, navigate and confront U.S. imperial 
power. The discourse of civilization offered them a language—mutually intelligible to 
Native peoples and U.S. citizens and officials—to demand goods and labor and to 
complain when such things failed to materialize. Miamis, Shawnees, and their neighbors, 
accustomed to dealing with U.S. officials and their missionary partners, thus manipulated 
the tools and language of "civilization," and they employed a variety of strategies that 
ensured that they continued to possess and wield authority in the region despite the 
increasing pressures of U.S. settler colonialism. 
 Many who remained in Ohio and Indiana after the war became neighbors, 
employees, and employers in a region that boasted a growing Euroamerican population. 
Some used their connections with Euroamericans to make claims upon the U.S. state and 
individuals, others employed the discourse of civilization to secure both material goods 
and bolster their political agendas, while others contemplated the advantages of 
participating in nation-building projects in places as far flung as Missouri. Such strategies 
illuminate the ways in which Shawnees, Miamis, and others found ways to remain 
connected to their lands and, when that appeared impossible, their people. While many 
scholars view the War of 1812 as the death knell of indigenous authority in the "old 
Northwest," attention both to the strategies that emerged as a result of the mission 
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complex and to indigenous peoples' roles in developing and participating in the dynamic 
Ohio Country economy after statehood reveals that their authority endured.  
 Such efforts did not come, however, without a price. Indians' claims making 
bolstered the U.S. federal state apparatus, and it linked them ever closer with the legal 
and bureaucratic policies of the United States. What was more, when Native peoples 
dared deviate from U.S. officials' ideas of "proper" Indian behavior—when they actually 
succeeded in adapting and adopting the ways of the American Empire—they fueled calls 
for their removal. As chapter six demonstrates, by appropriating U.S. Indian policies for 
their own purposes, some indigenous peoples forced Americans to grapple with the 
contradictions that lay at the heart of their civilization schemes. Ideas of race, class, and 
difference increasingly rose to the fore of discourse as, ironically, the differences between 
Euroamericans and many Native peoples eroded. 
 
* * * 
 After the War of 1812 concluded, the Shawnees and their neighbors in the region 
endeavored to take advantage of missionary and federal labors. Leaders like Captain 
Lewis at Lewis Town and Black Hoof at Wapakoneta maintained relationships with 
Friends in order to secure material advantages, organize their own labor force, and 
cultivate closer political relationships with U.S. officials. Despite their expertise in the 
arts of agriculture, they requested and accepted Friends' assistance and instruction in 
cultivating crops. Though sources indicate that Wapakoneta's inhabitants remained on 
relatively stable footing following the War of 1812, the Shawnees claimed strategically 
that "the war swept away every thing from us, and plunged us in the same situation, or 
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near the same, notwithstanding the United States have been very charitable to us, as well 
as our good friend John Johnson."275 The Shawnees at Wapakoneta suffered losses during 
the late war, but nothing like what Miamis suffered, for example, along the Wabash. 
Indeed, when Friends visited Wapakoneta in 1816, they noted that several hundred acres 
of corn and other infrastructure remained intact. Black Hoof and his people nonetheless 
endeavored to take advantage of the benefits Friends offered, rejoicing at the "prospect of 
the same help that we received from our friends the Quakers before the war."276 As 
political allies who had historically advocated for Shawnees, Friends offered the means to 
facilitate Shawnees' own economic development projects. In maintaining and cultivating 
their connections with missionaries, Shawnees, Miamis, and their neighbors engaged a 
strategy that drew upon older paradigms of Native-Euroamerican interaction and offered 
opportunities for indigenous peoples' success in a region undergoing increasingly rapid 
economic development. 
 For their part, the Baltimore Friends wasted no time in traveling to Ohio and 
Indiana to assess the condition of the region's Indian peoples.277  Their report to the 
Secretary of War William H. Crawford stressed that the Shawnees required further 
instruction from Friends to complete their transformation into civilized peoples. Writing 
to the secretary from Baltimore in August 1816, James Ellicott and Philip E. Thomas 
informed him that they had recently traveled among the Shawnees at Lewis Town and 
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Wapakoneta and found both Shawnees and Wyandots in Ohio "anxiously disposed to 
obtain instructions relative to the cultivation of their lands."278 In a population of 800 at 
Wapakoneta, for example, the Shawnees had "400 acres of ground enclosed by tolerable 
good fences, 250 acres being planted in Indian corn."279 They cultivated that land 
"principally with hoes," however, because they had only two ploughs. That lack 
encouraged Ellicott and Thomas to reiterate that the Shawnees and Wyandots yet 
required instruction—the use of hoes seemingly indicated their continued ignorance of 
agricultural techniques. The Friends had successfully overcome the Shawnees' "general 
indisposition" to work, "which prevailed...when the Society of Friends first embarked in 
this concern," and they were pleased that "the principal obstacles which retarded our 
successes are in a great measure removed" thanks to the mission foundation laid by 
Friends before the war.280 If they obtained their projected budget for work among the 
Indians ($4,720), Ellicott and Thomas concluded, the Friends could alleviate "[t]he 
situation of these Indians," which was "peculiarly calculated to awaken the 
commiseration and excite the benevolence of all who feel for the sufferings of their 
fellow men."281 The Friends' report to the War Department reflected a strategic blindness 
to Shawnees' economic ingenuity and success as agriculturalists: they either could not see 
the Shawnees as proficient or they weighted their record to reflect their own agenda.282 
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 Whatever the case, Friends' partnership with the War Department established a 
foundation for missionary-government cooperation on the continent and abroad. As 
earlier chapters demonstrated, the War Department relied on Friends as correspondents 
prior to the War of 1812 in part because their funds and organizational strengths made 
them efficient and useful partners. After the United States settled the dispute with Great 
Britain, the War Department gradually incorporated other societies into its cadre of 
philanthropic partnerships, particularly the American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Missions (ABCFM), established in 1810.283 Increased religious fervor and 
immigration to the region after the conclusion of the war fueled multi-denominational, 
federally funded mission work that modeled Friends' labor-intensive civilizing mission 
work.284 
 When the Civilization Act of 1819 passed—guaranteeing $10,000 annual support 
for missionary projects—it codified twenty years of partnership between Friends and the 
federal government. Drawing on the example offered by Friends' cooperation with the 
state, it opened opportunities for a larger variety of voluntary and religious societies to 
participate in the civilizing project. With the passage of the act, the federal government 
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wrote into law its determination to transform non-citizens into potentially assimilable, 
culturally homogenous co-inhabitants of North America. Individuals and societies 
received the funds for building construction and the running of schools and institutions of 
learning for Native peoples, and the monies were contingent upon schools’ success. 
Unlike Baltimore Friends’ efforts, many of those schools included literacy education, 
though manual and agricultural labor remained a centerpiece as well.285 The government 
also expected those employed by funded institutions to “impress on the minds of the 
Indians, the friendly and benevolent views of the government towards them.”286 In 
addition to bureaucratizing the missionaries' relations to the state, the act institutionalized 
the United States' economic and imperial ambitions.287  
 The U.S. imperial market economy encouraged missionaries to conceive of and 
brand their mission endeavors in a manner tailored to ideas of development, 
"improvement," and profit. In the early 1820s, Baptist missionary Isaac McCoy centered 
his mission work at a school that offered reading and writing instruction, and ensured that 
males were "instructed in agriculture, and Mechanic Arts," and "the Females in Spinning, 
Weaving, Knitting, Sewing &c."288 Missionaries in the field, most notably Friends, 
Moravians, and Jesuits during the preceding centuries, usually wrote to their home 
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congregations with news of their feats of conversion among the "heathens" in efforts to 
solicit funds for future work. McCoy and Friends, on the other hand, wrote not of 
religious triumph over savagery, but of economic development, and they solicited funds 
from the United States government. In an effort to obtain federal support for his mission, 
McCoy informed Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in 1821 that "[o]ur prospects in 
relation to those several tribes (the Scattering Mohigans Accepted) are truly inviting. And 
we trust that the patronage of the Government, And the liberality of the public, will 
render our funds adequate to the undertaking: I therefore humbly solicit a share of the 
10,000 Dollars appropriated by Government for Indian reform."289 To bolster his 
argument for funding, he detailed both the immense labor required for his mission work 
as well as ample evidence of his mission's economic contributions. He explained that 
"[b]eside the Superintendent & the Directress, there are belonging to the Establishment. 
A School Teacher, An Agent to procure Supplies of provision &c- And four labouring 
men. two assistent females. and a labouring woman." McCoy then wrote that "[w]e have 
cultivated this season 35 Acres of Land, 100 have 8 spinning wheels and a Loom-- The 
property belonging to the Mission consists of Land improvements, Horses, Cattle, Hogs, 
farming utensils, Houshold furniture. &c—and estimated at 1,800 Dollars."290 Thus, 
while his evangelical work still mattered, McCoy recognized that a successful appeal for 
federal monies depended upon the extent to which he could make a case for his essential 
role in economic progression. The prospect of receiving U.S. federal funds encouraged 
him and other missionaries to offer a certain type of missionary work and reporting. 
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 Meanwhile, Native peoples continued to engage the imperial market as 
consumers, employers, and manipulators. Just as they had with Baltimore Friends before 
the war, the Ohio Country's Indian peoples capitalized on the economic opportunities that 
the new missions engendered. McCoy's report to the federal government, for example, 
confirmed that Shawnees and their neighbors remained the beneficiaries of missionaries’ 
labor. Moreover, as Euroamerican population numbers increased, Indian leaders 
increasingly took advantage of that growth when they could by hiring immigrant men on 
their lands. They incrementally embraced the Euroamerican economic model, and they 
exploited their role in the U.S. economy to assert their own political authority and 
independence.  
 In 1820, for example, a group of Shawnees and Delawares who migrated from 
Ohio informed President James Monroe that since "our Tools will need frequent repair, 
and our Horses Shod, we ask if you are willing to give us a Black-Smith for five years 
only, to mend our ploughs &c. during that time, some of our Young Men, will learn with 
him to do it for us."291 The stipulation that the blacksmith should stay for "five years 
only" suggested that the Shawnees and Delawares desired to extract knowledge and labor 
from the hired man but did not wish to tolerate an open-ended engagement with the 
American. Instead, they maintained a preference for reciprocal, gift-based relationships 
that strengthened political ties between nations, even as they asserted themselves as 
employers with the power to re-hire or dismiss contracted labor at the end of a specified 
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period of work.292 The Shawnees and Delawares integrated Euroamerican ideas of 
apprenticeship, hired labor, and contract, but, as they built their own economic 
infrastructure, they asserted their relative autonomy, created and reinforced their political 
connections to the United States as contracting nations. 
 The Shawnees embraced and manipulated commercial market relations, but they 
also combined the concepts of debt and market exchange with those of older, trade-based 
forms of exchange with which they were familiar. According to George Johnston's 1829 
promissory notebook (a collection of receipts that record Wapakoneta Shawnee's names, 
debts, and the items they purchased), approximately 200 Wapakoneta Shawnee debtors 
failed to pay off their loans, and a roughly equal number of receipts were torn out of the 
notebook, signifying debts canceled (figure 5.1). Johnston's notebook thus provides 
evidence of the Shawnees' participation in a cycle of credit and debit and in the larger 
U.S. economy, just like the large number of Euroamerican debtors of the republic.293 
Indeed, every needle and yard of cloth marked as sold signified the profits of merchants 
and entrepreneurs elsewhere. Given that the Shawnees possessed a robust gift-exchange 
tradition, they may have viewed the goods as gifts. What is certain, however, is that they 
borrowed Johnston's money to secure items such as cloth, knives, bridles, and teakettles, 
and they did so to the detriment of Johnston's finances. The ambiguities of the evidence 
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reveal the consequences of the intertwining of a variety of economic understandings. 
While President Jefferson and William Henry Harrison conspired to drive up Indians’ 
debts in an effort to facilitate land sales in the early nineteenth century, some Native 
peoples nonetheless found ways to take advantage of those schemes.294 
 
Figure 5.1. George C. Johnston’s promissory book, Ohio History Center, Columbus, OH. 
 
 While most Shawnees obtained these goods in cash or future cash payments, 
some secured the wares or canceled their debts through barter. Such transactions included 
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Native women in the republic’s emerging economy, and they offer a means to expand 
historians’ understanding of women’s roles in the development of early American 
markets. “Turkey Feathers wife” (Figure 5.1) obtained goods at Johnson’s store, as did 
the Shawnee Mary DeShane who paid off part of her debt with "winter Deer Skins" in the 
"amount of fifty cents." The latter transaction offers a glimpse of the ways in which 
multiple economies collided with and became intelligible to one another in Wapakoneta. 
In this instance, DeShane exchanged skins, once the basis for trade in the region along 
with furs, for both a good and for a cancellation of standing debts. This system of market 
exchange shaped Ohio Country Indians' ideas of gift-giving and reciprocity, and it also 
produced a regional economy built through economic syncretism.295 
 Wapakoneta Shawnees welcomed Quakers to their town and accepted the 
agricultural infrastructure they offered, but their willingness to use Friends and other 
Americans like George Johnston for economic investment purposes suggested a kind of 
economic translation rather than assimilation. When Friend Isaac Harvey, then 
missionary at Wapakoneta, attended the funerary services of the aged Shawnee chief 
Black Hoof in 1831, he observed that the Shawnees intensely grieved the man's death, 
and that they marked their loss with food and ritual. He noted that "[t]wenty deer were 
killed, beside a large number of turkeys and what smaller wild animals they considered 
fit to eat—no tame animal or fowl was suffered to be eaten on that occasion, though there 
was a large quantity of bread prepared."296 Here is revealed Shawnees' selective 
appropriation of Euroamerican goods and practices and the complicated nature of their 
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politics: "tame" or domesticated animals had no place in this ritual of death. In 1810 
Wapakoneta Shawnees had turned Tecumseh away from their midst and refused to buy 
into Tenskwatawa's spiritual message of difference. In 1831, they maintained their 
acceptance of Euroamerican labor and infrastructure, but also revealed that they too 
valued their own cultural practices. Such episodes further demonstrate that cooperation 
with the U.S. government and its imperial agents was selective and politically and 
economically purposeful rather than mere "accommodation" of U.S. "expansion."297 
 Labor, trade, and cultural practices thus remained arenas within which indigenous 
peoples could exercise power. Indeed, the Shawnees and Delawares' request for a five-
year contracted blacksmith demonstrates that Native peoples invested in their lands by 
taking advantage of Euroamerican labor, government money, and their annuity payments. 
At the same time, however, the War Department bolstered the local economy and 
facilitated settler colonialism by hiring men in need of work. Though the number of men 
hired to labor on Indian lands was relatively small, they were hired to perform the same 
tasks that Friends once handled. John Johnston wrote to William H. Crawford in 1816 
that "labouring men is much wanted to instruct them [the Indians] in farming and to 
enable them to live on their own industry."298 He went on to request a budget of $2,000 
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that included payment for the labor, sustenance, and tools of six men, two each for 
Shawnees, Wyandots, Delawares, and Senecas living near Johnston's Piqua agency.299 By 
1829, the Miamis were due to receive the services of "10 Labourers" as part of the 
fulfillment of their annuity payment for that year.300 Those ten hired hands each received 
forty-five dollars and worked at either the "Miamie Villages" or they received their 
compensation for "[l]abour performed for [the] Thorntown party [of Miamis].”301 These 
workers may have thus supplemented their household subsistence economy with wages 
earned for work performed on behalf of the Miamis.302  
The relationship between market development and "civilization" established by 
the mission complex, then, endured after the War of 1812, and it broadened to draw upon 
the labors of missionaries and non-missionaries alike. U.S. immigration to the Ohio 
Country thus offered Native peoples and the War Department a growing labor force, even 
as it increased tensions between Euroamericans and their Native neighbors. That some 
migrants labored for Native peoples, moreover, reflects the contingencies of U.S. 
political and economic development: the mission complex, replete with its message of 
assimilation, offered both the possibility and the tools, labor, and infrastructure required 
                                                
299 Ibid. 
300 Miami and Eel River Indians, Receipt, Annuity Payment, August 24-December 23, 1829 (from 
N. Robertson and D. Ricker, ed., The John Tipton Papers, vol. 2, pp. 186-189), Miami file, 1829-
1847, Box #5023, folder 1 of 1 (1829), Ethnohistory Collection, IU. 
301 Tipton, John, Abstract of Payments for Labor at Miami Villages, 1829 (from N. Robertson and 
D. Ricker, ed., The John Tipton Papers, vol. 2, p. 238), Miami file, Box #5023, Folder 1 of 1 
(1829), Ethnohistory Collection, IU. The “Thorntown” Miamis were Eel River Miamis who once 
lived on the Thorntown Reserve lands that were ceded to the United States in 1828. 
302 While census data is inconclusive, the men who labored on Miami lands were likely from 
nearby lands and had recently moved there. 1820 U.S. Census; Census Place: Wayne, Indiana; 
Page 236; NARA Roll: M33_15; Image 135, accessed on Ancestry.com, June 28, 1815. 
 
 
191 
for indigenous peoples to remain in the region and become either masters of Ohio Valley 
farms or yeoman farmers themselves.  
 Indeed, while the federal War Department arranged for Euroamericans to labor on 
Ohio Indians' lands, Miami and Shawnee leaders such as the prominent Richardville 
family among the Mississinewa Miamis contracted Euroamerican laborers on their 
nations' lands to perform the same tasks as Quaker missionaries like William Kirk once 
had. While scholars such as Stephen Warren view Shawnees and their neighbors' 
cooperation with both Quaker missionaries and the civilization plan more broadly as 
evidence of their desire to appear as a peaceful people capable of living among the white 
Euroamerican population of Ohio, such an interpretation overlooks Native peoples' desire 
to manipulate U.S. policies for their own proactive—as opposed to reactive—economic 
and political purposes.303  
 The Richardvilles, like Little Turtle among the Miamis during the first decade of 
the nineteenth century, cultivated connections with Euroamericans that facilitated 
Miamis' ability to hire and manage labor on their lands. These relationships similarly 
served to bolster Jean Baptiste Richardville's political position in Miami Country, even as 
it offered opportunities for the region's immigrants to find work. Though Miamis' 
relations with Friends were more distant and infrequent after both the War of 1812 and 
the destruction of Dennis's Station, the mission complex facilitated and diversified the 
ways in which Miamis took advantage of expanding Euroamerican markets and the 
presence of U.S. officials. Friend Philip Dennis's labor at Dennis's Station, moreover, 
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remained a not too distant memory, and because the mission complex contributed to the 
region's economic development, Miamis took advantage of the shared language of 
economy and improvement that was, in part, a consequence of the U.S. civilizing project 
and its rhetoric. 
 Jean Baptiste Richardville, in particular, used his presence in both the regional fur 
trade and as an employer in Indiana to cultivate connections with the U.S. federal 
government. Richardville's father was a Frenchman and his mother was a prominent 
Miami. He received a Euroamerican education and was well-schooled in the ways of 
European politics, economy, and diplomacy. Richardville profited from both the fur trade 
and Euroamerican immigration to the region, and his accumulation of wealth—he was 
the wealthiest man in Indiana by 1840—suggests that his economic aims were personal. 
He nonetheless worked to secure a prosperous future for the Miamis in Indiana by 
ensuring that his economic interests intertwined with Miami political interests.304  
 To that end, Richardville and his son John secured laborers for work on Miami 
lands. They hired out tasks that reflected what U.S. officials understood to be "civilized" 
ideals, and their efforts suggest that Miamis and their neighbors endeavored to use 
Euroamerican conceptions of economy: they invested in their lands in order to become 
formidable economic players. In 1824, for example, the Richardvilles arranged for 
William Ewing to make "a Contract with the Miami's to Make rails and fence their 
ground" and, the following year, William Caswell earned $3.00 in return for making a 
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plow frame.305 In the case of Ewing, the elder Richardville, in particular, used the 
resources available to his people to hire out work that promised future returns. Ideas of 
investment, gaining prominence in the United States and the Ohio Country, lurked behind 
such labor contracts. Hiring Ewing to fence ground with a contract, moreover, suggests 
the adoption of evolving ideas of free labor and private property. U.S. market practices 
combined with the existing exchange economy in the Ohio Country to create a market 
system characterized, increasingly, by dynamic ideas of investment and production and 
that included Native and non-Native workers and employers. The emerging Ohio Country 
economy was one wherein all inhabitants struggled to assert themselves at the top of an 
economic hierarchy. The fact that Euroamericans were willing to perform such tasks 
reveals both their desire and need to work and their willingness to labor for Miami or 
Shawnee masters.  
 Richardville was largely responsible for cultivating a connection with the Ewing 
brothers, and while he used them to invest in his peoples' lands by contracting them to 
fence, clear, and plough lands, he also used the relationship in other productive ways. The 
Ewing brothers and their father were experienced traders who sought profit, and they 
demonstrate the extent of economic change underway in the nineteenth-century Ohio 
Country. Whereas regional traders once offered goods in exchange for valuable furs, 
these men made their profits by offering goods on credit, and they often succeeded in 
racking up Indians' debts that could then translate into profit during treaties with the U.S. 
government since debts were often deducted and paid out of treaty annuities and 
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payments. Richardville was himself a shrewd businessman, however, and he knew the 
power of consumerism. As historian Stewart Rafert makes clear, "[t]he Ewing firm could 
not survive without Miami annuities, and the Miami could not have resisted demands for 
removal as long as they did without the influence of the Ewings."306 Thus, as Miamis 
secured annuities from various land deals, they offered business to the profit-minded 
Ewings who supplied them various goods; this, in turn, ensured Richardville and his 
countrymen Euroamerican allies who shared an interest in Miami persistence in Indiana. 
Emerging capitalist ideas thus offered Miamis opportunities to thwart both U.S. 
imperialist ambitions and U.S. colonists' efforts to remove them until 1846. Even then, 
many Miamis remained in the state after Richardville and another chief, Francis Godfroy, 
purchased lands and allowed their countrymen to remain on those lands after removal.  
 In addition to forming connections with regional economic players such as the 
Ewing brothers, Richardville maintained a public role as a chief among the Miamis, and 
he attended many treaties and councils prior to and after the War of 1812. As a 
consequence, he cultivated and maintained connections with both Miamis and federal 
officials, and such a strategy served him well as a political and economic leader in 
Indiana. When in 1824 Indian agent John Tipton declared that traders in the region were 
"not to employ directly or indirectly any other than natural born american citizens of the 
united States" whether "as clerk or otherwise," Richardville made sure to apply for a 
trading license regardless.307 Upon hearing of the application, and the subsequent 
political problems that Richardville's application created due to his position of power, 
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then territorial governor of Michigan Lewis Cass urged Tipton to approve the application 
since "it is impossible to mark the difference between whites and Indians, so as to 
determine where the political rights of the one cease and of the others begin. It is a mixed 
question, depending for its solution, not so much on the relative quantity of Indian or 
white blood in the veins of the person, as upon his education, habits or pursuits."308   
 Richardvillle thus frustrated U.S. desires to render indigenous peoples culturally 
dead or vanished as a result of civilization policies. As Cass's statement to Tipton 
suggests, the civilization plan and the economic and social relations that resulted from the 
mission complex meant that race alone would not serve to "other" all Native peoples. 
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Cass seemed to suggest that Richardville was Metis, but “education, habits, or pursuits” 
mattered as well. Expanding markets in the Ohio Country meant not only that the United 
States economy grew, but that Miami and Shawnee businessmen could grow their profits 
and connections in the region as well. This in turn meant that men like Richardville were 
important politically but also economically: it was in U.S. officials' interests to keep such 
individuals satisfied. Richardville possessed the power to contribute to both U.S. 
economic growth and the maintenance of U.S. imperial dreams of uncontested rule in the 
region while also claiming power for himself and the Miamis in Indiana. Richardville's 
application for a trading license ultimately reveals, then, that in the early nineteenth-
century Ohio Country, practical concerns of politics and economy could trump blood 
quantum, and economic success and Euroamerican ideals regarding education proved a 
gateway to political power. 
  Richardville's economic and political power in Indian Country, moreover, 
intersected with U.S. state and national politics in crucial ways. His efforts make clear 
that racial politics in Ohio and Indiana were complicated.309 When John Tipton became 
Indian agent for the Miamis in Indiana, he made the mistake of complaining about the 
ways in which Richardville conducted himself as leader of the Miamis. Interpreter John 
Boure informed Tipton in 1829 that he should be acquainted "with the feelings of Cheef 
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Richardville to wards you."310 Boure continued to explain that the powerful Miami "was 
very much dissatisfied with you sow far as to say should thay Bee a treaty hee wood treet 
with Govr Cass But not you."311 By 1830, the Miamis wrote a memorial to Lewis Cass, 
the superintendant of Indian Affairs, complaining of Tipton. They informed Cass that "it 
seems as if our Agent wished & has usurped a power which we do not believe properly 
belongs to his office."312 They went on to say that Tipton "selected a place for the 
payment of our annuities contrary to our wishes. Our Principal Chief T B Richardville 
remonstrated & positively objected going to the place selected by our Agent & requested 
him to pay the annuities at or near the same place they were paid last year./ on a reserve 
made at the Wabash Treaty expressly for that purpose/.  to which he objected."313 
 What began as a dispute between Richardville and Tipton thus escalated to 
involve key federal officials like Lewis Cass and the Secretary of War. After the Miamis' 
memorial, Tipton wrote to Secretary of War John Eaton and informed him that "in 1828 I 
paid these people at a place selected by their chiefs where there was no good water, in a 
river bottom covered with nettles. I told the chiefs I would not pay at that place again. in 
1829 I proposed to pay on their reservation near the Treaty ground 20 miles nigher to the 
residence of the principle chief. but this was ten miles from a point where two chiefs have 
stores. I then appointed a place 8 miles below on the wabash to which the chiefs would 
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not come."314 The Miamis' grumblings thus forced Tipton to explain himself to his 
superior. Such politicking demonstrates the authority that Ohio Indian leaders yet 
possessed. In that same letter to Eaton, Tipton warned that "the chiefs of this Tribe will 
controul the operations of the Government unless the Department sustain the ground I 
have taken."315 
 The dispute would have been problematic for any U.S. Indian agent interested in 
removing Indian peoples, but it was particularly troublesome for Tipton, a Democrat, in 
1830. That year William Ewing, a pro-internal improvement Whig, wrote to Tipton 
supporting the state legislature's recent passage of a Canal Bill. Ewing's connections with 
Richardville, the Miamis, and U.S. officials like Tipton positioned him as a nineteenth-
century go-between who, in an effort to best satisfy his own financial interests, 
encouraged Tipton to facilitate a policy that was amenable to the Miamis. Though 
Indiana citizens sent a memorial to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives 
demanding Miamis' removal westward in order to make room for the proposed Wabash 
and Erie Canal, Ewing told Tipton that "their Removail from the State now I believe to be 
impracticable--would it not be well to suffer them to occupy back & unimportent 
situations for a while, as their increased annuity will be of material benefit in the first 
settleing of our county and there is yet room for all."316 Ewing, then, in an effort to ensure 
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continued profit from Miamis' annuity, encouraged Tipton to "restore…influence over 
old Richardvill" in order to "[gratify] the Malicious Minority, and false faced, formerly 
your hypocritical friends, who hope to throw obsticles in your road, when serving your 
country & its best interest."317 Gratifying Richardville and allowing the Miamis to remain 
in the state benefitted not only the Miamis, but it enabled Tipton, a Democrat, to indulge 
his Whig political opponents.318 What was more, Ewing openly stated that Miamis' 
annuities stimulated Indiana's economy. Indian affairs were bound up in individual profit 
schemes as well as state and federal economic policy.  
 When, in the early 1830s, the United States endeavored to buy the remaining 
Miami lands in Indiana, Tipton and others knew that Richardville was savvy, and they 
knew that he stood in the way of completely swindling the Miamis. George B. Porter, a 
U.S. commissioner, wrote to Cass in 1833 that he "cannot...believe that these Indians will 
dispose of the whole of their Lands:—nor are they willing now to move West of the 
Mississippi:—nor is fifty cents per acre a sufficient price.  Chief Richardville knows, as 
well as anyone else their value. They are worth at least two dollars per acre."319 Playing 
the property game according to Americans' own rules of market economy and value 
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increased Miamis' ability to remain on their lands, and it explains, in part, why they were 
able to maintain much of their territorial holdings into the 1840s and beyond the time 
when most other regional nations sold their holdings to the United States. Though it is 
quite possible that Tipton was truthful when he informed Eaton in 1830 that many 
Miamis "have many times requested me to pay the heads of families, or individuls, 
alledgeing that the village chiefs cheate them," cheating their fellow countrymen or no, 
Miami leaders such as Richardville cultivated connections with Euroamericans and their 
economy in an effort to ensure the best possible political and economic future for his 
people even as he turned a profit for himself.320  
 The Shawnees at Wapakoneta also utilized the connections established by the 
mission complex to invest in their futures, but unlike the Miamis, they maintained closer 
connections with Friends after the War of 1812. Black Hoof and other Wapakoneta 
Shawnees invited Friends to visit their town and resume mission work there in 1815, and, 
in response, Friends arranged for Joseph and Martha Rhodes to offer instruction in the 
agricultural arts, domestic production, and literacy. When Martha died in Ohio, Black 
Hoof and his countrymen grieved her passing alongside Joseph, and they lamented 
Rhodes's departure from the mission.321 The relationship between Friends and the 
Shawnees thus continued to be simultaneously personal and practical, with the lines 
between the two blurred. Friends were political allies and useful sources of economic 
assistance, and their personal relationships with Native peoples, built upon a century and 
                                                
320 John Tipton to John H. Eaton, February 15, 1830 (from N. Robertson and D. Ricker, ed., The 
John Tipton Papers, vol. 2, p. 250-251), Miami File, Box #5023, Folder 1 of 2 (1830-1833), 
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321 For report on Martha Rhodes's death and Black Hoof's sympathies, see 10 mo 16, 1817, 
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a half of cooperation, facilitated Indians' efforts to remain in their homes and ancestral 
lands. Securing labor and maintaining connections with government officials and 
missionaries proved crucial for Native leaders, but those Shawnees, Miamis, and their 
neighbors who did not occupy positions of leadership also found ways both to participate 
in the expanding market economy and manipulate U.S. policies to their advantage. 
Shawnees at Wapakoneta adapted to the emerging regional economic order bolstered by 
Friends' mission work in their town, and they invested in their future. By the 1820s, 
Baltimore Friends partnered with Ohio and Indiana Friends to run mission schools at 
Wapakoneta, Lewis Town, and Upper Sandusky.322 With the new influence of these latter 
Friends, the schools began to offer not only agricultural instruction but lessons in reading 
and writing as well. In 1823, however, Baltimore Friends reported that many Shawnees in 
Wapakoneta "expressed a wish that their children might be taught to work as well as read 
and write...they had also wholly abandoned all intention of removing, and appeared very 
desirous that Friends should continue the school."323 Friends may have included the 
statement in order to justify their own conceptions of what a "proper" education for 
indigenous children should look like. Sources suggest, however, that the Shawnee parents 
at Wapakoneta valued the "improvements" made by Friends there, and they in turn likely 
encouraged their children to learn to labor in order to continue to invest in Shawnees' 
future in Ohio. For some, the key to maintaining a foothold in their home hinged upon the 
next generation acquiring trade skills and learning to take advantage of and maintain 
agricultural infrastructure. 
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 Wapakoneta Shawnees' belief in the economic advantages afforded from Friends' 
labor are perhaps most obvious in their reaction to an 1831 treaty in which they sold their 
lands to the U.S. government. After misunderstanding treaty deliberations, the Shawnees 
sought out the assistance of Quakers. In looking toward removal they explained,  
[w]e are sorry to find that it is to be the price of our farms that is to take us 
to our new homes. We expected no such thing—we understood plainly that 
the government was to be at all that expense, and that what our 
improvements here were worth, after being valued by good men, was to be 
paid us in money, to assist us in making farms at our new homes. We have 
good homes here, and had abundance of labor and pains to make them. We 
wanted good men to value our improvements, for we are not ashamed of 
our homes...We cannot let our property go in this way; if we do, we are a 
ruined people.324 
 
While Shawnees' plea to Quakers reveals them as peoples attached to their lands, the 
passage also clearly speaks to their hope that investment in their lands—not merely 
accommodating or accepting Euroamericans' prescriptions for their endurance—would 
enable them to keep their homes. When confronted with sale, these Shawnees understood 
their improvements as investments that could yield higher returns during land 
negotiations. Indeed, as chapter six reveals, U.S. officials also acknowledged those 
improvements when negotiating removal. While Ohio Country Indian leaders were 
crucial to efforts to carve a place for their peoples in the region, the individuals who 
supported Friends and their leaders' "improvement" efforts and who built fences and 
contributed to the efforts to invest in their lands, also envisioned and used the tools of the 
U.S. market economy to work for a future among the growing Euroamerican population 
in Ohio.  
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 Ohio Indian leaders and their peoples in the early nineteenth century often 
possessed, wielded, and supported economic and political power in ways that harkened 
back to the ideals of reciprocity and leadership common among many of the region's 
peoples. Generous gift-giving once cemented hereditary chiefs' authority among their 
people, and chiefs' oversight of the distribution of annuities or land operated similarly in 
the nineteenth century. When Richardville or Godfroy offered their people the 
opportunity to remain in Indiana by offering a place for them on their recently purchased 
lands, they not only bolstered their own power, but they served their people in much the 
same way as their forefathers had for centuries. These leaders took advantage of the 
connections established by the mission complex, used them to serve their people as best 
they could, and, while they were at it, continued to mold, as employers, traders, and 
farmers, the creation and expansion of the U.S. market economy in the Ohio Country. 
 
* * * 
 Mission work and the civilization plan linked Ohio Indians ever closer to the U.S. 
market economy, and they opened new avenues of economic manipulation and strategic 
persistence for Native leaders and their peoples—avenues that simultaneously borrowed 
and diverged from earlier imperial precedents. As was the case prior to the War of 1812, 
such economic engagement continued to influence indigenous peoples' politics. As the 
Miamis' 1830 complaint regarding Tipton's reported abuse of power suggests, indigenous 
strategies for combating U.S. power increasingly involved claims making, petition 
writing, and a general willingness to issue complaints to state officials. Such appeals 
often involved matters of investment, labor, debt, or claims for economic redress. 
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Sometimes these requests were successful, and sometimes they were not. Regardless, 
they strengthened the bonds between Ohio Country Indian leaders and government 
officials and Native nations and the U.S. state, just as economic strategies linked Native 
peoples closer to the U.S. market economy that they helped to create. As Native leaders 
like Richardville employed a variety of strategies to secure a future for their people 
amidst a rapidly growing Ohio Country population, they participated in the creation of 
the U.S. economy, and they continued to contribute to the growth of the U.S. state.  
 The ability to make claims upon the U.S. federal government offered Ohio 
Country Indians an opportunity to engage with the state, but it also reveals that while 
there was power in making such appeals, indigenous peoples' opportunities were 
increasingly defined by that growing state.325 Native peoples in the Ohio Country used 
their connections with John Johnston, missionaries, and others to learn and navigate the 
evolving U.S. bureaucracy and legal system in order to claim what was rightfully theirs, 
and they could do so in large part because of the authority of indigenous leaders, the 
desires of U.S. officials, and the pressures of land hungry United States immigrants. As 
Richardville's successful application for a trading license suggests, Native leaders' power 
and relationships with traders and officials meant that regional peace and U.S. hopes for 
eventual removal often hinged upon these leaders' happiness; as a result, these 
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relationships became crucial for Americans’ own economic and political gains, just as 
they had during the heyday of the fur trade in the pays d'en haut.326 
 Political efforts to seek redress were not new, but by the 1820s, Ohio Indians' 
methods of seeking and exacting compensation for losses or grievances revealed the 
extent to which market considerations were at the forefront of their thinking, the extent to 
which Native peoples' practical concerns had shifted by the nineteenth century, and the 
ways in which they used and grew the U.S. state apparatus. Rather than seek gifts or 
adopt kin to remedy their losses during war with Osages, for example, Ohio and Indiana 
Indians in 1822 bargained for land. They "set up a claim against the Osages, of one 
thousand Dollars, for damages Sustained," and they rejected $500 worth of material 
goods in favor of a tract adjacent to their own in Missouri.327 Employing U.S. officials in 
these claims-making endeavors became a key strategy for some Native peoples in the 
early republic, and the allied Indians' claim, in particular, demonstrates that the desire to 
remain a united people drove Indians' politics. The aftermath of war with Osages offered 
an opportunity to use U.S. policy to their advantage: the commoditization of lands meant 
that Delawares, Shawnees, and their neighbors could bargain for Osage land in an effort 
to expand a territory in the west intended for the use of their people.  
                                                
326 Women, in particular, played vital roles in the cultivation of political connections with 
Euroamerican economies. See, in particular, Susan Sleeper-Smith Indian Women and French 
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327 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Osage, and Delaware, Shawnee, Wea, 
Piankashaw, Peeoria and Kickapoo, September 21, 1822 (from RG 75, Letters Received, 
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 Though some Native peoples used their connections with U.S. officials or 
missionaries to make claims against their Native neighbors, they also made claims upon 
the U.S. state for redress whenever they perceived a failure to fulfill a political or 
economic obligation. In 1826, for example, Le Gros, Richardville's Miami compatriot, 
issued a lengthy complaint on behalf of his nation that weaved together economic 
concerns with an assertion of political authority. He informed the Secretary of War, 
James Barbour, that, while the United States had fulfilled most of the provisions of the 
1818 Treaty at St. Mary's, it had promised the Miamis a blacksmith and a gunsmith, two 
laborers whom had yet to be provided to his countrymen. Weaving ideas of economics, 
reciprocity, and sovereignty into his appeal, Le Gros asked, "Now father, who is to pay 
the damage which has accrued to my nation in consequence of this failure?" and he 
followed this query with a remedy for the United States' misstep.328 He declared, "I wish 
to make a proposition to you, which is, that you will authorise our Agent, to employ a 
good blacksmith, who can repair our guns likewise, and a good trusty Miller in lieu of the 
gun smith as promised by the Treaty, to be placed at the mills, as that position will be 
central to the nation."329 Though the treaty stipulations were eight years old, less than one 
week after the Miami's complaint, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Thomas L. 
McKenney agreed to find, employ, and send Le Gros his miller; by the summer of that 
same year, the miller was in Miami Country.330  
                                                
328 Le Gros to James Barbour, January 27, 1826, Tipton Papers, 517-18. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Thomas L. McKenney to Le Gros, February 2, 1826, in Tipton Papers, 519-20; Hugh B. 
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 Le Gros's success reveals the extent to which Native nations in the Ohio Country 
continued to wield power in their interactions with the United States into the 1820s and 
beyond despite the political consequences of the War of 1812. Though U.S. policies 
constrained their actions to some degree, Native peoples still found potent ways to 
negotiate for power, just as they had when they forged partnerships with Quaker 
diplomats in the 1750s and 1790s. Le Gros's manner of bargaining and negotiation was 
characteristic of Miami relations with the United States into the 1840s. In 1826, for 
example, Le Gros confidently informed Governor Lewis Cass that "[y]ou have made a 
request of us for our land, which we have already refused. I told you our situation. We 
have a right to trade or exchange our property."331  
 These methods of combating and negotiating American empire travelled along 
with migrating Indians to places like Missouri. Thus, as chapter three makes clear, 
Americans’ ideas regarding race and class travelled, but so too did new ways of 
manipulating and appropriating those ideas. American settlers were not naive to such 
claims to power. Just as settlers destroyed Dennis's Station at the start of the War of 
1812, they continued to attack Indians' agricultural infrastructure. "Six ploughs, and other 
Tools, were Stolen from us by the Whites," Shawnees and Delawares complained in 
1820, and "our Houses have been broken open and our property robed [sic] by the 
Whites. Father! The Whites do not Steal these things merely for their value, but more to 
make us abandon our Land and Take it themselves."332 Just as Americans were savvy to 
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Native peoples' ability to translate economic "improvements" or success into political 
power and entrenchment in a coveted land, so too did Ohio Indians recognize Americans' 
greed: the thefts did not occur simply because Indians owned items of value (though that 
was part of it), but rather they occurred because Americans wanted Indians' developed 
lands. Perhaps more important, however, was that the victims of the thefts recognized 
their power to seek redress. 
 Indeed, Shawnees and Delawares did not employ violence to remedy the 
situation, but rather they chose to petition the president of the United States. They 
actively sought compensation for their losses, and such efforts further cemented a 
political relationship with the United States that simultaneously undermined and 
solidified Native polities' independent power. From the U.S. perspective, these claimants 
depended upon the state for assistance; from the petitioners' perspectives, the familiar 
rules of political alliance and reciprocity demanded that the U.S. government make 
amends for the acts of its citizens. Here, then, differing notions of the political 
relationship between the U.S. government and Indian peoples produced an opportunity 
for Indian peoples to exercise power. Indeed, the politics of fictive kinship meant that the 
Shawnees and Delawares seeking redress possessed the right, from their perspective, to 
exact compensation from their "father." U.S. paternalism offered a means to erode 
indigenous sovereignty, but it also provided opportunities for Indians to navigate and 
make claims upon the state bureaucracy in ways that reflected their own understandings 
of political reciprocity and association. 
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 While the politics of petitioning involved the meeting of distinct political cultures, 
the claims nonetheless reveal the adaptability of Native peoples' political economy. In the 
same 1820 petition to the president, Shawnees and Delawares claimed that "Two White 
Men have Stolen Two Hundred Dollars in Species, One Rifle estimated at thirty Doll.s 
and one Bridle at Two Dollars."333 Not only did these men demand redress in the form of 
monetary compensation, they demonstrated the extent to which their culture changed 
during the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While land still held 
value for reasons of lineage, nationhood, kinship, and history, such ideas were coupled 
with ideas of worth rooted in the dollar. Like the locks placed upon Creeks' valuables by 
the nineteenth century, Indians—in the Ohio Country but also in places where Indians 
had former or ongoing contact with missionaries—likewise took stock of their 
possessions and quantified them in terms of monetary value.334 
 Though Native petitioners did not shy from addressing the U.S. president directly, 
more direct relationships also, of course, offered numerous benefits to Native peoples, 
even if they were formed as a direct consequence of U.S. imperial ambitions. In Ohio, 
Shawnees' close relationship with John Johnston offered a potential means to secure 
payment for crimes committed by Euroamericans in ways similar to Shawnee and 
Delawares' petition to the U.S. president. Johnston complained to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, Thomas L. McKenney, in 1825 that he was "often compelled to grant 
renumeration to the Whites out of the Annuities of the Indians, and when an Indian 
suffers loss, which is now frequently the case...no redress can be afforded for want of 
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funds at the disposal of the Agent. It is beleived [sic] $1000 would not satisfy the claims 
of this nature now pending, and which are just and equitable."335 Johnston went on to 
submit a detailed list of "depredations committed on their property by our Citizens" on 
behalf of the Indians near his Piqua agency in 1827.336 The Seneca Captain Smith 
claimed $35 for a horse stolen; John Sky, $65 for one horse shot and another stolen; Blue 
Jacket's Daughter demanded $35 for a horse stolen; others listed saddles taken by 
Euroamericans and horses and cows stolen, shot, or killed by the same, and money, furs, 
blankets, and a kettle stolen.337 The goods ultimately totaled just over $1,000—a debt 
Johnston forwarded onto the U.S. federal government on behalf of the mostly Senecas 
and Shawnees near Piqua.338 The agent performed this duty out of a concern for "the loss 
of their confidence in the justice of the United States," and such work served both his 
own interests and those of the Indians near his agency.339 Indeed, it appears that the act of 
claiming damages against Euroamericans became so common that, by 1828, Johnston 
needed to make clear to McKenney that a "list of Claims of Shawanoese who have 
emigrated from Ohio west of the Mississippi" were "unfounded and ought not to be 
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paid."340 The requests reveal Piqua-area Indians' recognition that cultivating a close 
relationship with Johnston offered a means to make claims upon the U.S. state. 
 Such claims could, however, prove to be a double-edged sword. Johnston fought 
for Senecas and Shawnees' property rights, but he also advocated for their removal as a 
direct result of the damages suffered upon the Indians near his agency. Immediately 
following his recommendation that Piqua-area Indians receive compensation, he wrote, 
"[t]hese evils and a multitude of others which readily occur to your mind are rapidly 
encreasing upon us, and after a considerable part of my life spent managing this 
description of persons I am free to declare, that in my judgment there is no adequate 
remedy but removal to a Country of their own, where a suitable Government could be 
established over them."341 Native peoples' authority—and, indeed, the political act of 
remaining—often encouraged their removal from eastern lands. 
 Though Indians' claims making produced mixed consequences, it nonetheless 
reveals the extent to which Native peoples engaged with the politics and strategies 
embraced by U.S. citizens more broadly. Petitioning formed a political bond between 
petitioner and the state, and oftentimes, Native peoples living in the Ohio Country or who 
migrated from that region not only employed the tools of petition writing and claims 
making, but they also employed the discourse of civilization to their own ends; they thus 
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turned U.S. imperial rhetoric and policies on their head. Like the poverty rhetoric 
employed by Little Turtle and others during the first decade of the nineteenth century, 
Indians continued to make claims on the U.S. state by either asserting authority, or by 
couching their grievances in terms of impoverishment and pity. Even when material 
conditions were harsh, Native peoples found ways to appeal to government officials’ 
ideas regarding Indians, poverty, and civilization. 
 After years of hearing Euroamericans' pronouncements regarding the benefits of 
civilization—and after receiving the material benefits that accompanied partnerships with 
civilizing agents such as the Baltimore Friends—Native peoples combined ideas of 
petition-making with ideas of either civilization or savagery, depending on their aims. 
Hendrick Aupaumut and his fellow Mohicans, for example, masterfully used the 
discourse of civilization both in an attempt to secure Indiana lands before and after the 
War of 1812 and, when that ultimately failed, to secure a place for the Mohicans in 
Wisconsin Territory during the 1820s and 1830s. Aupaumut's initial petition, penned in 
1819, suggests both that he saw himself as possessing a viable claim as well as a political 
relationship with the state. In 1818 White River Delawares in Indiana sold their lands to 
the United States, but members of the Stockbridge nation lived upon those lands with the 
Delawares since an 1808 treaty, and they were not consulted during the 1818 
negotiations.342 When the Christian Mohican petitioned the President of the United States 
and Congress for redress in 1819, he wove together discourses of religion, poverty, and 
missionary zeal in order to make his appeal. He claimed that his people were lately "few 
and weak," but that they and Americans were "all decended from one father 
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and...acknowledge and worship one GOD."343 He continued to explain that his "nation 
have long ago cast away their dumb idols which could not speak, and we now worship 
the only true GOD and Savior Jesus Christ. Our Children are taught to read and write, to 
Cultivate the Earth, and to worship, love obey and serve the Lord."344 Not only did 
Aupaumut claim that his people held up their end of the bargain—they cultivated the 
earth according to the plans set forth by U.S. civilizing policies—but he also asserted that 
they could be instrumental in encouraging others to live in a "civilized" manner. A 
portion of the Stockbridge, Aupaumut explained, traveled to the White River in the hopes 
of civilizing the Delawares: "We saw them lying in darkness and paganism, and believed 
that our GOD called upon us to send among them a [coliny?] of our nation in which was 
built up a Church of our Lord and Savior, that we might be the means o [sic] Civilizing 
and Christianizing them and doeing to them great good."345 The Stockbridge thus 
internalized the discourse of civilization and appealed to U.S. missionary ambitions: they 
offered government officials hope that "civilized" Indians could become civilizers.  
 Aupaumut laced the language of Christianity together with that of civilization and 
duty, and he used that rhetoric to assert Mohicans' rights. Complaining of the 
Stockbridges’ loss of the lands sold in 1818, Aupaumut contended that the Stockbridges 
were "directed to leave them in a short time," and that their "right to them is denied."346 
Weaving ideas of property and investment into his claim, he continued to explain that "A 
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part of our nation, as we have told you, removed to these lands and possessed them with 
the Delawares and Munsees and made large improvements on them, at great expense to 
our nation, to prepare them for us."347 Aupaumut then closed his appeal with another 
consideration of the Stockbridges' rights: "we pray that you will consider our just rights, 
and set off to our Nation such a location of these lands as we are justly entitled to---that 
we may not suffer under this wrong and that we may thus be aided in our designs, and 
our nation again be...in peace and our hearts quieted."348 It was a petition that sounded 
eerily similar to claims of squatters' rights in the early republic. Just as U.S. immigrants 
claimed a right to the lands they developed, so too did these Stockbridge. Though the 
Stockbridge eventually moved to Wisconsin Territory, civilizing mission work, its 
accompanying rhetoric and that of U.S. settler colonialism nonetheless offered 
indigenous peoples additional means to use U.S. economic and political ideas in order to 
confront growing U.S. state power.349  
 Just eight years after making the 1819 appeal, couched as it was in language of 
Christianity and civilization, Aupaumut's signature graced a piece of paper that made yet 
another appeal, this time, to the ABCFM and for missionary aid. Rather than emphasize 
their civilized state or their belief in Christianity, however, the appeal began "We thank 
the Great Spirit that he has favored your Society with compassionate feelings for our 
Nation. We rejoice greatly that you have sent the Rev Jesse Miner to pay us a visit for the 
purpose of ascertaining our true state & condition to enable you to know what you could 
                                                
347 Ibid. 
348 Ibid. 
349 The most thorough history of the Stockbridge Indians is David J. Silverman, Red Brethren: 
The Brothertown and Stockbridge Indians and the Problem of Race in Early America (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2010). 
 
 
215 
do for us as also for those of our Brethren around us."350 Here, the Stockbridge Indians 
appealed to their supposed "heathen" state by calling upon the power of the Great Spirit. 
They down played their "civilization" (which was, apparently, lost in the eight years 
between appeals) by thanking the ABCFM for being willing to witness their "true state." 
What was more, the Stockbridges, Aupaumut among them, were eager to discern what 
the missionary society "could do for us." The Stockbridges, armed with their long history 
of missionary encounters, knew that missionaries held many keys: to "civilization" and 
Christianity, but also to powerful political alliances, economic infrastructure, 
Euroamerican labor, and the U.S. government's ear.  
 The mission complex in the Ohio Country thus offered material benefits to the 
region's indigenous peoples, but it also offered a means by which Shawnees, Miamis, 
Stockbridges, and their neighbors could make claims upon the federal state after the War 
of 1812. A discourse of civilization increasingly intersected with discourses of rights and 
nation to create a complicated nexus of ideas that both rendered Native peoples further 
intertwined with emerging U.S. intellectual currents and offered them opportunities to 
manipulate policies to their advantage. Such strategies reveal the ways in which Native 
peoples adjusted to life in the increasingly populated Ohio Country: as Euroamerican 
immigrants struggled to make a living in a new land, Native peoples confronted similar 
problems of money, work, and survival in a rapidly changing economy. 
 The various strategies adopted by Shawnees, Delawares, Miamis and their 
neighbors—whether petition-writing, cultivating connections with area traders, or 
                                                
350 Letter of the Stockbridge Indians, by Rev. J. Miner to the ABCFM, Oct. 30, 1827, Stockbridge 
Papers, Folder 9A, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. 
 
 
216 
asserting economic independence—reveal that the economic and political development 
accelerated by the mission complex in the Ohio Country offered means by which 
indigenous peoples simultaneously continued to assert their cultural, political, and 
economic independence and consciously borrowed from and adapted to Euroamerican 
ideals. Some Ohio Country Indians understood that they could carve a place with the 
emerging political and economic order in the region, and as they made steps toward 
doing just that, they increasingly frustrated Euroamericans. By using the mission 
complex and civilizing policies to their advantage, Native peoples forced the United 
States and its inhabitants to recognize that indigenous power was real and enduring. For a 
people desirous of a unified nation, this proved problematic. Thus, as Native power and 
authority endured, Americans increasingly supported removal policies in a quest to 
acquire lands but also to render the United States a homogenous, inclusive nation—a 
nation built on the policies and politics of exclusion. 
  
* * * 
 When Hugh McKeen declared the Miamis to be a "damnd rebelious race," he 
expressed frustration at their unwillingness to disappear from the Ohio Country on 
Americans' terms. That he wrote the statement with Richardville in mind is not 
surprising. The Miami leader was, in many ways, the exemplar of what many considered 
to be indigenous rebellion in the early years of American empire. Richardville, along 
with Shawnees at Wapakoneta, Delawares and Senecas near Piqua, and others who dared 
remain in the region, turned U.S. imperial rhetoric and policies on their head and adopted 
and adapted to civilizing policies and the economic, political, and social relations 
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established by the mission complex. They took part in an imperial struggle on Americans' 
terms, but they eked out victories that frustrated U.S. attempts to take the region by force 
or for no financial compensation or simply entirely on the state's own terms. When 
Wapakoneta debtors ruined George Johnston's finances, they secured items that made 
their own lives just a little bit better, and they did so on their own terms by partially 
paying off debts through barter of furs and by becoming economically-savvy neighbors in 
the midst of a population that sought their physical and cultural removal. When 
Delawares and Shawnees petitioned for economic redress, they invested the federal state 
with authority, but they also forced government officials to fulfill economic and political 
obligations that drew upon indigenous peoples' understandings of reciprocity and 
political alliance. They secured, in some cases, funds and goods that frustrated, at least in 
the short term, Ohio Country Euroamericans' attempts to drive them off of their lands. 
Ohio Country Indian leaders and peoples, then, ultimately used the tools available to 
them, and they ensured that they continued to exercise their power to shape their own 
lives and also to mold the contours of American imperial policy and the U.S. market 
economy and state. They also forced Americans to confront an immense problem—that 
of how to simultaneously live up to their republican ideal while eliminating persistent 
Indian peoples. 
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Chapter 6 
"Of Mercy and of Sound Policy too": Indian Removal and the Cultivation of 
Empire 
 
 
 
The U.S. civilization plan and its effects offered tools with which the Ohio 
Country’s Native peoples could both mold and combat the American empire. The plan 
also, however, ensured that U.S. officials and American citizens confronted the problem 
of persistent eastern American Indians in a manner that cultivated U.S. claims to 
benevolence on a global stage. Americans’ brand of empire was cloaked in the garb of 
humanitarianism, and it was in large part thanks to the Society of Friends and their fellow 
non-governmental organizations, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions (ABCFM) most particularly, that it gained purchase. That many Americans 
considered Indian removal in the early 1830s Ohio Country to be humanitarian is 
significant. With eyes toward Great Britain and a reputation at stake, Americans 
struggled to reconcile their own policies with those of other empires. British abolition in 
1833 did not, of course, ease Americans’ consciences. It did not grant American 
abolitionists their victory, convince many to renounce slavery, or prevent the forced 
migration of thousands of enslaved people to the southwest. Instead, Americans placed 
their hopes upon a “benevolent” Indian policy. With the problem of slavery looming with 
no politically amicable solution apparent, Americans endeavored to reconcile Indian 
policies—particularly Indian removal by the 1820s and 1830s—with both their own and 
others’ ideas of sensibility, humanitarianism, and morality in order to claim moral 
authority on the world stage. Absent from their musings on benevolence, of course, was 
that southeastern Indian removal and the expansion of slavery went hand in hand. 
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Removal became a means by which the United States could deal with Native 
peoples who, by successfully appropriating and manipulating U.S. ideals and policies, 
refused to disappear on Americans’ terms. Importantly, Americans did not contemplate a 
single “Indian removal.” The removals of southeastern Native peoples such as the 
Seminoles or Cherokees galvanized the republic’s attention—as well as the attention of 
foreign observers—but in the Ohio Country, removal was a protracted process marked by 
land sales and both federal and missionary encouragement. For some Americans, removal 
in either the Ohio Country or the southeast seemed a logical solution to the republic’s 
“Indian problem.” They understood it in terms of sovereignty and rights to land and state 
versus federal jurisdiction, but they also framed it as being a fundamental determinant of 
the national character. U.S. officials, reformers, and everyday Americans understood 
Indian policy, like the problem of slavery, in moral terms, and it was part of an 
international discourse regarding empires and nation-states, their moral authority, and, in 
turn, their political authority. Those who opposed removal spoke in moralistic and 
humanitarian terms to point out the hypocrisies of the United States’ republican 
experiment. Those who supported removal schemes used the same rhetoric often to 
present the policy as the only viable option available to Indian peoples, as did Indian 
agent John Johnston when he informed Lewis Cass that offering Delawares funds to 
remove west of the Mississippi would be an act “of Mercy and sound policy too.”351 For 
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many Americans, Indians could either remove and receive government charity or face 
further moral corruption or extinction.  
At the root of both positions, however, were ideas of philanthropy cultivated 
during the earliest years of the civilization plan. Whereas from the 1790s through the 
early 1820s, Friends’ motivations differed somewhat from those of some U.S. officials, 
and Quakers certainly took issue with certain aspects of Indian policy, they nonetheless 
perceived government efforts in Indian Country to be fundamentally beneficial. By 
Jackson’s presidency, however, most Quakers and other reformers openly lamented the 
state of U.S. Indian affairs. Nonetheless, the U.S. government’s endorsement, funding, 
and support of missionary projects and non-governmental organizations like the Society 
of Friends, enabled many officials to claim enlightenment in the realm of Indian affairs, 
and those claims to humanitarianism continued to facilitate the ongoing development of 
the federal state by both masking the violence of American imperialism and fostering the 
ongoing growth of the republic’s market economy.352 
 
* * * 
U.S. officials, regardless of politics, harbored deep concerns for the United States’ 
reputation abroad, and Indian policy was a means by which some hoped to cultivate an 
image of humanitarian power on the world stage. The American Revolution invested the 
slavery issue with new political potential, and as such Great Britain’s elites ultimately 
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acted on their abolitionist ideas thanks to the politics of the eighteenth-century imperial 
crisis. A moral push against slavery was one way to defend the British Empire’s 
reputation—and purpose—in the face of colonial attacks. U.S. Indian policy ultimately 
became politicized in a similar vein during the nineteenth century.353 With fervor for 
abolition growing, Great Britain, in particular, presented the United States with a clear 
rival in the global contest over moral authority. By the nineteenth century, the new 
United States sought to convince the world—and itself—that it too was an enlightened 
empire.354  
Indeed, U.S. Indian policies had global consequences and international 
connections. While frameworks of settler colonialism enable and encourage some to 
compare indigenous experiences and their relationships with imperial powers in the 
United States, Australia, and South Africa, fewer works explore the linkages that 
extended between the policies of the United States and Great Britain during the early 
nineteenth century.355 Reformers, often Quakers, corresponded and shared ideas and 
literature during the nineteenth century, and they kept each other abreast of their 
respective empires’ policy initiatives. Indeed, the Philadelphia and Baltimore Yearly 
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Meetings had, since the eighteenth century, regularly discussed the issue of Indian affairs, 
and London even offered some funds for North American Friends’ initiatives to civilize 
Native peoples. Such trends continued into the nineteenth century. In 1817, for example, 
Baltimore Friends recorded that "by a letter received from Elizabeth [Pickessew] a friend 
residing in Cork, Ireland…we have received £100 Sterling, to be appropriated to the use 
of the Indians to assist in procuring tools or other conveniences for their advantage."356 
 Historian William Unrau demonstrates that prominent members of Britain’s 
Aborigines Protection Society (APS) developed their ideas regarding indigenous policies 
in light of and in tandem with those of the United States. Quaker Thomas Hodgkin, he 
points out, encouraged the APS to adopt an assimilationist policy in South Australia 
thanks to his contempt for Jacksonian plans of removal.357 One British reformer, Adam 
Hodgson, moreover, applauded Jedidiah Morse’s 1822 plan to civilize Native peoples in 
communities near Euroamerican settlements, and deemed the plan a humanitarian one in 
his 1824 Letters from North America, Written During a Tour of the United States and 
Canada.358  
By the 1830s, however, British officials, reformers, and thinkers considered U.S. 
Indian policies to be decidedly less philanthropic. In 1837, for example, Saxe Bannister, 
an official in New South Wales and later a member of British Parliament, applauded the 
United States’ civilizing efforts, but decried Jackson’s harsher policies of removal. He 
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also made it clear that Britain and the United States were in close competition for the 
right to claim moral authority. He remarked that “no more honorable rivalry can be 
imagined than that of the British Parliament with the American Congress in the difficult 
task of elevating the ignorant and protecting the weak.”359 As both the American and 
British empires sought to expand their territorial claims, such a competition mattered. 
The discourse of morality and humanitarianism offered a common language that rendered 
each power intelligible and comparable to the other. 
Cultivating the image of a benevolent empire was not easy for a republic tainted 
by its notoriety as a slave-holding power. In 1827, Lewis Cass, future Secretary of War 
under Andrew Jackson, nonetheless made the attempt by penning an eighty-page 
document that compared the treatment of North America’s indigenous peoples during the 
eras of both the British and American empires. Cass, the architect of Jacksonian removal 
schemes, had served as the territorial governor of Michigan from 1813 until his 
appointment as Secretary of War in 1831. He was renowned as an expert on Indian affairs 
and penned works relating to various Indian nations, perhaps most famously, the 
Delawares in 1821-22, and he continued to write in defense of removal into the 1830s. 
He was a Democrat, and central to his pro-removal arguments were ideas of benevolence 
and civilization.360 His 1827 article was an attempt to position Indian policy as evidence 
of the United States’ enlightened state in contrast to Great Britain. His essay was in 
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response to an indictment, recently printed by the London Quarterly Review, of the U.S. 
government’s handling of Indian affairs. Cass’s response reveals the extent to which such 
criticism riled U.S. officials. He began his discussion of Indian affairs claiming that 
“[t]he true character of this policy has not been well understood, even in this country, and 
abroad it has too often furnished the motive or the pretext for grave accusation and 
virulent invective.”361 The document, written for a British but also a global audience, 
references the United States’ reputation numerous times, and, indeed, Cass insisted that 
“[t]o the judgment of the world we may safely commit the conduct of the American 
government, in regard to the particulars here touched upon.”362 
 Those particulars included extensive analysis of wars conducted by Great Britain 
and the United States alike and of the virtues of U.S. efforts to offer Native peoples 
annuity payments and civilization. Cass deemed annuities to be a particularly enlightened 
policy. He argued that “[t]he plan of permanent annuities guaranties to the Indians a 
never failing resource against want, and its beneficial effects are apparent in the improved 
condition of the Wyandots, the Shawnese, and the Miamies.”363 As chapter five 
demonstrates, any “improvement” of Ohio Indians’ condition according to 
Euroamericans’ standards, was the result of Miamis, Shawnees, and Wyandots’ own 
adaptability and ingenuity. Nonetheless Ohio Indians were Cass’s rhetorical foil; 
indigenous peoples of the southeast—those peoples upon whom historians have, for the 
most part, centered their analyses of Indian removal—he largely ignored. The situation of 
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Shawnees and Miamis offered Cass his best talking points, largely thanks to mission 
work, land sales, and importantly, the absence of slaveholding. “Civilization” in the Ohio 
Country was tied to ideas of market economy, not slavery, and thus Cass offered little 
mention of elite Cherokees or Creeks of the southeast, many of whom owned African 
slaves.364 In this way, Cass diverted attention away from the issue of slavery in the 
United States, while simultaneously pointing to Indian policy as the realm in which the 
republic could stake its benevolent reputation. 
Discussion of annuity payments and civilizing policies enabled Cass to draw 
explicit comparisons with the British Empire. Annuity payments, he argued, ensured 
Ohio Indians’ well-being, and Cass placed the policy—and others—in direct contrast 
with that of Great Britain in both Canada and Australia. He wrote that “[t]he inquiries, 
which we have instituted, have satisfied us, that no system of permanent annuities has 
heretofore been adopted in the Canadas, as a consideration for cessions obtained from the 
Indians.”365 Great Britain likewise offered no compensation to indigenous peoples of 
Australia. “We hear of no treaties of cession,” he contended, “no ‘purchases compulsory,’ 
or voluntary, no mutual discussions, no annuities for future relief.” Instead “The land is 
wanted, and it is taken.”366 The comparison with Britain’s colonies suggests not only the 
extent to which Cass endeavored to portray the United States as an enlightened power but 
also the degree to which U.S. officials understood the United States as an empire among 
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empires. Employing a direct comparison with Britain in the world, Cass took issue with 
the London Review’s suggestion that the United States was among the most land hungry 
of polities, “Has England furnished us with any example of such a system of self denial, 
or rather of canting weakness?” he asked. “We will not inquire in India, for there no 
barbarians, strictly speaking, are found. But the Australasian continent is now a British 
province, acquired and settled within the memory of the present generation. And where 
are its aboriginal inhabitants?”367 The idea of “self denial” is particularly striking. Cass’s 
claim that Americans were unable to deny themselves extensive lands contradicts the idea 
of Americans as virtuous Protestants and ultimately reveals the inconsistencies of 
American ideologies at work.  
 Britain, Cass contended, failed to ensure indigenous peoples’ well-being. He 
censured the British government for neglecting to pass “any prohibition against the 
introduction of spirituous liquors in any part of their Indian country,” and for failing to 
“to provide a permanent residence for the Indians.”368 Indeed, he wrote, “[t]here were no 
schools, and no efforts to introduce agriculture, or the mechanic arts. There were no 
annuities, no regulations to direct the conduct of the traders, and no law to prevent the 
sale of ardent spirits.”369 For Cass, then, government regulation took on the cast of 
benevolence. Trading laws, civilizing schemes—these were the tangible evidence of the 
United States’ “benevolent empire,” evidence that the British Empire did not have.  
 According to the London Quarterly, however, there was “‘not to be found, on the 
face of the globe, a race of men, so utterly abandoned to vice and crime—so devoid of all 
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fear of God and regard towards man, as the outsettlers of Kentucky, Ohio, and the other 
back states.’”370 Cass defended the reputation of Ohio Valley settlers, but also raised the 
issue of removal in an effort to confront the issue of vice. “Revolting scenes” of Native 
peoples falling victim to traders’ liquors, Cass argued, were limited to areas where 
Indians and settlers lived in close proximity.371  “In the interior,” on the other hand, he 
insisted that “[w]e have seen many Indians, remote from the white settlements, who had 
never tasted of spirituous liquors, and we can testify, from personal knowledge, that the 
evil itself is almost unknown there.”372 Such an argument suggests that Cass viewed 
removal from the “white settlements” as a potential remedy to Indians’ supposed 
miserable nature.  
 Cass was clear to say, however, that the issue of removal was contested. He 
explained that “[w]e have brought it before our readers merely as an evidence of the 
feelings of the American government, and of their earnest desire to discharge with 
fidelity a great moral debt, which is neither concealed nor denied.”373 By recognizing and 
attacking the republic’s missteps head-on, the United States could remedy past faults. 
Cass pointed out that in British Canada no “plan has been digested or proposed for 
removing the Indians from any part of the lands they now occupy, where they are 
peculiarly exposed to temptations and danger.”374 By framing the “Indian problem” as an 
ethical quandary with which the United States actively grappled, Cass offered evidence 
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of American moral superiority, and he framed removal as evidence of Americans’ 
enlightened approach to empire.375  
 The civilization plan and missionaries’ labor also figured prominently in Cass’s 
evaluations of U.S. morality. Once again invoking an imperial comparison and quoting a 
British publication, he informed his readers that “we are told, that ‘in Canada, there is but 
one regular protestant Indian mission!’”376 As a result of Britain’s failure to engage in 
mission work Canada suffered “no want of physical wretchedness, or of moral 
depravity.”377 That “moral depravity” was the result of British indifference and vice. 
Ultimately, Cass was able to detect only minimal “interference of the British government 
in any plan to improve the moral condition of the Indians.”378 American missionaries, 
however, actively sought to spread knowledge of agriculture and the mechanic arts, and 
they did so at the behest of the U.S. government. Their work became an important 
element of American imperial rhetoric. Missionary societies’ work as non-governmental 
organizations was thus crucial to U.S. claims to benevolence in the early republic. 
 Cass’s article ultimately sought to restore and bolster the humanitarian reputation 
of the United States abroad, but it was also an attempt to rally his fellow citizens to his 
side. He insisted that Americans could not “sit still, with folded arms, while the civilized 
world are believing, and judging, and condemning, deceived, as they well may be, by 
such bold assumptions” of the United States’ Indian policies.379 He contended that 
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“[v]ainly shall we look back with pride, or forward with hope, or around us with 
congratulation, if we do not cherish a sacred regard for national character.”380 Connecting 
Indian policy to the nation’s character raised the stakes at home, even as it established 
indigenous affairs as a pivotal battlefield upon which U.S. officials endeavored to build 
and protect the republic’s global reputation. The American Empire, Cass suggested, was 
an enlightened one; Indian policies were a means by which Americans’ could claim 
moral and political authority. 
Cass’s frequent allusions to the virtuous nature of American intentions in Indian 
Country reveals the extent to which considerations of morality factored into claims to 
global authority. If domestic politics and divisions ensured that the United States could 
not compete in the race toward abolition, then a “merciful” Indian policy could, perhaps, 
offer a means to claim enlightened standing in the world and political durability. Indeed, 
in a last biting remark, Cass wrote that “[s]incerely do we hope that [Britain’s] day of 
glory will not be shrouded in a night of gloom,” and that “what has happened to other 
nations may happen to her; and the traveler may yet inquire for the site of London, as we 
now inquire for those of Nineveh and Babylon.”381 Failed Indian policies in North 
America and Australia, then, showcased Britain’s backwardness and proximity to demise. 
The United States’ own policies offered proof of American exceptionalism: the young 
republic was unique for its humanitarian treatment of indigenous peoples, and it would 
thus endure. 
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* * * 
 U.S. claims to humanitarian Indian policies rested, however, on contradictions 
and widely-believed fictions. The civilization plan, for example, was a supposed effort to 
offer Native peoples an education fit for potential “good citizens,” but it ultimately served 
to categorize Indians as non-citizens while also limiting their access to the educational 
opportunities afforded “middling” and “elite” Euroamericans. The mission complex, 
meanwhile, ultimately linked indigenous peoples closer to the U.S. market economy at 
the expense of their formerly more global connections, again in the name of “civilization” 
and “progression.” As earlier chapters demonstrate, Quaker missionaries carried with 
them ideas regarding poverty in the early republic, and Native peoples, in turn, 
appropriated those ideas in order to secure wares, infrastructure, and labor. Indians’ 
demands for material goods or labor, however, ultimately bolstered Americans’ 
assumptions regarding Indians’ dependence upon the U.S. federal government. Indians’ 
demands also facilitated Americans’ claims to offering assistance. Ideas of poverty, 
dependence, and charity, then, became foundations for yet another fiction embraced by 
many regardless of politics: by assisting “deserving” “poor Indians,” the U.S. government 
could cancel the “moral debt” to which Cass and McKenney referred while 
simultaneously revealing itself as a philanthropic empire on the world stage. Native 
peoples’ sovereign authority, power that forced the United States to welcome Quakers as 
diplomats during the 1790s, now was subsumed beneath a fiction of impoverished 
dependence—“domestic dependent nations” by 1831—cultivated by a growing state. 
As ideas of humanitarianism and human rights gained purchase in the early 
United States, Americans endeavored to frame, and perhaps to understand, Indian 
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policies such as removal as benevolent and as a means by which the republic could 
defend its character.382 The idea of a moral debt that the United States could somehow 
repay to the continent’s indigenous peoples by working to alleviate their want became a 
centerpiece of the young republic’s claims to benevolent power by the 1820s and 1830s. 
In the 1820s Ohio Country, government assistance in the form of clothing or funds for 
removal became commonplace, and just as Friends’ diplomacy during the 1790s rendered 
missionaries partners in foreign affairs, so too did missionaries’ civilizing efforts 
continued to offer a crucial and, importantly, visible foundation for U.S. philanthropy 
both in North America and the world. Again, the Society of Friends and the ABCFM, by 
performing as non-governmental organizations that nonetheless possessed close ties with 
the American government, played central roles in the creation of the United States’ 
humanitarian reputation. In the 1820s, Superintendent of Indian Affairs Thomas L. 
McKenney encouraged the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions to 
continue their work. 
The Indians hold us in great arrears, and the Missionaries go to aid in 
cancelling them—not by a re-investment of their titles to land—nor by a 
counting down the cost of this vast territory, which once was theirs—no; 
but they go to spread a moral beauty over the face of the desart; they go to 
'reclaim another, and another portion from the wastes of dark and fallen 
humanity;—to invite the wanderers into the fold of civilization—to teach 
them the arts and the comforts of domestick life; and to point them to the 
vast concerns of a future state.383 
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McKenney’s hope was that missionaries would follow Native peoples as they traversed 
the heart of the continent from the Ohio Country to Missouri and Kansas, and in doing so, 
they would aid Native peoples as well as pave the way for virtuous settlement—safe from 
the vices of “white savages” or corrupt traders—across the continent. Removal, then, 
would be a good. It would “improve” both lands and peoples, and it would offer evidence 
of the United States’ inherent virtue. 
With McKenney at the helm of Indian affairs in the 1820s, ideas of removal thus 
became concerned with not only the emptying of lands that, supposedly, could be better 
employed by Euroamerican agrarians but with the expansion of morality—or, at least, 
American ideas of morality—in North America. According to McKenney, it was not 
merely North America's indigenous peoples who required civilizing. Writing in a vein 
reminiscent of Quaker theology, he explained that in order for Native peoples to become 
"a portion of 'our great American family of freemen,'" Americans needed to view Indians, 
as human beings, having bodies and souls like ours—possessed of 
sensibilities, and capacities, as keen and as large as ours—That their 
misery be inspected and held up to the view of our citizens, that the 
trophies of reform be pointed to—I say, it needs only this to enlist in their 
favour the whole civilized population of our country; for could the extent 
of their wretchedness be comtemplated with indifference by our citizens, 
if it were known? And would not the charities of seven millions of men 
warm into animation their sad and dismal torpor?384 
 
 
Here, discourse of civilization combined with that of poverty in an effort to appeal to 
Americans' own sense of and claims to civilization. Indians' "wretchedness" required 
Americans' charity, and such philanthropy possessed the power, in turn, to translate into 
moral capital that would further elevate the United States to a place of prominence.  
                                                
384 Ibid. 
 
 
233 
Of all Quakers employed in the service of the War Department, McKenney 
attained the most prominent position, and his rhetoric and policies reflect his spiritual 
beliefs. As Superintendent of Indian Trade he institutionalized the paradigm of labor 
established by Quakers in the Ohio Country by aiding in the crafting of the Civilization 
Act of 1819. His belief in the Inner Light, familiarity with Quaker reform efforts, and his 
business savvy gleaned as a result of merchant work in Maryland all shaped his policy-
making and manner of business. He ardently believed that Native peoples were the equals 
of Euroamericans, and he maintained a generous and philanthropic attitude toward Native 
peoples. Such an attitude led him to publish his multivolume History of the Indian Tribes 
of North America (1836-1844), but it also precipitated his removal from office by 
Andrew Jackson in 1830.385 Jackson disagreed with McKenney on the topic of Indians’ 
intellectual potential, and he deemed the superintendent too soft, in general, on Indian 
affairs.  
McKenney’s example, while exceptional in some ways, nonetheless reveals the 
extent to which Friends’ early efforts established a paradigm for a program of benevolent 
policies that was, nonetheless, connected with ideas of market capitalism. Just as Friends’ 
educational reform efforts ensured that “poor Indians” received an education that was 
tailored for their assumed station, ideas of mercy, charity, and poverty further wed Native 
peoples to the republic’s socio-economic hierarchy. What is more, Cass and McKenney’s 
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rhetoric of “arrears” and cancelling a debt illuminates the market context in which early 
U.S. Indian policies were conceived.  
Indeed, ideas of success and virtue, born out of the development of the republic’s 
capitalist economy, ultimately gave U.S. Indian policies the “benevolent” sheen that, in 
turn, invested authority in the American Empire at home and abroad. Native peoples’ 
supposedly sad state offered the United States a chance to offer aid that, in turn, 
demonstrated the republic’s generous character. Central to this intellectual somersault 
was a tendency to frame Native peoples as “poor Indians”—not in the eighteenth-century 
sense of savage or misguided, but as poverty-stricken populations. If ideas regarding 
“civilization” and savagery encouraged Americans to consider Native peoples as “poor 
Indians,” Shawnees and Miamis’ own claims of impoverishment entrenched that status in 
the imaginations of many Americans. Though ideas of poverty and dependence relegated 
Native peoples en masse to the lower ranks of a developing socio-economic hierarchy, 
they also created space for Americans to distinguish between different kinds of 
impoverishment. As Michael Katz’s work shows, ideas of the “deserving” and 
“undeserving” poor abounded during the era of the early republic, precisely when 
Americans worked to define ideas of race and class.386 Such ideas applied to Native 
peoples as well. For some Americans and U.S. officials, those Miamis or Shawnees who 
attempted to become civilized—but who in actuality appropriated some of the ideas of 
the civilization plan in order to mold and combat U.S. imperial policies or to maintain 
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their own lands—earned a place among the republic’s “deserving poor.” Ideas of class, 
then, played a large role in how Americans perceived their Native neighbors. 
 Katz’s work on the “undeserving poor” demonstrates that the “redefinition of 
poverty as a moral condition accompanied the transition to capitalism and democracy in 
early-nineteenth-century America.”387 Ascribing morality to wealth and immorality to 
poverty was a means by which Americans endeavored to make sense both of growing 
inequality and others’ sometimes dire situations. Other scholars suggest that linking 
poverty with laziness or vice was also a way to “discipline” laboring populations.388 
Ultimately, it was a way of rationalizing the apparent inadequacies of the republican 
ideal.389 Katz notes that a distinction arose between impoverishment and pauperism in the 
early republic, with the latter term reserved for those able-bodied individuals who 
nonetheless failed to succeed in the U.S. economy. Those individuals whom Americans 
deemed the “impotent poor”—those who suffered from some condition that hindered 
their ability to succeed—were vilified less, though this changed as the nineteenth century 
wore on. Eventually, Americans subsumed “the poor,” as a more or less homogenous 
group, within a broad discourse of immorality and failure.  
Euroamericans’ rhetoric regarding Native peoples’ impoverishment and supposed 
savagery or immorality similarly demonstrates the extent to which the emergence of a 
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capitalist political economy influenced the development of U.S. Indian policy. As chapter 
three makes clear, Quakers and U.S. officials alike employed a discourse of poverty when 
considering reform among Indians and urban laborers. Those notions of poverty, 
however, emerged out of developing ideas regarding race and class to render those 
Indians who attempted to “civilize” initially among the ranks of the deserving poor, or in 
Katz’s terms, the “impotent poor,” in the minds of many early Americans. Those Native 
peoples who refused to become civilized, who failed to employ the lessons offered by 
missionaries, were akin to able-bodied “paupers” who inexplicably failed to try to better 
their station. Such categories offered Americans a means by which they could ascribe 
logic to the harsh consequences of American empire on the continent.390  
Native peoples were akin to those “impotent poor” who were hindered by some 
factor, either physical or mental: they were, in the minds of American reformers, 
handicapped by their race and their supposed savagery—as well as, sometimes, by age or 
some infirmity—and they were deserving of the U.S. government’s “liberality.” At times, 
U.S. government officials were happy to be generous, both in the Ohio Country and 
elsewhere. In 1820 Missouri, for example, Delawares and Shawnees, former Ohio 
Country inhabitants, appealed to the U.S. federal government for redress and "pity." 
"Two White Men," Shawnees and Delawares claimed, "have Stolen Two Hundred 
Dollars in Species, One Rifle estimated at thirty Doll.s and one Bridle at Two Dollars." 
The owner of the stolen $200 was an elderly man, and the petitioners explained that the 
money took "many years to collect." They explained that the owner "is now too old to 
work" and that the United States should subsequently "have pity on him, and have that 
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Sum returned to him."  This appeal was followed by a proclamation of Shawnees and 
Delawares’ civilized state. They argued that "we have made use of the plough since 
several years. Father! We wish to hear from you as Soon as possible so that we may 
know what to do."391 The plough "improved" lands, but it also bolstered indigenous 
peoples’ claims to economic assistance and prompted U.S. officials to label them as 
“deserving.”392  
Indeed, after receiving Shawnees' and Delawares' requests, Indian agent Pierre 
Menard informed Calhoun that they "deserve the indulgence and encouragement of 
Government—They have acquired habits of industry and learned to value the soil—They 
farm quite handsomely, and raise every kind of Stock common in the Country, and are in 
general orderly and well disposed." These Shawnees and Delawares were not alone 
among those deemed “deserving” Indians. In 1821, Indian agent John Shaw wrote to 
Lewis Cass that Wyandots near Upper Sandusky were "intirely destitute of many usefull 
Tools, and their dispositions to use them are equal at least to any other Indians that I am 
acquainted with, they in my opinion deserve as much of the bounty of Government as any 
other Tribe."393 Here, Shaw claimed that the Wyandots in question deserved “the bounty 
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of Government” because they showcased a particular disposition to make use of “usefull 
Tools.” Shaw continued to assure Cass that the Wyandots, who "may be considered 
poor," demonstrated appropriate "signs of thankfulness when they receive favours."394 
Wyandots’ manners—no doubt evidence of their propensity for civilization—too 
convinced Shaw that those near Upper Sandusky were worthy of government aid.  
Shaw also offered evidence of Wyandots’ destitution. He noted that "as a proof of 
the poverty, as also of the Acconomy of these Wyandots they dress very much in leather, 
and very seldom see them wear any costly clothing or ornaments of Silver as is 
customary with some other Tribes."395 Shaw’s argument makes clear that Americans’ 
ideas regarding poor Indians were, by the early republic, grounded in observable notions 
of destitution. For many Euroamericans and indigenous peoples alike, the materials and 
adornments that one wore offered information regarding economic and political status.396 
Still Shaw’s observation is particularly interesting given his Quaker background. For 
Shaw, Wyandots’ leather clothing and lack of silver ornamentation connoted poverty, 
rather than proof of their humility or simplicity. The Wyandots’ dress also, however, 
demonstrated their “Acconomy” and, in turn, virtue: they refrained from wearing items 
that they could not afford. Federal officials' perceptions of Natives' civilization offered 
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opportunities for Native peoples to receive material aid, even as it further linked Native 
peoples with evolving ideas of morality, poverty, and pauperism in the early republic.397   
Shaw’s assurances of Wyandots’ worthiness contrasted their supposed poverty 
with government abundance and generosity. It was a discourse that positioned the United 
States as Indians’ merciful benefactor. In urban spaces, Americans were more 
sympathetic to those—widows, children, and the “impotent poor”—who were 
“deserving” of public assistance, and offering charity to those in need was, like 
reformers’ educational efforts, a means to garner “moral capital.”398 A similar 
phenomenon applied to the United States’ treatment of Native peoples deemed to be 
among the “deserving poor.” Missionaries’ civilizing work, as Cass made clear, offered 
the United States rhetorical tools for displaying its humanitarian character. It also, 
however, offered means by which Indians could become “deserving” “dependents” even 
though rhetoric suggested “civilization” was intended to render Native men independent 
providers for their families. With Native Americans categorized as impoverished, U.S. 
officials increasingly offered assistance and “merciful” aid to those deserving individuals. 
In the imaginations of many U.S. officials and reformers, Indians’ vices were the result of 
contact with unruly Euroamericans, and as a consequence, many—like Cass—in turn 
                                                
397 Indeed, as with American veterans, U.S. officials judged service during wartime as 
contributable to Native Americans’ qualifications for assistance. In 1821, the then governor of 
Michigan Territory Lewis Cass wrote to Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in order to inform 
him of Delawares’ readiness for removal westward. Cass explained that Delawares "are too poor 
& wretched to provide the means for their own transportation. They were faithful, zealous & 
useful during the late war & I am anxious they should, in abandoning their Country at your 
request, be satisfied, that we have not only justly, but liberally towards them." See Lewis Cass to 
John C Calhoun Detroit, March 2 1821, National Archives, RG 75, Michigan Superintendency 
Letters Sent, in box 1524, Delaware, 1820-1827, July 1820-1821, folder 1 of 2, Ethnohistory 
Collection. 
398 See McCarthy, American Creed; Brown, Moral Capital. 
 
 
240 
framed Indian removal in terms of—and sometimes as a form of—morality-based public 
assistance. 
 
* * * 
In 1825, President James Monroe offered a message to Congress on the topic of 
Indian removal. He ultimately suggested that, through removal, the United States could 
secure peace with Native Americans and that also “our commerce [would] be much 
extended.”399 He advocated establishing a government that would “protect their property 
from invasion, and, by the regular progress of improvement and civilization, prevent that 
degeneracy which has generally marked the transition from the one to the other state.”400 
Through such a scheme, Monroe argued, the United States would “become in reality their 
benefactors.”401 Here it was clear that Monroe, like other U.S. officials endeavored to 
frame removal policies as philanthropic endeavors for reasons both foreign, as made clear 
in Cass’s article, and domestic. As a result, ideas of philanthropy, mercy, and charity 
infiltrated officials’ and reformers’ correspondences on the topic of removal. 
As time wore on, U.S. officials’ rhetoric lost some—but certainly not all—of its 
generosity. In 1829, Secretary of War John Eaton informed Cherokees residing in 
Georgia that “[i]t must be obvious to you, and the President has instructed me again to 
bring it to your candid and serious consideration, that to continue where you are, within 
the territorial limits of an independent state, can promise you nothing but interruption and 
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disquietude.”402 Eaton nonetheless softened by the end of his message to write that 
removal would ensure that  
Indians being thus brought together at a distance from their brothers, will 
be relieved from very many of those interruptions which, situated as they 
are at present, are without a remedy. The Government of the United States 
will then be able to exercise over them a paternal, and superintending care 
to happier advantage, to stay encroachments, and preserve them in peace 
and amity with each other; while with the aid of schools a hope may be 
indulged, that ere long industry and refinement, will take the place of 
those wandering habits now so peculiar to the Indian character, the 
tendency of which is to impede them in their march to civilization.403   
 
Eaton’s statement that the afflictions facing Native peoples were “without a remedy” 
obscured the fact that Americans were the root of the problem. Indeed, such ideas reveal 
one of Indian policy’s fundamental contradictions. Namely, that the United States was a 
supposedly “benevolent” and virtuous power because it endeavored to tackle the 
problems posed by its vicious citizenry.  
The contradictions inherent in Americans’ brand of humanitarianism, nonetheless, 
offered the foundations for removal. Indeed, such ideas prompted Alexis de Tocqueville 
to comment that it was “impossible to destroy men with more respect to the laws of 
humanity.”404 Removal in southeastern North America was, on the surface of things, 
more blatantly contentious and violent than in the Ohio Country. As such, most historians 
focus their studies on removal schemes in that region, and in particular, on the 
experiences of the Cherokees and the “Five Civilized Tribes.” Contemporary Americans 
likewise focused their attentions on the plight of southeastern Indians. Georgia’s relations 
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with the Cherokees, in particular, galvanized citizens’ attention. In 1827, the state of 
Georgia declared that it possessed jurisdiction over Cherokee lands, and that Cherokees 
were subject to Georgia law. The state pressured the federal government to remove 
Cherokees from Georgia lands, and soon, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act in 
1830 that authorized the president to negotiate treaties that would remove Native peoples 
east of the Mississippi. Soon thereafter, Georgia squatters and speculators intensified 
their campaign to push Cherokees out.405 
The Cherokee Nation, however, fought back. When one Cherokee killed another 
on Cherokee lands, Georgia hanged the accused offender, Corn Tassel, denying the 
Cherokee Nation the right to prosecute its own people and attempting to signify the end 
of Cherokee sovereignty. The Cherokees brought the case before the Supreme Court in 
1831, and, in one of the most infamous cases in the history of U.S.-Indian law, Chief 
Justice John Marshall ruled that the Supreme Court possessed no jurisdiction because the 
Cherokee Nation was a “domestic dependent nation.” The remainder of the 1830s were 
marked by ongoing pressure to remove and, ultimately, the forced removal of thousands 
during the “Trail of Tears” in 1838.406  
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Even in the 1830s and 1840s, Ohio Country removals were, in some ways, quieter 
affairs.407 As in the southeast, it was a negotiated phenomenon, with Native peoples 
doing their best to secure advantage as well as they could, and in the Illinois Country, it 
provoked violent episodes such as the 1832 Black Hawk War.408 Corrupt treaties and 
bargains characterized the treaty-making process that ultimately rendered Ohio Indians 
migrants, but even there individuals such as the Miami Jean Baptiste Richardville secured 
some of his countrymen lands in Indiana. Nonetheless, Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, 
Wyandots, and their neighbors repeatedly lost more land as the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s 
wore on. Treaties with the Potawatomi and Miamis in 1826, for example, granted the 
United States valuable lands near the mouth of the Mississinewa on the Wabash River in 
Indiana. An 1828 treaty with Miamis, meanwhile, ensured that the republic gained lands 
near Sugartree Creek in Indiana from the Thorntown band of Miamis. The republic 
bought Delaware lands that lay adjacent to the Wyandot reservation on the Sandusky 
River in northern Ohio in 1829, while other treaties gradually ate away at Ohio Indians’ 
territory in the 1830s and 1840s. Finally in 1846, the United States forced remaining 
Miamis to leave Indiana for Kansas, though some Miamis nonetheless thwarted the 
United States and remained along the Wabash.409 Baltimore Quakers lamented the 
removals, but nonetheless hoped that their work would not be for naught. In 1825, when a 
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portion of the Shawnees endeavored to leave Wapakoneta and travel westward, Baltimore 
Friends lamented that "We...hope that our labours have not been unavailing, and that 
even should [the Shawnees] finally be removed, they will carry with them the knowledge 
they have acquired, and as this becomes diffused amongst their people, they may long 
continue to reap advantage from the efforts that have been made for their benefit."410 
Removal in the north, including the infamous Buffalo Creek treaty of 1838 as 
well the various treaties pertaining to Ohio and Indiana lands, was embedded in 
developing American market culture: Native peoples and Americans took into account 
any “improvements” made on the lands, haggled for the best deal, and ultimately framed 
the removals as economic transactions. Ohio Country removal was also, like all 
American-sponsored removals in nineteenth-century North America, part of a national 
effort to exclude. The Mississippi still presented a formidable boundary in the 
imaginations of many early Americans, and pushing Indians west of that boundary was 
akin to other efforts to eliminate “undesirable” peoples—the urban poor, free African 
Americans, and Native Americans alike—from the new nation-state.  
During the 1820s, many reform-minded Americans moved to institutionalize the 
poor by placing them in public almshouses, and Indian removal operated similarly: both 
offered a means to eliminate from the United States the specter of difference as well as 
those whom many Americans deemed undesirable. In both cases, rather than 
acknowledge the inadequacies of the republic’s political economy that was grounded in 
ideas of difference and inequality, some Americans employed physical space in order to 
exclude individuals from their view. Removing impoverished laborers by placing them in 
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almshouses or shuffling poor Indians onto lands beyond the Mississippi meant that 
poverty, difference, and supposed failure disappeared behind walls and rivers in the early 
republic. Such removals left only a cultivated and successful—and thus virtuous—
citizenry in plain sight.  
In an era when Americans increasingly saw their claims to North American 
territories as boundless, geographic space was an obvious way to consolidate a nation 
both by claiming the right to an entire continent—and the right to carve up that territory 
as the republic saw fit—as well as by excluding certain people from the nation-state 
geographically. The case of free African Americans in the early republic elucidates this 
point. In 1806, Quaker John Parrish, the diplomat who factored so heavily into the United 
States’ efforts in the 1790s, argued that the United States should establish a territory 
beyond the Mississippi where free African Americans might settle. He wrote, “[h]ave not 
the General Legislature a right to instruct a committee to assign a tract within some part 
of the western wilderness (where there are millions of acres likely to continue many ages 
unoccupied) for colonization of those already free and disposed to remove thither?”411 As 
early as 1806, then, removal offered a possible solution for confronting the problem of 
African American freedom. Parrish envisioned the “west” as a land unoccupied—a 
surprising observation for a Quaker so involved in Indian affairs—that would offer 
African Americans refuge from the scourge of racism and the specter of re-enslavement. 
Efforts to remove free blacks gained popularity—among reformers but also 
among slaveholders—after Gabriel’s Rebellion in 1800 and 1802, and as the numbers of 
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freed people grew after the American Revolution.412 Gradual emancipation and wartime 
service meant that more and more African Americans gained freedom to the 
consternation, and sometimes fear, of white Americans. In 1816, Presbyterian minister 
Robert Finley established the American Colonization Society (ACS) for the purpose of 
removing free African Americans to Africa. Great Britain, with the aid of the Committee 
for the Relief of the Black Poor, had already begun to send free Africans to Sierra Leone. 
Christopher Brown indicates that the committee’s work was partially the consequence of 
the British government’s increasing tendency “to think of black loyalists as wards of the 
state,” and the removal of black loyalists to Sierra Leone was similarly couched in terms 
of charitable aid.413 After an exploratory mission to the continent, the ACS, similarly 
decided that Liberia, just north of Sierra Leone, presented an ideal location for emigrating 
Africans. It supposedly offered a haven away from the poverty of the republic’s urban 
spaces, it offered a means by which slaveholders could hide the example of free blacks 
from the enslaved, it offered free blacks an opportunity to gain the kinds of political 
freedoms longed for after the American Revolution, and it offered reformers a chance to 
further claim benevolence.414 
Some missionaries explicitly considered the problems presented by both Native 
American and free African Americans populations to be similar. Both posed challenges 
to ideas of citizenship. Both were free, but they were non-citizens. Both were not quite 
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“American,” but they were not wholly “other” either. One missionary wrote to 
Superintendent of Indian Trade Thomas L. McKenney in 1818 in the hopes of convincing 
him to consider forming an American Civilization Society. This society, the missionary 
contended, would act "as a sister establishment to the Colonisation Society. The object of 
which should be to patronise the exertions of such Societies of different denominations as 
are actually engaged in civilising and educating the American Indians & otherwise to 
promote this verry important work." Such a society would "form a connecting chain to 
them, & harmonise their operations, & more effectually prevent any clashing between 
them than perhaps any other method."415 It was a proposal that revealed that some 
Americans considered the "Indian problem" to be akin to that posed by African 
Americans, slavery, and the problem of freedom.  
 Indeed, historian Linda Kerber demonstrates that reformers such as Lydia Maria 
Child, John Greenleaf Whittier, David Lee Child, and Nathaniel P. Rogers all denounced 
the U.S. government’s Indian policies while juxtaposing the Indian problem and 
slavery.416 These individuals, in newspapers and in novels, exposed the fictions of 
American benevolence in Indian Country and, as they did with the problem of slavery, 
denounced the United States for claiming to be a liberty-loving nation when, in fact, it 
was one that consistently failed African Americans and American Indians by qualifying 
or rejecting non-white peoples’ freedom or humanity.417 Most Quakers too, lamented the 
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U.S. government’s plans for removing Cherokees, Choctaws, and Seminoles, and others 
in southeastern North America. By the 1830s and 1840s, the Whigs, the party of choice 
for many abolitionists, staunchly opposed Cass’s and Jackson’s removal plans as did 
many members of the Society of Friends. Ohio Friend Elisha Bates, for example, 
lamented in 1836 that he had “thought it possible that some plan might be adopted by 
which sections of territory (intermixed) might be obtained by Europeans, without at all 
unsettling the natives from those spots on which they might be disposed to locate 
themselves.”418  
Whether or not they shared Bates’s disappointment and disillusionment, some 
Whigs, as well as others who professed a sense of concern for the well-being of Native 
peoples, supported removal and participated in American settler colonialism. As Bethel 
Saler demonstrates, the term “settler” is flexible, and in the early republic, state agents—
even those who sought to extend “mercy” to Native peoples—were settler colonists as 
much as Euroamerican immigrant families.419 In the Ohio Country, Indian agent John 
Johnston, for example, an eventual Whig who was removed from his post by Jackson in 
1829, admitted that removal was, perhaps, Indians’ best hope for endurance. When 
organizing some Ohio Indians’ departures, however, he endeavored to ensure that they 
were provided for as well as possible, and he invoked ideas of mercy and charity, a 
narrative that obscured the violence of removal, when discussing plans for Native 
peoples’ removal from Ohio with his superiors.420 Various “depredations committed on 
[Natives’] property by our Citizens,” he contended in 1827, “are rapidly increasing…and 
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after a considerable part of my life spent in managing this description of persons I am 
free to declare, that in my judgment there is no adequate remedy but removal to a 
Country of their own, where a suitable Government could be established over them. 
Whatever speculative benevolence may urge to the contrary, their race must perish under 
the present management.”421 Johnston’s argument was, like Cass’s, based upon the 
assumption that Americans could not—and should not—engage in “self denial.” For 
Johnston, federal regulation offered the moral option. Here, then, Johnston contrasted 
“speculative benevolence” with that of removal, a policy that, to his mind, offered the 
truest form of aid to Native peoples, that of survival. As with Cass’s 1827 article, federal 
power offered the most philanthropic course of action. 
Johnston’s plan for removal was not that of Cass or Jackson, but his language 
reveals in stark terms his participation in American settler colonialism. In 1828 he wrote 
to McKenney to describe a piecemeal process by which, eventually, Native peoples 
would remove to the west. He argued that “the best and cheapest way to get rid of them 
would be to afford aid to individuals families and small parties. in this way a few years 
would relieve us from all within my agency, it would be much the cheapest plan by far 
the most agreeable to the Indians. the Agent might be authorised to purchase of each 
family when ready to go their right to the soil and compensate them for their 
improvements, and this would nearly cover all expence of emigration.”422 Johnston still 
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advocated for removal—he wanted to “get rid of” the Indians—but insisted that both his 
(relative) good intentions and the economy mattered. 
Though land sales and migration had long been part of U.S. government policy in 
the region, the push for removal in the Ohio Country began in earnest in the 1820s. Still, 
removal was colored by ideas of both U.S. political economy and settler colonialism: 
notions of poverty, charity, investment, territorial acquisition, and bargaining were at the 
heart of removal schemes. In 1820, Johnston remarked that Delawares near Piqua 
requested half of their annuity, $2,750, before attempting to remove. Johnston 
encouraged Cass to agree to the deal since "otherwise it will be impossible to get them 
off on account of their poverty." He continued to state that "some provision should be 
made for furnishing them with subsistence and amunition [sic] to prosecute their 
journey." Ultimately, he lamented that "it is a troublesome and expensive affair to get rid 
of about 1800 sou[ls] many of them the most miserable and wretched o[f] their race. The 
Government as an act of Mer[cy] and justice too should present them with $3000 worth 
of goods, to clothe and send them awa[y] confortable [sic]...their claims for 
depred[a]tions could be commuted in this way."423 Johnston combined both harsh 
language—“get them off” and “get rid of”—with ideas of paternalistic benevolence in a 
way that he believed would appeal to federal officials and in a manner reflective of the 
growing tendency to couple poverty with assistance.  
Johnston made a similar appeal in that same year that again wove rhetoric of 
poverty, mercy, and removal together, but that also reveals the extent to which British 
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agents in the region continued to offer Native peoples a means by which to counter the 
political authority of the United States after the War of 1812. Johnston noted that 
"[a]lmost all the Indians of this [Piqua] Agency has been at Malden the present seaso[n] 
to receive goods from the English, Necessity has been the chief motive, as it is found 
their annuities is totally inadequate to cloth their population." Here it is apparent that the 
British too—though, of course, Cass could never admit it—were willing to offer the 
region's indigenous inhabitants material goods to ameliorate their condition. Again, it 
appears that Native peoples’ ability to play one imperial power off of another did not 
vanish with the conclusion of the War of 1812. Indeed, Johnston sensed the political 
threat that British assistance posed his federal government, and he explained to the War 
Department that, "the character and dignity of this Government will be somewhat 
affected by these visits these Indians have parted with their Coun[try] and are now 
oblidged to solicit charity from a foreign nation, whose Agents will not fail to improve 
the occurrence in a way the most disadvantageous to us." Foreign policy thus intersected 
with ideas of benevolence, charity, and Indian removal in the Ohio Country, and 
Johnston, savvy politician and practical Indian agent that he was, knew it. Earlier in the 
nineteenth century, Britain posed a military and diplomatic threat to the United States’ 
claim to the Ohio Country. By the 1820s and 1830s, the British state continued to act as 
both a diplomatic rival and as a sparring partner in a contest over moral authority on the 
continent and in the world. Johnston ultimately asked Cass, "[a]s the residence of the 
Tribes here cannot continue over a few years, would it not be an act of Mercy and of 
sound policy too, for the Government to send on Annually Three thousand Dollars worth 
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of cloathing for them?"424 Johnston, though he was a Whig by the 1830s, did not openly 
combat removal—indeed, he saw benefits to Ohio Indians’ departures. Nonetheless, the 
discourse of mercy and morality proved useful to him when making his appeal to Cass.  
Though Johnston offered his pleas for government mercy in 1820, other middling 
officials continued to appeal to humanity in order to secure federal assistance in removal. 
In 1828, for example, William Clark lamented that “[a]s the wild game deminishes, the 
pressing calls of those unfortunate people upon the humanity of the Government for 
assistance increases.”425 Here, however, Clark exposed the continuing disconnect 
between ideas and reality from which so many Euroamericans suffered. The “unfortunate 
people” to which Clark referred in this case were Delawares migrating from Ohio, 
Delawares who had undoubtedly sufficient knowledge of agriculture and who were by no 
means completely dependent on “the wild game.” Nonetheless, even this intellectual 
blindness offered a means to construe the U.S. government as humane. 
Indiana memorialists felt similarly in 1830. A group of citizens who were 
primarily concerned with the ongoing construction of the Wabash and Erie Canal—a 
project that ran through Miami Country near the old site of Dennis’s Station—petitioned 
the federal government that year in an effort to eliminate Miami Indians. They framed 
their call for Miami removal, however, in philanthropic terms. The memorialists opened 
their letter stating that “the interest of the United States and of the State of Indiana, 
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require, at this time, a course of appropriate measures to be pursued, calculated to 
extinguish the claim of the Indians, (more particularly the Miamies) to their reserved 
territory, lying upon the borders of the contemplated Wabash Canal, and within the 
boundaries of this State.” The writers were careful to say that they would “not fatigue 
your honorable body with detailing the evils which will necessarily follow the longer 
continuance of the Indians in the possession of their reserved territory.” Instead they 
simply explained that “humanity dictates their immediate removal from a place where 
they are exposed to many evils.”426 Though these memorialists were some of the very 
people who possessed the power to ensure Miamis’ protection from “evils,” they 
nonetheless chose to ignore that point by obscuring it with language of philanthropy in an 
effort to conceal—from others but also likely from themselves—less-than-humanitarian 
motives. Here it is clear that settler colonialism was a powerful force that was, 
nonetheless, made stronger with government assistance. 
Indeed, rhetoric of philanthropy bolstered Americans’ various political claims, 
and it also, as with the mission complex, endeavored to conceal the violence of American 
imperialism. Rhetoric of mercy and charity obscured the fact that Native peoples’ 
territorial exclusion had political as well as economic benefits for the republic. Early 
Americans framed removal, in part, as an economic transaction—and it was. The mission 
complex was an investment in the United States’ future in a myriad of ways, and it 
presented easily-observable rewards when policies increasingly turned toward removal in 
the Ohio Country. In performing an analysis of Indian removal, federal officials and their 
correspondents made it clear that improved land was more valuable. In 1820, John Scott 
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wrote to Calhoun regarding the sale of the Shawnees and Delawares' lands. "[T]he 
Bargain to the U States," he determined, was "a good one." The Indians' land had 
"Houses, Towns, and farms thereon," "Their Animals are domesticated to the place," and 
they had "all their property there." The proposed land west of the Mississippi, on the 
other hand, was "not of equal quality by a great difference" and would not be as valuable 
as the lands they were leaving for a long time, though Scott made no mention of how 
unfair such a transaction was for the Shawnees and Delawares or that such a move would 
erase all of the “gains” made by the civilization plan. Indeed, regarding the U.S. 
government's initial investment of $20,000 for the removal scheme Scott speculated that 
"[t]he Very first sales will more than remunerate this disbursement—and the Land [the 
Indians] will receive would not do it in many years." Improved land translated into 
profits. Missionaries' civilization efforts, the mission complex, and Native peoples' 
participation in the U.S. imperial market economy, ultimately incentivized, from the 
perspective of the United States, Indian removal.427 
Even when confronting the possibility of relocation, however, Native peoples held 
negotiating power. When Benjamin Parke wrote to John C. Calhoun in 1820 regarding 
Weas' civilization and imminent departure from Indiana, he insisted that while the 
"prospect of civilizing the Weas" was "remote," even though their requests make it clear 
that they had learned enough of Euroamericans’ economic trends to negotiate a higher 
price for their lands. They contended that "the land abounded in Salt, Iron, Copper & 
Silver," and they insisted on $15,000 plus $4,000 annually for twelve years for their 
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lands. Parke "reluctantly allowed them five thousand dollars"—a price far below the 
asking price but nonetheless more than the War Department hoped to pay at a time of 
economic depression in the United States.428 
Bargaining similarly took center stage in a talk delivered by Shawnees and 
Delawares that same year. They informed President Monroe that they would "exchange 
our Land which our Spanish father, has given us, for Fifty Square Miles, on the other side 
of White River, and Twenty Thousand Dollars....More than one half of this sum you will 
pay to those we owe, the half of the Balance will help us to improve our New Land, and 
the other half to procure Farming Utensils."429 Here, Shawnees and Delawares did not 
just "accommodate" American land greed but used it, as best they could to their 
advantage: they demanded certain lands for a certain price distributed in a particular way. 
What was more, they demanded that part of the cash balance owed them be issued in 
"Farming Utensils" and that the other half would help them "improve our New Land." 
This was a win-win: the utensils ensured that U.S. manufacturers maintained a consumer 
base by expanding the mission complex further into Missouri, but it also ensured that 
additional lands would become "improved." Improved land was a thing desired by 
Indians and Americans alike. 
Ideas of economy continued to have a prominent place in Americans’ appeals to 
Ohio Indians in 1830s Ohio and Indiana, even after the Indian Removal Act became law 
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in 1830. In 1833, for example, U.S. officials spoke in glowing terms of the financial 
opportunities that awaited Miamis west of the Mississippi should they choose to remove. 
They contended that there Cherokees, Choctaws, and Creeks “have all got comfortable 
cabins to live in, good plantations and fences, cattle and horses, and every every [sic] 
thing comfortable about them, and last year, the Creeks raised forty thousand bushels of 
corn more than they wanted for their own consumption.– Instead of Indians looking to 
white men for bread as they used to do, now, white men look to Indians.”430 Such rhetoric 
no doubt appealed to some extent, but it was also likely looked upon with skepticism by 
Miamis, such as Richardville, who knew that their lands in Indiana were much more 
valuable than lands westward. Nonetheless, it is clear that U.S. officials understood that 
ideas of market, profit, and power held sway among Miamis, and the 1833 appeal reveals 
in stark terms the extent to which ideas of market economy ultimately informed U.S.-
Indian relations. Indeed, officials went on to remark in that same appeal that “[o]ne of the 
chiefs [west of the Mississippi] had a contract to supply Fort Gibson with what corn they 
want.”431  
Ideas of exclusion also ran through the 1833 appeal as officials insisted that 
Miamis would enjoy a section of land to themselves, set off from any “white people.” 
Such a promise would seem to undercut the officials’ insistence that Euroamericans 
depended upon Native peoples for wares and subsistence, but they paid such logical 
inconsistencies no attention. They did offer, however, that “the time may come, when 
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your condition shall be so improved that you may be admitted as a state in the American 
Union.”432 Thus, in the west, Miamis could enjoy economic power and independence, 
and, perhaps, someday citizenship. But those things were in the future, and they were 
contingent upon removal. The 1833 appeal thus offers a glimpse of the ways in which 
Americans employed ideas of independence and market economy in order to cultivate—
by ways of exclusion and territorial acquisition—a homogenized nation grounded in 
ideas of citizens’ equality.433 
 
 
* * * 
After the American Revolution, the new United States struggled to pinpoint in 
precise terms the kind of polity it would be. Rhetoric played a central role in that defining 
process. The discourse of morality offered a means to compare the young republic with 
the empires of old, and it offered a powerful narrative by which early Americans could 
understand their place in the world while simultaneously grapple with their status as a 
postcolonial empire.  
Ideas of race and class combined to create U.S. Indian policy in the nineteenth 
century, and missionaries and indigenous peoples alike played central roles in crafting 
both the character of those policies and the narrative that Americans spun when trying to 
contemplate and reconcile the immense violence that characterized their republican 
experiment. Non-governmental organizations like the Society of Friends offered a means 
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to provide “merciful” American charity for those “deserving” of it, and they ultimately 
enabled U.S. officials to make claims regarding the benevolence of the American empire 
on a global stage. Native peoples, meanwhile, alternatively fought, outwitted, and 
endured—sometimes all three—and they forced the young republic to make sense of an 
inherent contradiction—that of how to be an empire of liberty that denied the liberty, 
rights, and humanity to many of North America’s peoples. 
 Americans ultimately confronted that contradiction with additional contradictions. 
And they were powerful. The idea of a benevolent empire, one that could best Britain on 
the international stage, held purchase in the imaginations of many Americans. Whigs who 
disdained Jacksonian removal along with Democrats who saw in it the future of the 
nation, each saw power in the rhetoric of humanitarianism and philanthropy. As Linda 
Kerber points out, however, both got it wrong. Even those reformers who fought removal 
at the ballot box and in the press found a solution in the maintenance of paternalistic 
“benevolence” into the twentieth century.434 In the formative period of the republic’s 
generation, the rhetoric of civilization, built on the foundations of missionaries’ labors, 
became a tool by which Americans crafted fictions that ultimately became inseparable 
from their national narrative and sense of selves as citizens of the world. Missionaries, 
Native peoples, settlers, and officials together, then, created the American empire, and 
each played a role in defining the story of its birth—and of its supposed nonexistence. 
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Conclusion 
Negotiating American Empire 
 
While missionaries endeavored to teach Native peoples in the way of "civilized" 
agriculture, they ultimately succeeded in teaching them the ways of American empire 
such that they facilitated Indians' adaptation to, appropriation and manipulation of U.S. 
imperial practices. Sometimes, this meant that Shawnee women obtained goods without 
paying off their debts. Other times, it meant that a Mohican could gain employment with 
the War Department in order to make connections with federal officials and Native 
leaders that could secure new lands for his people. Sometimes these strategies worked, 
and other times they did not. Nonetheless, they had consequences.  
Indigenous peoples of eastern North America, as elsewhere, persisted in the face 
of incredible obstacles, and they made their persistence known. Their efforts—what 
Gerald Vizenor terms “survivance”—had ramifications that reverberate across time and 
space, and they point to a pattern of indigenous peoples working within and against 
ideological and political paradigms created as a result of U.S.-Indian negotiation.435 The 
experiences and strategies of one group of Shawnees who voluntarily left their Ohio 
lands behind during the late eighteenth century serves as a case in point. In 1824, these 
Shawnees, then in Missouri, combated the growing American empire with a nation-
building project of their own. They employed the discourse of civilization in a political 
move that reveals not only their knowledge of North American geopolitics but also their 
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willingness to manipulate imperial ideas to their advantage. In 1824, they petitioned the 
Mexican government, in the very year of that republic's birth, in an effort to escape the 
clutches of the United States and join the state of Coahuila and Texas. The Shawnees 
indicated a desire "to place themselves under the protection of the Mexican government" 
and asked for a tract of land "on the west bank of the Colorado River from the Pedernales 
upward on this river with its western branches which go out from it, with the proportion 
of an English square mile for each family."436 They asked for this land not only for 
themselves but also "for all their allies and friends who may follow them, giving them 
one English mile square for each family."437 They ultimately indicated that it was "[o]n 
these conditions they have the hope that many thousands will unite with them in taking 
this asylum under the Mexican Government."438 These Shawnees were willing to adopt 
the ways of U.S. settler colonialism—moving with families to new lands—in order to 
remain together and ensure their future. 
 The Shawnees' petition reveals both that Shawnee leadership kept themselves 
well-informed concerning North American politics, but also that they were keenly aware 
of the needs of the newly republican Mexican government in particular. According to one 
official, the Shawnees in question apparently promised Mexican officials "of being 
industrious, pacific, and in another state of culture than those that have hostilized [sic] 
us."439 Here, then, it is apparent that the Shawnee leaders who made the original petition 
capitalized on the discourse of civilization. These were "industrious" Shawnees who 
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could also protect the Mexican state from the raids that pestered its northern border. 
Indeed, these Shawnees coupled their civilized state with the fact that they could offer 
"270 men capable of bearing arms."440 The discourse of civilization here was thus 
flexible: Shawnees could use it to either make claims upon the U.S. state or to appeal to 
other states; what was more, the Shawnees could claim to be farmers who also knew how 
to wage war. Civilization, these Shawnees found, offered numerous ways to mold 
themselves into what it was that their audience required. Indeed, they were so successful 
at doing just this that the official who forwarded the Shawnees' petition onward to 
Mexican officials wrote that, "[i]n conclusion...this province needs this kind of settlers 
for its advancement."441  
 The Mexican Republic offered Shawnees a means by which to become "settlers" 
themselves. By joining the Republic of Mexico, they hoped to carve an independent life 
for themselves and for their nation or for a pan-Indian confederacy of Indian nations–for 
"all their allies and friends who may follow them." Indeed, it was a political move for 
independence that nearly parallels Texans' movement to be part of Mexico. What is more, 
the attempt to secure "one English mile square for each family" indicates an adoption of 
the ways of U.S. settler colonialism. These Shawnees desired land per family, and the 
household became the unit by which they proposed to move and settle Mexican lands. 
While we should not ignore the trauma of being pushed off of ancestral lands, these 
Shawnees demonstrate that there was ample power at play even in removal.  
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 The Shawnees' petition did not ultimately secure them "one English mile per 
family," but they were nonetheless allowed to remain "on the right bank of the Red River 
of Natchitoches."442 The Mexican government granted "them as well as to their friends, 
those already settled, that they continue there cultivating and working the lands which 
they already have opened, or may have commenced to cultivate, reserving as to their 
estate and permanence whatever it may please the Supreme General Executive Power to 
resolve as a point specially of his knowledge and approbation."443 Thus, these Shawnees 
could remain in the state of Coahuila and Texas and others could join them there even 
though additional lands would not be available. Though this was a mixed result for the 
Shawnees, the petition nonetheless reveals the tenuous nature of North American 
geopolitics even after the War of 1812. The power of the discourse of civilization 
extended far beyond attempted "assimilation" or even Indians' ability to carve out a place 
within the Ohio Country; it offered some emigrants an opportunity to continue to play 
one power off of another even after the War of 1812 decreased their ability to work with 
the British in North America. Shawnees' adoption of ideas of U.S. empire ultimately 
provided opportunities to carve out new lives either in the Ohio Country or as far 
removed as the Mexican Republic, and such episodes illuminate the contingencies of 
North American political and economic development.444 
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 The power of civilization and of missionaries and NGOs’ partnerships with the 
U.S. federal state opened space for Native peoples to develop innovative methods to 
combat the American empire, but it also proved remarkably effective in facilitating the 
growth of that empire. The civilization plan’s many effects—economic development, 
state growth, U.S. claims to humanitarianism—were powerful enough that variations of 
the plan continued to shape U.S. foreign policy into the twentieth and, indeed, twenty-
first century. The mission complex soon included Asia, Africa, and South America. 
Wherever missionaries traveled, they brought with them particular ideas of consumerism, 
labor, and morality that facilitated the spread of American socioeconomic and, often, 
political ideals. In many ways, Indian Country was the formative ground upon which 
those paradigms of American imperialism emerged. As the nineteenth century 
progressed, the world became the United States’ newest “Indian Country.”445 
 The Shawnees’ efforts also, however, point to the holes in Americans’ imperial 
project. Americans continued to adapt their Indian policies to Native peoples’ politics of 
persistence throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Policies shifted between—
and sometimes combined—civilization, removal, allotment, boarding schools, 
termination, and, thanks to indigenous peoples’ work during the height of “Red Power” 
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and the American Indian Movement, a slow recognition of indigenous rights and 
sovereignty by the later twentieth century. The Society of Friends, too, remained central 
to such policies, and they ultimately became pivotal to President Ulysses S. Grant’s 
“peace policy” after the U.S. Civil War, acting as superintendents of Indian affairs during 
that period. Such shifts were due in no small part to indigenous peoples’ refusal to 
disappear.  
That American policy-makers altered their tactics so often suggests their 
frustration in combating the United States’ “Indian problem.” Indeed, the very fact that 
indigenous peoples continue today to live in Indiana and Ohio exposes the chinks in the 
American imperial armor. Yet, to return to Tocqueville, because Americans built their 
empire “quietly, legally, philanthropically, without bloodshed, without violating a single 
one of the great principles of morality in the eyes of the world,” they ensured that Native 
peoples would find ways to maneuver within the legal and philanthropic paradigms of 
that empire and, in turn, to continuously redefine those paradigms.446 Present-day 
struggles in courts and before Congress on the issues of gambling, fishing and water 
rights, and domestic violence on Indian reservations reveal that American imperialism 
did not, in fact, lead to the ends that Tocqueville thought it did. He claimed that 
Americans, “with marvelous ease,” found a way to “exterminate the Indian race” and 
“prevent the Indians from sharing their rights,” but they did not, despite their best efforts, 
do so.447 Rather, Americans’ strategies—including mission work and “philanthropic” 
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violence—left room for American Indians to continue to negotiate the terms of American 
imperialism into the twenty-first century. 
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